Foreign Policy of Pakistan: a Critical Approach by Bastos, M. & Bastos, M.
WestminsterResearch
http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch
Foreign Policy of Pakistan: a Critical Approach
Bastos, M.
This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of Westminster. 
© Ms Maria Bastos, 2021.
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to 
make the research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and 
Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or copyright owners.
 
  












A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements of the University of 

















I hereby declare I declare that all the material  contained in this thesis is my 
own work. This thesis is carried out as per the guidelines and regulations of 
the University of Westminster. I further affirm that that no portion of the work 
referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for 
another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute 
of learning. 
 
        


























This thesis would not have been possible without the support of family, 
friends, and colleagues. I owe my gratitude to my Director of Studies, 
Professor Dibyesh Anand, and to my Second Director of Studies, Dr Frands 
Pederson. Their constant support, constructive criticism, feedback, 
intellectual stimulation, trust, and invaluable supervision have turned this 
project into an extraordinarily rich and stimulating endeavour. Without them 
there would be no thesis. 
 
I owe my gratitude to the Graduate School, and the School of Social Sciences 
(Centre for the Study of Democracy/DPIR), for their support, including 
financially, that allowed to present my work at various international 
conferences during the past three years. The Graduate School at the 
University of Westminster provided a stimulating learning programme, and I 
am  honoured and indebted for having been selected to present my study 
poster at the Graduate School Annual Reception. 
 
In Pakistan I had the opportunity to work with supportive and encouraging 
colleagues at the School of Governance and Society, UMT, Lahore. I’m 
profoundly grateful to Mr Rahat ul Ain, for his wisdom, friendship, and 
support in the past years. Numerous students at UMT were also a source of 
encouragement through their kindness and bright minds. 
 
 iii  
In London several colleagues and friends have contributed to ideas exchange 
and camaraderie. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Anna, Amina, 
Eduarda (Duda), Hans, Pierre, Sabine. Other friends lent a great deal of 
support. I’m indebted to Jolanta and Dev for their hospitality and friendship. 
I am very thankful to Neil for his timely help and patience in reading the 
thesis and helping with useful comments. To Helen I owe my gratitude for 
her support, constant encouragement, and for to be so caring ever since. 
 
I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr Nitasha Kaul for the extremely 
useful comments at the different stages of progress of this thesis. 
 
My family has been the most supportive, a source of fortitude. Time and again 
they had the patience to listen to me, often countering with humorous 
remarks, and joy. I am particularly indebted to Amir for his invaluable 
support and encouragement. I would like to extend my thanks to his mother 
for her constant prayers for my wellbeing and success. 
 
Lastly, there are no words to describe how I am indebted and owe my 
gratitude to my daughter Sumayyah. When I started this journey, she was 
younger. She folded a ten rupees note, put it inside a small red jewellery box, 
and congratulated on my admission. Little she knew how precious her 
constant encouragement would be, and how she would have to deal with her 
mum’s work pressure, endless days of no real fun for a child, and periods of 
absence. Sumayyah is growing into a bright, capable young person, from 
whom I learn and take solace every day. I dedicate this thesis to her. 
 iv  
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the interlinking between identity and security in the 
context of foreign policy in Pakistan. Foreign policy constitutes one of key 
national policies in Pakistan. Since the country’s inception in 1947, foreign 
policy has had an unwavering influence on the construction of the state, and 
of her relations with the international community. The distressed conditions 
the new state of Pakistan faced in the years after her emergence, led the early 
leadership to procure security in relations with other international partners, 
like the US and China. Yet, it was mainly her relations with India that 
motivated this search for security, which was mostly translated into 
assembling a fairly large military force. Unsurprisingly, the armed forces, 
namely the army in association with a militarised intelligence started control 
the country’s foreign policy decisions. The study and analysis of Pakistan’s 
foreign policy has followed a conventional approach to International 
Relations theory. This approach, as the thesis argues, neither permits to 
investigate how foreign policy is shaped by the interlinking between security 
and identity, nor allows to contextualise how militarism as an ideology 
becomes interwoven with security, identity, and masculinity. Thus, this study 
uses feminist and postcolonial approaches to answer these questions. It 
focuses on Pakistan’s relations with China, India, and the United States to 
identify representations of the interlinking between security and identity, as 
well as representations of militarism. The thesis makes an original and 
innovative contribution to knowledge in three ways: it applies a feminist and 
postcolonial  approach to the study of Pakistan’s foreign policy, an area that 
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has hitherto been dominated by mainstream IR realist/neo-realist approaches; 
it puts forward an innovative approach to study the links between state 
identity and foreign policy, and to ascertain how militarism grows out of this 
relationship, and it encourages and contributes to new possibilities for study 
and analysis in the context of South Asian foreign politics and beyond, 
centred around militarism. 
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   Introduction 
 
The creation of Pakistan on 14th August 1947 was one of the most significant 
international political events following the end of World War II. It marked 
the beginning of the collapse of the British Empire, the partition of British 
India, and the birth of a new state inspired by a religion: Islam. In the seven 
decades of her existence, Pakistan’s path has been filled with internal and 
external conflicts, ranging from nationhood, to territorial and natural 
resources disputes, to terrorism and religious sectarianism. Pakistan’s initial 
atypical geography, consisting of two wings separated by Indian territory, 
proved to be a political, social and governmental challenge, while it lasted. In 
1971, after a civil war and an interstate war with India, Pakistan lost her 
Eastern wing, resulting in the liberation of Bangladesh. 
 
In Pakistan, the construction and representation of concepts such as 
sovereignty and national identity were in constant tension. The unclear and 
conflicting views on the role of Islam in the newly formed state helped to 
generate this tension between the two ideas. Main state actors like the 
military-bureaucratic and religious elites maintain this tension. In turn, they 
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consolidate their power around those representations that are best suited to 
maintaining their status in governance. 
 
The demanded creation of Pakistan on the pretext of becoming a homeland 
for the Muslims of India, despite their wide diversity, agglomerated a 
culturally and ethnically diverse population into a “multi-nation” state. 
However, the state of Pakistan continues to validate its existence via her 
othered relation with India. Identity/alterity processes, contested 
cartographies, including the Kashmir question, and war are the most 
conspicuous elements that constitute this relationship. It is essentially 
characterised as an external relation oriented by conflict, whilst both states 
continue to share relevant cultural, religious, and linguistic ties, particularly 
in the northern part of the subcontinent. 
 
The centrality of India to Pakistan’s foreign relations is expressed in various 
ways. The country’s initial leadership developed a sense of threat involving 
Pakistan’s reintegration with India, which would signify a return to a Hindu-
dominated form of government. One of the ways to deal with this was to 
further assert the state’s Islamic identity. Ijaz Khan notes that a “gradual 
growth of religion in governance, and policy making and implementation, 
especially in its relations with India and Afghanistan and dealing with ethno-
national identities, has strengthened the religious content of the Pakistani 
identity question” (2006, p55). Hence, Islam-based discourses were 
constructed to consolidate national identity, and have been simultaneously 
used as a tool for domestic and foreign policies. 
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The association of a Pakistani national identity with Islam draws heavily on 
the controversial concept of the two-nation theory, believed to be “the 
founding premise of Pakistan” (Haqqani, 2013, p55). The two-nation theory, 
drawn along the religious and cultural differences between Muslims and 
Hindus, was used to ensure the impossibility of a common form of 
government for the two major religious communities in an independent India. 
Pakistan’s early leadership rallied behind it, and to this day the theory 
continues to be used as the perceived guarantor of otherness in relation to 
India. 
 
Whilst Pakistan’s relations with India have been of prime importance to her 
foreign relations and policies, relations with the United States and China have 
also been pivotal in how Pakistan’s state elite has constructed the country’s 
representations of a Pakistani identity and nationhood. The political processes 
that constitute these three relations have emerged as a result of a complex 
relation between religion, the security of the state, and identity/alterity issues. 
 
Pakistan’s foreign policy has been predominantly constructed as one that 
privileges state security (Rizvi, 1993; Sattar, 2017; Amin, 2001). However, it 
is also firmly established in identity. As this thesis argues, in Pakistan, 
security and identity discourses are interlinked and are expressed in the way 
that foreign policy discourses are constructed and represented by the main 
state actors, chiefly the military establishment. One of the results of these 
mutually linked discourses is the ascendency of militarism as a political 
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ideology (Eastwood, 2018; Stravrianakis and Selby, 2013). Militarism in 
Pakistan, as this thesis examines, results from the political dynamics 
generated by the interlinking of security and identity. In the construction of 
these dynamics, the centrality of India is overriding, notwithstanding the 
importance of China and the US. 
 
This study evaluates these external relationships to explain how, in Pakistan, 
state security, identity/alterity, and religion are mutually interlinked. Instead 
of adopting a parochial approach to the study of foreign policy and 
international politics, mainly dominated by realist and neo-realist approaches 
to IR, the present study adopts a critical approach, leading to a critical 
engagement with foreign policy analysis of Pakistan’s relations with the 
aforementioned countries. Post-colonial and feminist approaches to IR and 
foreign policy are helpful in explaining the interlinking of security, 
identity/alterity, and religion. Their focus on rethinking and critically 
analysing essentialised concepts and categories – such as the state, 
sovereignty, national and ethnic identities (Seth, 2013) – is helpful to build a 
critical approach to the interconnections between state security, 
identity/alterity, and religion.  
 
Feminist IR and Militarism  
 
Feminist IR has seen an exponential growth in importance in the last three 
decades. Once identified by A. M. Agatangelou and L. M. H. Ling (2004) in 
the “House of IR” as the fallen daughters, in its version of post-modern 
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feminisms and queer theory, or as Caretaking Daughters in the form of 
neoliberalism, liberal feminism, and standpoint feminism, the reality is that 
“Feminist IR has also challenged the epistemological monism of mainstream 
IR, not only by offering post-positivist critiques of IR’s positivist pretensions, 
but in the fact of the overt and often celebrated methodological and 
epistemological plurality of feminisms” (Squires and Weldes, 2007, p193). 
Moreover, feminist IR scholars1 have demonstrated how IR has  
 
traditionally been a male-dominated (and great-power dominated) discipline, [and] 
most of the standard research questions have been those that these scholars have 
found interesting – questions about the foreign policy behavior of powerful states 
and, most importantly, about their attempts to achieve (military) security in what is 
conceptualized as an anarchical world. (Wibben, 2011, p17) 
 
A central theme in this study is the relationship between security and identity 
in the context of Pakistan’s three key foreign relations. A feminist approach 
to security is relevant as “feminists have played an important role in 
proposing alternative conceptions of power and violence that go beyond the 
traditional military configurations of the discipline of IR, including ideas of 
common and cooperative security arrangements, and non-state-centric 
perspectives on security” (ibid, p5).  
 
These approaches offer the possibility to deconstruct and reveal the gaps and 
oversights in analyses of how, in the post-colonial state of Pakistan, a 
                                               
1 The list of feminist IR scholars who have demonstrated how IR, Security Studies, and 
International studies are male-dominated fields of study and enquiry is extensive. See, for 
instance, Tickner (1988, 1992, 2001); Enloe (1990, 2000, 2007); Ackerly, Stern, and True 
(2006); Sjoberg (2010); Wibben (2011). 
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nationalist identity and its interlinking with security is rooted on gendered 
and gendering masculinist narratives. For instance, foreign relations 
narratives of Pakistan, either produced by Pakistani or international scholars, 
have followed a traditionalist, non-critical IR/foreign policy analysis, which 
is mostly focused on strategic balances of power, anarchy, war, and conflict. 
These narratives describe the state of Pakistan as being in a permanent state 
of war-preparedness, without acknowledging the importance of militarism or 
how foreign policy has been militarised. Moreover, those narratives do not 
demonstrate how security and its representations, particularly the ones linked 
to militarism, are gendered and gendering. They also do not contemplate how 
this is reflected in foreign and security policies, and in the national identity of 
the state. Furthermore, these narratives have remained silent about the 
relation between identity and security.  
 
Feminist IR approaches have played an important role in the attempt to 
disclose how militarism is a gendered, masculinised ideology. Cynthia 
Enloe’s feminist scholarship is germane in this regard. Enloe views militarism 
as a “complex package of ideas that, all together, foster military values in 
both military and civilian affairs. Taken together, the package that is 
militarism also justifies military priorities and military influences in cultural, 
economic, and political affairs” (2016, p11). For Enloe, militarism gets 
inculcated into societies, through militarisation, thus transforming values, 
gender assumptions, and national identity narratives (ibid). Enloe 
corroborates her theoretical points by way of historical examples, national 
holidays, and rituals. Victoria Basham also suggests that “militarism thus 
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gives meaning to the national identity of states, but also to identities within 
constituent societies” (2016, p884). Stavrianakis and Selby argue that 
militarism relates to “the social and the international relations of the 
preparation for, and the conduct of, organised political violence” (2012, p3). 
According to Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via, who make a distinction between 
militarism and war, the former is “much broader than war, comprising an 
underlying system of institutions, practices, values, and cultures. For them, 
militarism is an extension of war-related, war-preparatory, and war-based 
meanings and activities outside of ‘war proper’ and into social and political 
life more generally” (2010, p7). Still centred on war,  Bernazzoli and Flint 
maintain that militarism “is generally viewed by social scientists as an 
ideology that takes root in a society via a process of perpetually preparing for 
war, reshaping cultural values, and reorienting the society’s collective 
worldview” (2009, pp399-400). 
 
A key theme associated with militarism is the relation between society and 
violence. In this respect, Chris Rossdale argues that “militarism provokes an 
account of how particular wars, coercive state practices and other forms of 
violence are embedded within, legitimised through, and function to reshape a 
wide range of social relations” (2019, p3). He further reflects on how, through 
militarism, violence becomes glorified and even rendered banal (ibid, p4). 
Rossdale concludes that militarism “links macro-level topics of war, conflict 
and state violence to more intimate relations of power, authority, and 
domination” (ibid).  
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In the context of South Asia, Anuradha Chenoy describes militarism and 
militarisation by tracing it to the colonial period: “militarization was 
necessary for maintaining the colonial state and the communal ethnic/caste 
divisions within these societies. These divisions were used to strengthen 
colonial rule and give it legitimacy” (1998, p104). This is particularly relevant 
as it mirrors how the leadership in Pakistan (both civilian and military) has 
dealt with political dissent in Balochistan, Sindh, and more recently with the 
Pashtun community.2 These definitions are useful to frame how militarism 
has taken root in Pakistan’s governance and society. Ijaz Khan (2006) 
attempts to articulate a religious-based identity with militarisation and 
religious extremism, in the context of post-colonial Pakistan. He asserts how 
and why the Pakistani military has carved out a hegemonic position, having 
assumed  
 
the responsibility of guarding the Islamic ideological identity and frontiers of the 
country. The threat perception from India, viewed as a Hindu power which cannot 
bear the existence of an Islamic Pakistan, has provided a certain ideological 
justification to the argument that it is only the military establishment that can 
provide security to this ideological state. (Khan, 2006, p58)  
 
Ijaz Khan’s assertion is important because it highlights how the religious 
identity of the state has become intertwined with militarism (a gendered 
ideology) and with representations of security (the supposed threat posed by 
Hindu India). Thus, whilst a feminist approach to IR is significantly important 
                                               
2 The case of the PTM. See, for instance, Mir (2018). For a scholarly unsympathetic, state-
centric account of PTM, see Shah (2020).  
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to deconstruct the gendered power relations that mediate the interlinking of 
security and identity, a post-colonial approach to IR will help to analyse how 
identity, culture/religion, and security are interlinked. The combination of 
these approaches is thus relevant to build a critique of Pakistan’s foreign 
policy. Together, these approaches, understood as critical discourses, as Swati 
Parashar notes, “have enriched the understanding and explanatory potential 
of international relations … [T]hese two theoretical approaches have grown 
exponentially in their capacity to embrace the diversity and unpredictability 
of global politics and social life” (2016, p371). Yet, accounts of Pakistan’s 
foreign policy have remained disconnected from post-colonialism and 
feminism in IR, and as such remain limited in their explanatory and analytical 
potential. Hence, this study aims to help to construct and complement other 
possible analyses of foreign policy in Pakistan. 
 
Post-colonial IR and its relevance to Pakistan’s foreign policy, security, and 
identity 
 
Pakistani literature dedicated to the country’s foreign relations and politics 
also ignores the country’s post-colonial position in global politics. There are 
various advantages in following a post-colonial IR approach in order to 
construct a critique of foreign policy and its relationship with security and 
identity. First, it is necessary to explain what the term “post-colonial” entails, 
and how it is relevant in constructing a critique of foreign policy, including 
the interlinking of security and identity. Various fields in the social sciences 
and humanities theorise about the “post-colonial”; indeed, it is important to 
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acknowledge how comprehensive the term is. For instance, in the 
introductory chapter of An Introduction to Post-colonial Theory, Childs and 
Williams (1997) foreground the questions of when, who, and what constitutes 
the post-colonial. These interrogations reveal a vast scholarship extending 
knowledges between the so-called “Third World” and the West during the 
colonial and post-colonial periods. Similarly, the very critique3 of 
postcolonial theory provides multiple theorisations, thus complementing the 
complexity of relationships between the West and other parts of the 
developing world. Thus, the relevance of post-colonialism and decoloniality4 
resides in  
 
their challenge to the insularity of historical narratives and historiographical 
traditions emanating from Europe. This has been particularly so in the context of 
demonstrating the parochial character of arguments about the endogenous European 
origins of modernity in favour of arguments that suggest the necessity of 
considering the emergence of the modern world in the broader histories of 
colonialism, empire and enslavement. (Bhambra, 2014, p115) 
 
                                               
3 See, for instance, the critique set out by Aijaz Ahmad (1992, 1998) in his In Theory: 
Classes, Nations, Literatures, particularly on the articulation of “third-worldism” with post-
structuralism. Chowdry and Nair (2004) also provide an enlightening account of the 
controversies that the term “post-colonial” has generated, and how it is relevant for the study 
of international relations.  
4 The difference between post-colonialism and decoloniality is clearly laid out in Bhambra 
(2014).  
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However, situating post-colonialism also requires reflecting on what 
colonialism5 (still) happens to be,6 and how it has been produced and 
reproduced, particularly within the context of different Western imperialist 
projects. Edward Said’s seminal work Orientalism (1978) has influenced 
many in how to think the “post-colonial”, as well as how to interpret colonial 
discourses and practices. Following the publication of Orientalism, a number 
of social sciences and humanities scholars turned their attention to questions 
of identity, difference, and the politics of representation (Said, 2000). 
Williams and Chrisman note that “Orientalism focused on what could be 
called colonial discourse – the variety of textual forms in which the West 
produced and codified knowledge about non-metropolitan areas and cultures, 
especially those under colonial control” (1993, p5). The colonial production 
of knowledge and representation of the “Other” are thus central to the concept 
of Orientalism. However, in post-colonial states like Pakistan and India, the 
structures of power that characterise what Said referred to as Orientalism 
continue to exist. For instance, state and religious elites continue to produce 
and reproduce colonial representations of colonial modes of power and 
                                               
5 A possible definition of colonialism may be: “the settlement of people and so the 
colonisation of lands by powers from other, usually economically richer, more powerful 
lands. Colonialism needs colonies, people settled in new lands. Imperialism implies control 
of other lands and people by a power which can be defined as having an empire which is 
itself a collection of lands (countries, islands), all part of a governed whole. An empire most 
usually will also have an emperor or empress ruling it (such as the Roman Emperor, or Queen 
Victoria defined as the Empress of India). While imperialism does not necessarily settle its 
people in other lands, it can rule many other peoples from a distance, economically as much 
as politically” (Wisker, 2007).  
6 There are several arguments as to whether colonialism belongs to the past, or whether it 
still persists. The discussion of both arguments can be found in Chowdhry and Nair (2004), 
as well as in Shohat (1992), Shome (1998), and Darby and Paolini (1994), with the latter 
suggesting that colonialism is a “continuing set of practices that are seen to prescribe relations 
between the West and the Third World beyond the independence of the former colonies” 
(p375). I concur with Chowdhry and Nair when they suggest that “the postcolonial does not 
signify the end of colonialism, but rather that it accurately reflects both the continuity and 
persistence of colonizing practices, as well as the critical limits and possibilities that has 
engendered in the present historical moment” (2004, p11).  
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domination, with the intention of producing a homogeneous and 
unchallenged national identity. 
 
In respect of the discipline of IR, there is a growing engagement with non-
traditional, mainstream themes. Race, gender, sex, class, identity, and culture 
are among those topics that have been silenced by decades of Eurocentric IR 
research and theorisation (Krishna, 1993; Doty, 1996; Chowdhry and Nair, 
2004; Anand, 2007; Seth, 2011). On the specific case of analysing issues of 
identity construction and representation, L. M. H. Ling (2002) suggests that 
the importance of post-colonial theory on the construction of identity is 
reflected in how the identities of “coloniser” and “colonised” are “intimately 
constructed identities that lead to an inseparable subjectivity … born, literally 
as well as figuratively, from the intercourse between conquistador and 
indigène, West and Non-West, Self and Other, masculine and feminine” 
(2002, p69, italics in the original). Hence, in order to understand how state 
identity in Pakistan has evolved, it is crucial to contextualise it in terms of its 
colonial origins. 
 
The Eurocentric nature of mainstream IR theories has come to the fore as the 
result of several scholarly considerations such as the study of North-South 
relations and their implications for issues of agency and representation (Doty, 
1996), the recognition that non-Western knowledge and discussions on 
international issues are more often than not side-lined in the main debates 
(Acharya and Buzan, 2017), and the acknowledgement that the conventional 
understanding of power relations in IR “fails, with some exceptions, to 
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systematically address … the intersectionality of race, class, and gender in 
the production of power in IR” (Chowdhry and Nair, 2004, p3). Moreover, 
there is a persistent level of parochialism within the discipline. To that end, 
Dibyesh Anand discusses the pressing need to “deparochialize IR” (2007, 
p3). He makes the case for recognizing IR’s Eurocentrism and the “poverty 
of IR when it comes to matters concerning the majority of the world’s people 
who live in areas formerly under direct or indirect colonial rule of Western 
European states” (ibid). This supports the fact that IR and foreign policy 
theories and discourses have been built on practices of silencing (Gergis and 
Lugosi, 2014). Hence, post-colonial scholars highlight the lack of historical 
content and engagement within mainstream IR (Krishna, 2001; Grovogui, 
2001; Anand, 2007; Seth, 2011; Gergis and Lugosi, 2014), particularly in 
terms of imperial and colonial history. Imperialism, colonialism, and their 
global expansion7 did not happen in isolation from the implementation of the 
“Westphalian system” or the expansion of capitalism. In fact, the latter 
“coincided with the colonial conquest and trade” (Seth, 2011, p173), and the 
former was not centuries apart from “the subjugation and settlement of the 
Americas, the rise of the slave trade, the founding of the British East India 
Company and the Dutch East Indian Company, Macartney’s mission to the 
Middle Kingdom, and so on” (ibid).  
 
                                               
7 As to what concerns imperialism, it “was typically driven by ideology, belief and power, 
controlled from the metropolitan centre, and concerned with the assertion and expansion of 
state power (for example, the French invasion of Algeria can be seen as an act of imperial 
control by the French Empire). Imperialism operated as a policy of state and a drive for 
power, and also has attached to it the meaning of ‘command’” (Wisker, 2007). 
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The absence of history in mainstream IR has contributed towards the political 
marginalisation of entire populations. A post-colonial critique thus aims to 
demonstrate how mainstream IR and foreign policy analysis privilege the 
study of war and balance of power, without analysing historical narratives. 
As Sankaran Krishna suggests, the need for a “postcolonial engagement” is 
vital in “deconstructing, historicizing, and denaturalizing all identities 
(national, ethnic, linguistic, religious) as well as envisioning and struggling 
for a future that does not seek to transcend or escape identity politics so much 
as fight for justice and fairness in the worlds we inhabit” (1999, pxviii, italics 
in the original). Krishna’s theorisation is relevant to this thesis. Pakistan’s 
foreign policy narratives are often silent on issues of identity and ethnicity, 
and the historicity associated with them. A notable exception in this regard is 
Mehtab Ali Shah’s (1997) book, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic 
Impacts on Diplomacy, 1971-94, in which the author traces how domestic and 
ethnic politics have impacted the country’s foreign policy. 
 
The silencing of race in IR is another shortcoming of the field with which 
post-colonial IR scholars take issue. Krishna suggests that mainstream IR 
theories, including those of a critical, poststucturalist character,8 have 
produced “an amnesia on the question of race” (2001, p404). Siba Grovogui 
(2001) argues that Western theorists, and in particular IR ones, follow an 
egocentric ontology, which marginalises the history of Europe’s periphery, 
                                               
8 Sankaran Krishna provides an important position for post-colonial IR in his 1993 review 
article “The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International 
Relations Theory”, in which he points out not only the Eurocentric nature of some post-
structuralist IR works and their association with French, continental philosophy, but also the 
question of amnesia in IR, particularly in the context of the analyses developed after the First 
Gulf War. The issue of the “denial of subjectivity” and the need for “strategic essentialism” 
(in the Spivakian sense) are also themes articulated by Krishna (1993). 
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together with numerous non-Western/European epistemologies. Grovogui’s 
critique brings to the fore the question of the “whitening of history and the 
human experience” (2001, p439). Concerning the case of Pakistan’s 
narratives on foreign relations and their intertwinement with security and 
identity, the same pattern is followed. The amnesia and relegation to the 
margins of peripheral minorities (as in the case of Baloch and Pashtuns, for 
instance), in the context of relations with China or the US, and the ways in 
which foreign policy decisions continue to impact specific ethnic groups are 
significant. Furthermore, the succession of governmental practices carried out 
by West Pakistan in East Pakistan provide another example of how issues of 
race, ethnicity, and gendered relations remain absent from indigenous 
accounts of Pakistan’s relations with India. 
 
Thus, engaging with feminist and postcolonial critical approaches when 
studying foreign policy and its relation to the interlinkage between security 
and identity opens up the possibility to rectify the amnesia of macro-
narratives, by engaging the micro-narratives of unrepresented people and 
reckoning with the effects of high-politics on them. Consequently, traditional 
foreign policy analysis remains incomplete by ignoring the exposure to and 
the extension of “controversial” domestic/regional issues.  
 
Research Questions and Contribution 
 
This thesis aims to illustrate how, in the case of Pakistan, its foreign relations 
with India, China, and the United States contribute to the interlinking of 
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security and identity. The thesis also seeks to explain how militarism, 
understood as an ideological framework for political practices, reinforces the 
interconnection between security and identity. Hence, the study addresses two 
main research questions: 1) how does the interlinking of security and identity 
shape foreign policy in Pakistan? To answer this question, the study examines 
feminist and postcolonial  approaches to international politics in order to 
articulate how gendered power relations, as well as ideological and cultural 
factors contribute towards the interlinking between security and identity. The 
study attempts to illustrate how these processes happen in the context of the 
above-mentioned key relationships. 2) how is militarism as an ideology 
interwoven with security, identity, and masculinity, and how has it been 
enhanced by the state of Pakistan? In order to answer this question, this study 
engages with Pakistan’s foreign relations with China, India, and the US, and 
examines the role of Pakistan’s main foreign policy actor – the military. This 
engagement happens by using feminist and postcolonial approaches, which, 
as I mentioned earlier, have been critical to study and identify how militarism 
works. 
 
This study makes an original and innovative contribution to knowledge in 
three ways: 1) it applies a feminist and postcolonial  approach to the study of 
Pakistan’s foreign policy, an area that has hitherto been dominated by 
mainstream IR realist/neo-realist approaches; 2) it offers an innovative 
approach to study the links between state identity and foreign policy, and to 
ascertain how militarism grows out of this relationship; and 3) it encourages 
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and contributes to new possibilities for study and analysis in the context of 
South Asian foreign politics and beyond. 
 
  Methodology 
 
As mentioned above, this study follows a feminist and postcolonial approach 
to IR. In this study, methodology is understood, following Ackerly and True, 
as a 
 
theoretical approach that does not require a set of lock-step rules for research like a 
protocol. Rather, it entails a commitment to use, and a process for using, any 
constellation of methods reflectively and critically. For us, this commitment has 
four aspects involving attentiveness to (1) unequal power relations, (2) to 
relationships, (3) to boundaries of inclusion–exclusion and forms of 
marginalization, and (4) to situating the researcher in the research process. (2013, 
p136) 
 
Feminist research is deeply concerned with questions of reflexivity and 
subjectivity (Tickner, 2005). My experiences of living and working in 
Pakistan have impacted my ontological and epistemological positions, and 
led me to interrogate beyond merely “how things are” and towards “how 
things came to be”. As Jennifer Maruska notes, “most feminist IR theorists 
(and IR constructivists) share an ‘ontology of becoming’, where the focus is 
on the intersubjective process of norm evolution, for example, than on the 
final result” (2010). Thus, this thesis follows a feminist “ontology of 
becoming”.  
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Both prior to and during the research period of this study, I spent several years 
living and working in Pakistan, mostly in the city of Lahore. Due to 
family/personal circumstances, I embraced this opportunity as one that would 
contribute towards my learning and unlearning about Pakistan, including its 
culture, history, and current and past political histories. During this 
learning/unlearning process, it became clear that what I knew about Pakistan 
from visiting two weeks during the year was limited. At that time, I enjoyed, 
in an unreflective manner, the exoticised life of a middle/upper middle class 
family and its hospitality. Upon shifting to Lahore, I learned that what I knew 
did not correspond with the social and political reality. Gradually, I learnt 
about numerous narratives of inequalities of power and marginalisation 
concerning gender, across civil society, and in state and private institutions. I 
became particularly interested in issues of identity, as I learned that the 
national identity sanctioned by the state elite did not align with how different 
ethnic and minority groups (for instance, Baloch, Pashtuns, Hindus, 
Christians and Ahmadi Muslims) in the country have historically related to 
the centre; it also became clear how the state elite establishes its claims to 
difference in relation to India. Moreover, I became interested in how 
Pakistan’s foreign policy appeared to have shaped identity, and how the 
military dominated foreign and domestic politics. This is reflected in how this 
study is concerned with not just “how, in Pakistan, security and identity are 
interlinked”, but also “how this came to be”. 
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Hence, as suggested by Ackerly, Stern, and True, “the distinctiveness of 
feminist methodologies inside and outside IR lies in their reflexivity, which 
encourages the researcher to re-interrogate continually her own scholarship” 
(2006, p4). During the time in which this study was conducted, I had several 
opportunities to interrogate my own scholarship and epistemological 
positions. Concerning epistemology, this study follows a postcolonial 
feminist approach, which has its origins in Black feminist thought (Achilleos-
Sarll, 2018) and privileges the intersectionality of gender with other social 
categories such as class, ethnicity, race, and sexuality. Columba Achilleos-
Sarll (2018) attempts to move beyond the limitations of post-positivist 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) by highlighting the importance of 
intersectionality in the constitution of a postcolonial feminist approach to 
FPA. She suggests that “intersectionality moves beyond universalist or group 
accounts of a feminist ‘standpoint’” (Achilleos-Sarll, 2018, p42). This leads 
to the adoption of a gender-relational approach wherein the intersection of the 
above-mentioned categories allows for “power relations to be analysed in a 
more dynamic way … The intersections of these social categories – which in 
turn creates gendered, sexualised, and racialised hierarchies – structure 
relationships between states and between peoples, remaking the content of 
foreign policies and conditioning how foreign policy issues are framed, 
prioritised and perceived” (ibid, pp42-43). 
 
This study privileges language as the key material with which to analyse and 
discuss the interlinking of security and identity within the construction of 
Pakistan’s foreign policy.  Concerning data, this thesis uses linguistic and 
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non-linguistic data, understood as discourse(s). As Ruth Wodak suggests, 
discourse “means anything from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a 
policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, 
text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language per se” (2008, 
p1). Primary data was collected from various sources, including semi-
structured interviews, a visit to the Army Museum in Lahore, foreign policy 
documents, speeches from official state representatives, and my personal 
experience while living in Pakistan. 
 
 
Fieldwork and interviews  
 
The literature on qualitative research methods reveals that interviewing is an 
exploratory method, which provides the researcher with “information on 
understandings, opinions, what people remember doing, attitudes, feelings 
and the like” (Vromen, 2010, p258). As also suggested by Alvesson, 
qualitative interviews are “beneficial in as much as a rich account of the 
interviewees’ experiences, knowledge, ideas and impressions may be 
considered and documented” (2002, p108). 
 
Concerning interviewing, I conducted semi-structured interviews in order to 
obtain raw primary data on Pakistan’s foreign policy, foreign relations, and 
national identity. I chose to interview individuals who, during the course of 
their professional activity, had had direct contact with foreign policy 
discourses and practices. Semi-structured interviews provide the possibility 
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to induce a conversation, a dialogue, and as such appear to be an adequate 
method through which to collect data, particularly when Pakistan’s foreign 
policy remains a theme that overlaps with what is sanctioned to be the state’s 
national interest.  
 
For this study, I have interviewed Pakistani academics, ex-Ambassadors and 
diplomats, think tank directors, and retired bureaucrats who have dealt with 
foreign policy narratives and discourses during their professional life. 
Interviewing individuals who have dedicated their life to the practice and 
study of Pakistan foreign policy constitutes a valuable source of data, as those 
individuals, acting as respondents, are potentially able to convey information 
that helps to delineate how foreign policy and national identity are co-
constructed. To be sure, all the interviewees belong to the so-called elite class 
in Pakistan, whose members converse fluently in English. Within the group 
of potential respondents I have mentioned and selected, a total of 38 contacts 
were made in order to obtain an interview with this researcher. Most of the 
contacts were made via email. Of those 38 contacts, 15 did not reply, 
including after a follow-up email. I note that from the number of women 
potential respondents, only two accepted the offer of an interview. All the 
remaining respondents were men. Foreign policy-related think tanks proved 
rather difficult to be interviewed, and I was only able to obtain a single 
interview from a think tank and had a last-minute cancellation that could not 
be rescheduled, due to travel arrangements. 
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In total, I have interviewed seven academics, four retired Ambassadors, two 
retired senior bureaucrats, and one think tank director. Most of the interviews 
took place in Islamabad. Travelling from Lahore to Islamabad is relatively 
easy. However, since I do not drive, I had to make specific arrangements in 
order to commute between Lahore and Islamabad, and then within the latter. 
I was fortunate enough to have relatives working at key places and they 
facilitated my stay, the commute, and most importantly provided me with 
access to two former Ambassadors and a prestigious academic at one of the 
most influential universities in Pakistan. The interviewees were provided with 
a confidentiality form, assuring that their identity will not be revealed in the 
study. Thus, I have codified their identity as follows: for academics, AC1, 
AC2, AC3, AC4, AC5, AC6, AC7; for Ambassadors, AM1, AM2, AM3, 
AM4; for think tank, TT1; and for Government Officers, GO1, and GO2. 
During the interviews, I took written notes, which I have included in different 
parts of the chapters. Three interviewees, while being interviewed face to 
face, asked to provide answers in writing, as they wished to have more time 
to answer in greater detail. Thus, the questionnaire was sent to those 
individuals via email, and it was returned the same way. 
 
Concerning my ethnographic experience, I had the opportunity of living and 
working at a private university in Lahore. The life of an academic institution 
often exhibits a national ethos concerning social organisation, values, culture, 
and customs. I could observe how social and organisational practices 
reflected a permanent nationalistic, military, and religious ethos. For instance, 
in terms of spatial organisation, the campus resembled a military cantonment. 
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The campus was limited by high walls and barbed wire. It was organised, and 
clean, with flower beds, yellow and black painted kerbs, and paved roads. 
This environment contrasted with its surroundings of unpaved dusty roads 
and heavy, unorganised traffic. I encountered the same thing when visiting 
other universities in Lahore, as well as military cantonments9. As part of 
academic engagement, I had the opportunity to participate as a guest, as well 
as a speaker, in a few conferences, seminars, and talks related to Pakistan 
foreign policy, as well as with other themes that are part of the country’s 
national identity. 
 
In Lahore, I included a visit to the Army Museum as part of my research for 
analysing data, as well as ethnographic experience. The fairly new Army 
Museum is a representation of nationalist discourses, their association with 
militarism, and how both are produced and reproduced. At the museum, the 
Army has combined its tailored version of national and military histories. I 
visited the museum during the weekend, when it was busy with families on a 
day out. They arrived in large groups, and there were numerous small 
children. The museum’s architecture is the prototype of an overground 
military bunker, surrounded by large lawns adorned with old tanks, cannons, 
and helicopters. The museum exhibits in chronological order what the 
military imagines to be the “history of Pakistan”. For instance, in one of the 
panels it is possible to view a map of Pakistan in which all “invasions” the 
country has faced are represented. The description reads: “Introduction of 
                                               
9 My ethnographic note is in line with the scholarship on the history of colonial urbanism in 
South Asia, which describes in detail the organisational purposes of the cantonment. (see for 
instance Glover, 2008; Cowell, 2016; Berverley, 2001) 
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organised military due to foreign invasions of Pakistan” (Pakistan Army 
Museum, Lahore). From the East, according to the imagined historical 
narrative of the Pakistan Army, the country was invaded by the Mauryan 
Empire in 323 BC, the Gupta Empire in 319 AD, the Pala Empire in 770 AD, 
and the British in 1843 AD. At another panel explaining the history of 
Pakistan, one can read that her history can be “traced back to millions of 
years”. The bilingual board tells of the ancient civilisations that lived in 
present-day Pakistani territory, such as the Indus Valley Civilisation. The last 
paragraph is significant in understanding how the army (re)writes Pakistan’s 
history and identity: 
 
Historically, the landmass of Pakistan has been invaded both from the east as well 
as from the west. However, in the entire over 9000 years of Pakistan’s known 
history, Pakistan and Republic of India have been forced into a political unification 
for only about 200 years; around one hundred years under the Mauryan Empire and 
for similar time frame under the British colonial rule. For 500 odd years, sub-
continent was ruled by the Muslims. For the remaining over 8000 years Pakistan 
remained a separate identity. The people and landmass of Pakistan have an identity 
embedded in their Islamic ethos and glorious settled history and heritage, since over 
9000 years. (Pakistan Army Museum, Lahore) 
 
The content of this paragraph is significant at several levels. Firstly, the act 
of displaying this re-interpretation of history at a military museum is a 
significant event in itself. Secondly, the arithmetic deployed is staggering, 
particularly in terms of establishing how Pakistan and India were “united” for 
200 years, and how Pakistan remained a separate identity for 8,000 years. 
While this is a deliberate attempt to re-inscribe Pakistan into a territory that it 
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was not identified with, it also reveals how the army attempts to extend the 
concept of “Islamic ethos” by fusing it with territorial imaginations that 
predate Islam. And thirdly, “200 years of Pakistan and India in political 
union” is an attempt to invest Pakistan with a separate political identity during 
the colonial era, in an extraordinary re-interpretation of Indian Muslim 
nationalism, which in its initial stages was never associated with any specific 
territorial demand. Clearly, if national identity narratives in Pakistan are 
loaded with controversial facts, this attempt to restate a “national history” 
infused with ideational overtones reveals how the army wishes to be not only 
the custodian of national identity, but also its re-definer. 
 
The Pakistan Army museum10 is thus a place of citation and performativity. 
The institutional museum works as a privileged space of repetition and 
sedimentation. Hence, the army museum represents a re-appropriation and re-
articulation of historical narratives, some of which are factually wrong. 
Pakistan has existed only since 1947. Therefore, such an utterance as 
“Pakistan and Republic of India have been forced into a political unification 
for only about 200 years” does not ring true. During the British occupation, 
there was no “Republic of India” or Pakistan.  
 
This demonstrates that the Pakistani military has attempted to forge a 
discourse that represents Pakistan as an ancient country. Pakistan’s insecurity 
is thus ideational and identity-related as well. The military has tried to 
                                               
10 During previous trips to Pakistan, I visited two other military museums: the Pakistan Air 
Force Museum and the Pakistan Maritime Museum. The nationalistic display at these 
museums is highly conspicuous. They, too, function as sites of citation and performativity 
for the nationalistic discourses woven by the state elite. 
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eliminate ambiguity around issues that still mark the nation’s identity. The 
construction of the historical basis for Pakistan’s national identity is therefore 
sanctioned by the army and performed within a militarised space inspired by 
militarism. Hence, visiting citizens, including school children, are inculcated 
with a historical narrative aiming to construct a specific national identity, 
while their bodies become militarised as they become exposed to values and 
attitudes such as the use of force, political violence, obedience, and hierarchy. 
That said, since performative processes are inherently mutable and 
contingent, this imagined national narrative of the Pakistan Army remains 
unstable and precarious. 
 
Limitations of the Study 
 
In Pakistan, foreign policy remains a sensitive theme. I have noted that 
foreign policy debates and decisions are dominated by men. There are a few 
women who work in foreign policy, in government or in academia. I have 
tried to interview them; however, I have obtained no answer, most likely due 
to the high-profile posts they held at the time. 
 
One limitation of the present study is that I did not formally interview anyone 
in the military. While I had a few conversations with military-related 
individuals, perhaps I acted overcautiously, given the dominant role of the 
military in Pakistani society. Perhaps I was also overly cautious about my 
own positionality, as a foreigner researcher in Pakistan, asking questions 
about foreign policy and national identity, which could have generated some 
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degree of suspicion, and in turn risked jeopardising the whole research 
project. Therefore, in regards to the military, I have used published sources 
by military figures, including Twitter statements, official videos and 
publications. 
 
Chapter Structures and Outlines 
 
Concerning the chapter structure, this study consists of an introductory 
chapter, six chapters, and a conclusion. Chapter I examines and introduces 
the South Asia foreign policy literature, with a focus in Pakistan. I use a 
feminist and postcolonial approach. I identify the main realms of focus within 
the study of South Asia foreign policy, which is largely dominated by the 
India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. I also note that a common form of 
discourse within this literature is linked to war, aggression, and military 
power. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to Pakistan’s foreign policy, with 
a focus on the key stages that comprise its history: 
the 1950s; the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War; and nuclear Pakistan. In 
analysing these stages, I discuss how identity and security are interlinked and 
how militarism emerges in association with these processes. 
 
Chapter II is dedicated to examining and discussing militarism and its agents 
in Pakistan. In order to understand how militarism has become embedded as 
a state ideology, I provide an analysis of the origins of the state of Pakistan. 
The main objective is to understand how agents like those linked to religion, 
to the military, and to intelligence have intervened in foreign policy issues, 
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and therefore have shaped the interlinking between security and identity. In 
the introductory section of the chapter, I provide an overview of existing 
theories about the emergence of Pakistan. I also examine how these theories 
give support to contested views as to the country’s origins. The second section 
of the chapter explores how religion has shaped the construction of foreign 
policy, and the interlinking between security and identity. In section three, I 
map and analyse the role of the military11 in association with the civil 
bureaucracy, as well as with the intelligence services in shaping foreign 
policy. This section also contains a subsection in which I analyse the direct 
role of the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence services, in Afghanistan and Kashmir, 
as these were the places where the ISI sponsored the expansion and growth 
of radical Islamist groups, at the time perceived as promoting and 
safeguarding Pakistan’s state interests. This chapter sets out the context of 
Pakistan’s foreign policy, which is intimately associated with defence and 
war issues, in order to understand why her relations with China, India, and 
the US are critical to the construction of the linking between foreign policy 
and identity, and how militarism becomes enhanced and entrenched in the 
process. 
 
Chapter III is the first of the case study chapters, and deals with Pakistan’s 
relations with China. In the introductory part of the chapter, I provide an 
overview of the origins of Sino-Pakistan relations, explain its importance, and 
then move to show how militarism has taken root in Pakistan, as a 
                                               
11 By “the military” I mean the three branches of the armed forces: army, navy, and air force. 
However, in the specific context of Pakistan, the army has been the main actor in influencing 
foreign policy. Thus, I use the military and army interchangeably. 
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consequence of this relationship. The chapter’s main focus, however, is the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The next section of the chapter 
introduces CPEC, its main features, and notes how both countries have been 
committed to mobilise a discourse that enhances the strength of this 
relationship. In the following section, I examine CPEC’s contentious issues, 
which include the social and political consequences of the seaport of Gwadar 
as a key project of CPEC in Pakistan’s Balochistan. In the next subsections, 
I also analyse and historically integrate the geopolitical issues associated with 
Gwadar, and its militarisation, which are connected to colonial practices of 
exploitation and domination of natural resources, territories, and people. In 
the subsequent section, I integrate and examine the “Kashmir Question” and 
the impact of CPEC on this issue. I centre the discussion on CPEC’s impact 
on the Kashmiri region of Gilgit-Baltistan, and how it affects Pakistan’s 
claims on Kashmir. In the next subsection, I examine how CPEC is 
contributing towards the enhancement of militarism as a state ideology, and 
how the governing processes linked to it are becoming further under the 
control of the military. In the chapter’s concluding remarks, I highlight the 
importance of the potential that CPEC represents to Pakistan’s economic 
future, whilst existing political practices inspired by neo-colonial and 
militaristic values continue to dictate how CPEC is actually developing in 
Pakistan. 
 
Chapter IV analyses the relations between Pakistan and India, with a focus 
on the Kashmir question. The introductory part of the chapter maps out the 
key features of this relationship, particularly those centred on security and 
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identity. In the second section, I examine the history of the “Kashmir 
Question”; in the following subsection, I discuss Pakistan’s unabated efforts 
to gain control over Kashmir, including the provision of support for non-state 
actors in order to control and manipulate Kashmiris’ identities. In the 
following section, I discuss how Pakistan has used militarisation to try to 
control Kashmir, including resorting to war, and control over discourses on 
Kashmir, including becoming the “saviour” of Kashmir. In the concluding 
section, I note how the conflict over Kashmir is one that is served by the use 
of the masculinised language of militarism, deployed by Pakistan, which 
ultimately serves her state-centric interests of seeking to control the territory 
of Kashmir. 
 
Chapter V is dedicated to Pakistan’s relations with the US. For decades, this 
relation has functioned as the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy. In the 
introductory section, I examine the key events that have constructed this 
relationship, including Pakistan-India relations, before proceeding to 
integrate these findings with the importance of Afghanistan to the 
development of this relationship, post-1979. In the second section, I analyse 
Pakistan and US relations in the context of the Afghan War, after the Soviet 
invasion. I examine the role of Islamic ideology on how Pakistan and the US 
masterminded the fight against the USSR, and how discourses of existing 
masculinisation of the Pakistan state were further enhanced to bolster the idea 
of it being a “front-line state”. In this section, I also explore the role of the ISI 
as a foreign policy agent, as the main interlocutor of Pakistan in Afghanistan, 
and how this further enhanced the presence of militarism. In the last section 
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of the chapter, I examine the US’s “AfPak” strategy devised during the 
Obama administration, and consider how that policy served to enhance and 
make militarism more visible in Pakistan. I also focus on the importance of 
the use of armed drones by the US and subsequently by the military in 
Pakistan to demonstrate how masculinity in its different expressions 
contributes to shaping the interlinking of security and identity. The chapter 
concludes by reflecting on how Pakistan-US relations constitute a significant 
background factor in the militarisation of Pakistan, and how Pakistan’s 
foreign policy decisions towards Afghanistan have contributed to the 
militarisation of the state. 
 
Chapter VI utilises a postcolonial feminist approach to build a critique of 
Pakistan’s foreign policy and the study thereof. In the introductory section, I 
explore the analytical tools afforded by this approach to examine and explain 
foreign policy-related issues. I then move on to explore what colonial 
practices are still a reality in postcolonial Pakistan. In the following sections, 
I revisit the case studies of Pakistan’s relations with China, India, and the US, 
and I apply a postcolonial feminist approach to each. In the section dedicated 
to Sino-Pakistan relations, I explain how CPEC enhances colonial practices 
of domestication, growth, and civilisation, and connect this with China’s 
global, imperialist-like designs. I note that, despite the presence of these 
practices, Pakistani scholarship on CPEC remains largely oblivious and opts 
instead to focus on state-centred discourses of power that reinforce militarism 
and neo-colonial politics. In this section, I also link China’s alarming policies 
 43  
in Xinjiang with CPEC, and show how the Pakistani leadership ends up 
fulfilling the role of a collaborator. 
 
The following section of chapter VI is centred on a postcolonial feminist 
analysis of Pakistan’s relations with India. I revisit the significance of 
Pakistan’s use of a tailored human rights discourse to expose Indian human 
rights abuses in Kashmir, in order to argue that a postcolonial feminist 
critique of foreign policy considers all the struggles for rights, broadly 
understood, as being interlinked and intersecting, thus not privileging one 
over the other. That is precisely what Pakistan does. I also discuss the 
importance of identifying China and India as “Postcolonial Informal 
Empires”, following Dibyesh Anand’s (2012) lead, as well as the highly 
relevant connection that exists between Kashmir and Xinjiang, identified and 
examined by Nitasha Kaul (2020). I conclude that Pakistan’s foreign policy 
discourses are unconcerned with imperialist politics of domination, and that 
her discourses on Kashmir rights, from a critical postcolonial feminist 
approach, remain selective, incomplete, and destined to serve state-centred 
interests. 
 
In the last section of the chapter, I return to Pakistan-US relations and revisit 
the origins of this relationship in order to demonstrate the importance of 
acknowledging how Pakistan’s early leadership prized its relations with the 
US/West to understand how the interlinking between identity and security is 
intimately connected with relations of identity/alterity in relation to India. I 
also examine how these processes are intrinsically linked to colonial thinking 
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and practices, much of it absorbed by the Americans from the British colonial 
rulers. I also examine how Pakistan-US relations have contributed towards 
the enhancement of the global structure of patriarchy, as the relationship was 
built on concepts that are ideologically masculine and rooted in a tendency to 
represent a colonial mode of thinking, which is deeply gendered and 
gendering. In the concluding section, I note the importance of adopting and/or 
adding a postcolonial feminist critique to the study of foreign policy. I outline 
the need to consider the intersectionality of different factors like gender, 
sexuality, class, and ethnicity, and their importance in establishing a context 
for studying and analysing foreign policy, whilst remaining committed to 
ethical principles that are often forgotten by state-centred accounts of 
international relations and foreign policy studies. 
 
The study ends with a concluding chapter in which I establish how security 
and identity are interlinked, and how militarism as an ideology emerges as a 
result of the foreign policy processes involved this interlinking. I revisit the 
consequences of militarism in Pakistan, before summarising how Pakistan’s 
relations with China, India, and the US are constituted by foreign policy 
processes that are masculinised and that together contribute to the 
continuation and expansion of patriarchy globally. Briefly, I also make the 
argument that foreign policy analysis in general, and that of Pakistan in 
particular, will be enriched by integrating a postcolonial feminist approach. 
This approach, as the study as a whole demonstrates, is helpful to explicate 
how identity and security processes associated with foreign policy are deeply 
 45  












In this chapter I aim to examine the existing foreign policy literature on South 
Asia, with a specific focus on Pakistan. My aim is to contextualise the key 
areas upon which foreign policy in South Asia/Pakistan have been 
constructed and analyse them through postcolonial and feminist lenses. As 
Laura Sjoberg notes, “feminist scholars have argued that states’ foreign 
policy choices are guided by their identities, which are based on association 
with characteristics attached to masculinity, manliness, and gender generally” 
(2010, p5). 
 
However, foreign policy accounts of South Asia in general, and of Pakistan 
in particular, follow a more parochial, state-centric route, and eschew feminist 
and postcolonial analysis. My objective is to highlight how existing foreign 
policy narratives and practices in Pakistan are constructed in order to portray 
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her as a ‘hard country’, whilst hiding the existence of representations of 
power structures which are intrinsically gendered and gendering. 
 
Approaches to Pakistan’s foreign policy do not differ from the realist/neo-
realist school that dominates foreign policy narratives in South Asia. 
However, it is the study of India’s foreign policy that dominates those 
narratives. Ganguly and Pardesi (2017) note that South Asian foreign policy 
and security studies have not been effectively integrated into the IR 
mainstream literature. The authors find this situation puzzling given how 
India has now acquired the status of a key actor in global politics; her regional 
hegemonic role is also noteworthy. Yet, Ganguly and Pardesi explain the 
marginalisation of South Asia foreign policy studies on account of its 
countries’ independent positioning during the Cold War (with the exception 
of Pakistan). India’s NAM policy under Jawaharlal Nehru has vastly 
contributed towards this development. Moreover, the colonial legacy, as the 
authors point out, dictated that only a few “South Asian colonial elites had 
any exposure to questions of foreign policy, security, and international 
relations” (Ganguly and Pardesi, 2010, 2017, Online). 
 
South Asia foreign policy literature is concentrated around seven main 
themes: India-Pakistan relations; regional nuclearization; the politics of 
regional associations (SAARC, BIMSTEC, IORA); external influences in the 
region (China and the US); the Afghan conundrum; terrorism; and territorial 
disputes, including natural resources. These themes have generated a 
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substantial amount of literature12, from regional and external scholars. These 
themes often overlap. Most of the literature analyses these themes through 
realist/neo-realist lenses, privileging security and strategic studies 
approaches. The present study, thus, is working towards providing an 
alternative approach to analysing foreign policy related themes in South Asia. 
 
South Asia foreign policy literature, including work focused on Pakistan, 
often deploys a discourse based on images of aggression, power politics, war, 
conflict, and military might. This certainly denotes an inclination towards 
foreign policies shaped by realist conceptions of international politics, 
dominated by concerns over anarchy and state power. While this constitutes 
the general background that has influenced Pakistan’s foreign policy since 
her inception, India’s foreign policy has followed a different trajectory. Until 
the 1990s, Indian foreign policy remained committed to nonalignment (see 
Mohan, 2003; Ganguly, 2003; Pant, 2016; Pande, 2017). To be sure, post-
independence India’s leadership was mostly concerned with keeping foreign 
influence out of the region (Pande, 2017). This general trend of inward-
looking is in contrast to Pakistan’s urge to seek an ally status with the US, 
and more recently with China. India, which nevertheless was perceived to be 
closer to the USSR, has averted the convulsions of Cold War international 
politics. However, Indian foreign policy has undergone a shift particularly 
since the 1998 nuclear tests. India has increasingly sought to be perceived as 
                                               
12 In their essay “South Asia and Foreign Policy”, Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet Pardesi (2010, 
2017, online) provide a substantial list of the main works that explore foreign policy issues 
in South Asia. Notably, most of the works mentioned are focused on Indian foreign policy 
and diplomacy. Accounts of the foreign policy of Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 
are scarce or non-existent. 
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the natural major regional power and as such expects external actors within 
the region (the US, the EU, Japan, and China) to accept and recognise her role 
(Pande, 2017). 
 
This chapter consists of a main section dedicated to Pakistan’s foreign policy. 
The section is then divided into three sub-sections in which I analyse what I 
consider to be the key stages in Pakistan’s foreign policy that have decisively 
shaped the interlinking between security and identity: the decade of the 
1950s; the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War; and nuclear Pakistan. These 
stages, as I will explain, are significant and representative of how identity and 
security are interlinked, and how gender and militarism are associated with 
these constitutive processes. The chapter concludes by noting that the above-
mentioned three key stages are mostly constituted and constitutive of a state 
identity that is highly militarised and hyper-masculinised. 
 
1.2  Foreign Policy in Pakistan  
 
In this section I analyse how, over the course of the past seven decades, 
Pakistan’s foreign policy became militarised. My aim is not to historically 
chart a series of foreign policy events, but rather to focus on specific ones 
which were decisive in transforming Pakistan’s foreign policy into a fully-
fledged exercise in militarism. Feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe (2004) 
explains how this transformation occurs: 
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the militarization of any country’s foreign policy can be measured by monitoring 
the extent to which its policy: is influenced by the views of Defense Department 
decision-makers and/or senior military officers, flows from civilian officials’ own 
presumption that the military needs to carry exceptional weight, assigns the military 
a leading role in implementing the nation’s foreign policy, and treats military 
security as national security as if they were synonymous. (2004, p122) 
 
Enloe applies this definition to the US’s foreign policy. It also dovetails with 
the case of Pakistan, not only because the country endured long periods of 
military dictatorship, but also due to the conspicuousness of the extensive 
power amalgamated by what sociologist Hamza Alavi has labelled a 
“bureaucratic-military oligarchy” (2002, p65). This partnership never ceased 
to exist, even during civilian rule, and it has been enhanced by the military 
continuing to gain access to key bureaucratic structures of governance, 
including foreign policy. The origin of this civil bureaucratic-military 
oligarchy can be traced back to the first decade post-independence (Jalal, 
1991; Chaudhry, 2011). I will return to this theme in the next chapter. 
 
Foreign policy in Pakistan ranks as one of the most significant of its national 
policies. Since the country’s inception, foreign policy has been equated with 
the need to promote the new state in the international community (Sattar, 
2017). However, it has also become closely associated with the country’s 
relations with India, mainly as a result of the dispute over Kashmir. However, 
it is often noted that the sharing of assets, including military ones, the water 
flow in common rivers, and trade disputes (Hussain, 2016) have also shaped 
and directed Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India. Hence, Pakistan’s 
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foreign policy came to be known as ‘India-centric’ (Yasmeen, 1994; Pande, 
2011). 
 
In 2016, former Ambassador Sardar Masood Khan (currently President of 
Azad Jammu and Kashmir – AJK13) wrote an article in Hilal Magazine 
(published by the armed forces) regarding foreign policy objectives. 
According to Masood Khan, the principal objective is to make Pakistan a 
‘hard country’. Despite the fact that this objective has now been seven 
decades in the making, Pakistan’s state elite continues to represent it as an 
unfinished task. Yet, the historiography of Pakistan’s foreign policy (Sattar, 
2017; Amin, 2000; Rizvi, 1993) is replete with events describing how foreign 
relations with the US and China have helped to strengthen defence capacity, 
including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. With the military at the centre 
of this intertwining of defence and foreign policy, it becomes clear that 
foreign policy has gradually turned into a representation of a certain type of 
hegemonic masculinity that valorises particular qualities such as being 
‘aggressive’, ‘hard’, and ‘tough’. Thus, one could argue that Pakistan’s 
foreign policy is based on masculine-oriented conceptions, particularly in 
terms of her relations with India and Afghanistan. However, despite the 
exponential militarisation of the country’s foreign policy and its consequent 
masculinisation, the sense of a constant encircling threat lives on.  
 
As a result, foreign policy in Pakistan can be described as a series of decisions 
taken to counter India’s threat to her identity and sovereignty. Regional and 
                                               
13 This is how Pakistan-controlled Kashmir is officially referred to in Pakistan. 
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global politics, namely the Cold War, have also shaped and dictated foreign 
policymaking. The literature on Pakistan’s foreign policy (Burke, 1973; 
Rizvi, 1993; Yasmeen, 1994; Amin, 2000; Faruqui, 2003; Pande, 2011; 
Sattar, 2013, 2017) is univocal in pinpointing security as the backbone of the 
country’s foreign policy. The “search for security” (Sattar, 2017) is 
principally centred on the “fear of India” and the need to counter this fear. 
According to Samina Yasmeen (1994), the fear of India and the attempt to 
achieve a “balancing act” have constituted the country’s foreign policy since 
1947. The fear of India has been constructed largely by resorting to narratives 
that portray the former as a threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty and existence. As 
Yasmeen (1994) explains, the “balancing act” can thus be seen as a reaction 
to the supposed threat posed by India. This led the state leadership to seek 
“external patrons” who could assist in “balancing the India threat” (Yasmeen, 
1994, p115). 
 
1.2.1  Foreign Policy in the 1950s 
 
The extent to which Pakistan’s foreign policy accounts revolve around the 
India threat is evident in the country’s foreign policy choices throughout the 
1950s. To counter the alleged threat posed by India, Pakistan’s preferred 
response has been to seek assistance in order to achieve what foreign policy 
actors (both civil and military) envisage to be a ‘balancing act’, and as such 
become a permanent feature of foreign policymaking. Most realism-based  
accounts are unanimous in identifying the US and China as Pakistan’s 
external patrons. Pakistan acquired membership of the SEATO and CENTO 
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military alliances in the 1950s (Ali and Patman, 2019). Yet, these alliances, 
however economically beneficial they might have been in the short term, 
complicated foreign policy towards India and the Middle East, whilst China 
waited patiently14. However, these defence pacts led by the US played a 
critical role in shaping how Pakistan and the US developed their bilateral 
relations, at both civil and military levels, and they continue to do so to this 
day. 
 
The existing foreign policy literature mostly centres on analysing whether 
these alliances brought disadvantages or benefits to Pakistan (Rizvi, 1993; 
Sattar, 2017). The literature is filled with important details trying to explain 
why Pakistan felt compelled to join the alliances (threats from India and 
Afghanistan/USSR), and why disenchantment followed. However, this 
literature makes no reference to what military alliances represent, namely the 
institutionalisation of violence as a result of a foreign policy decision, and the 
enhancement of militarism.  
 
Broadly, those parochial discussions are therefore centred on the extension 
and conditions of US support towards Pakistan’s security needs, the extension 
and impact of military assistance, (see Kux, 2001; Fair, 2014), the adverse 
impact on other Muslim states (Rizvi, 1993), and the subsequent 
disenchantment with the alliances formed, following Western military aid 
being provided to India during and after the 1962 border war with China.  
                                               
14 See the chapter on Pakistan’s relations with China, where I explain the details of China’s 
position in relation to Pakistan’s options for forming military alliances. 
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However, these foreign policy decisions associated with military alliances 
have become associated with manifold representations of the US as the 
epitome of imperialist power relations, aggression, war, conflict, and military 
might. The Pakistani leadership looked upon foreign policy alignments 
through alliances with the US as the “sheet anchor of Pakistan’s foreign 
policy” (Sattar, 2017, p57). Indeed, this ‘anchoring’ contributed towards the 
institutionalisation of these representations, yet the literature usually follows 
the ‘India threat’  and the troubled relations with a Soviet-friendly 
Afghanistan as explanations for Pakistan’s decision.  
 
I note that these discussions do not analyse how, by joining these military 
alliances15, Pakistan’s foreign policy was transformed by becoming further 
militarised and masculinised. Nor do such accounts consider how these 
alliances represent a desire to join a Western foreign policy and security 
design that Pakistani state elites perceived as more ‘robust’, ‘rational’, and 
‘tough’, whilst ignoring US imperialist designs in the Middle East and South-
East Asia.  
 
The act of engaging a country’s foreign policy with international military 
organisations as a strategy to guarantee the state’s defence and survival 
carries a number of implications that are not discussed in traditional accounts 
of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan’s participation in military alliances may 
                                               
15 The literature on feminist analysis of military alliances is very limited, and does not include 
SEATO or CENTO. However, it is worth mentioning the scholarship developed by Cynthia 
Enloe (1993) and Wright, Hurley, and Ruiz (2019). 
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be taken as a departing point to analyse how security and identity are 
interlinked, and how these processes are intrinsically gendered and gendering. 
As Annica Kronsell argues, “militaries are institutions that have largely been 
governed by men and have produced and recreated norms and practices 
associated with heterosexual masculinity, surprisingly consistent across both 
cultures and time” (2012, p44).  
 
The fact that Pakistan’s cultural orientation differed from that of the US did 
not prevent the former from embarking on the latter’s security designs. 
Moreover, it enhanced the army’s heterosexual masculinity, perceived as the 
only acceptable form of manliness. The overall involvement of Pakistan in 
integrating with Western military alliances reveals how military organisations 
and alliances are supported by ideas of masculinity associated with force and 
combat capabilities. 
 
The historical context of the Cold War and US relations in South Asia suggest 
that Pakistan’s membership in the military alliances indeed signified more 
than merely a way to limit the ‘Indian threat’, and contributed towards 
Pakistan’s militaristic and masculinised identity. For instance, in The United 
States and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies, Dennis Kux (2001) 
describes a conversation at a dinner party between the foreign policy 
columnist Walter Lippman and former US Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles. The conversation was about the benefits of the military alliance. 
Dulles reportedly told Lippman that he needed “to get some real fighting men 
into the south of Asia. The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis. 
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That’s why we need them in the alliance” (Dulles, cited in Kux, 2001, p72). 
In the same conversation, Dulles also associates ‘Moslems’ with the 
perceived fighting inclination of the Pakistanis. This view fits well with how 
Pakistani state elites imagined their identity to be constructed – that is, on 
ideas of manliness and masculinity associated with combativity and virility.  
 
To be sure, since her independence, Pakistan’s state elites sought an identity 
that would be differentiated from Hindu India. Whilst Islam as an identity 
marker is the most common feature of this identity/alterity relationship, the 
normalised contrast between traits of masculinity and femininity is also 
present. Over centuries of colonial rule, India and Indian men in particular 
were consistently represented in the West by way of features that are usually 
associated with femininity, such as being weak, servile, effeminate, 
emotional, and conveying ‘heterosexual ambiguity’. This became all the more 
salient since the 1950s, when the Pakistani army shifted from its perennial 
inherited British ethos, and started to benefit from direct exposure to US 
military practices, which included innovative military technology and 
doctrine (Cohen, 2004; Siddiqa, 2017). 
 
Henceforth, the normalisation of military practices and their inculcation into 
the society, including the permanent appeal to a zealous support for the 
military, has not ceased. Springing out from the US military philosophy, the 
American-inspired Pakistani military, as Stephen Cohen suggests, “had an 
exaggerated estimate of their own and Pakistan’s martial qualities, with some 
believing that one Pakistani soldier equaled ten or more Indians” (2004, 
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p103). I argue that the Pakistani state elite integrated these Western 
perceptions, aided by the fact that the US also made use of them. This 
enhancement of militarism, powered by Pakistan-US relations, has become 
part of a discourse controlled by the army, used to produce a ‘Hindu Indian’ 
as Pakistan’s ‘other’. This Indian other is then represented as being weak, 
passive, and effeminate. Exemplary of this otherness relation is India: A Study 
in Profile, a book intended as a reference text at the Command and Staff 
College, Quetta. In 1990, the then Lt Col Javed Hassan (now a retired 
General), while discussing “practical politics on National Integration”, wrote: 
“the most critical factor that has given stability to the Indian polity is the 
passive character of the Hindu public. … The passive nature of the Hindu 
majority is evidently an important element in the political stability of India” 
(Javed, 1990, pp122–123). While the book has been written for military 
indoctrination, given the extension of the military’s influence on the discourse 
of national identity, the idea of an inferior, weaker, and passive Hindu India 
has infiltrated this wider discourse. 
 
Moreover, Andrew Rotter (1994) highlights how such stereotypes about 
Indian men continued during the Cold War period, particularly among 
Americans and British politicians, and how they were linked to Pakistan’s 
and India’s relations with the US. For instance, Rotter demonstrates how the 
leadership in the US interpreted the dilemma of weapons supply in South 
Asia: 
 
In 1954, the former law partner of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote that 
Indians had “an almost feminine hypersensitiveness with respect to the prestige of 
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their country.” President Dwight D. Eisenhower agreed. Reading of Indian 
objections to the administration’s plan to provide arms for Pakistan, Eisenhower 
wrote Dulles: “This is one area of the world where, even more than most cases, 
emotion rather than reason seems to dictate policy”. (1994, p525) 
 
Rotter further explains that the Americans continued to mirror British 
colonial thinking on martial races and manliness in South Asia16. Rotter cites 
Elbert G. Mathews, State Department Director for South Asia Affairs (1948–
1951), noting that in the US Government, there was “a strong view, based on 
the reading of Kipling, that the martial races of India were in the north, and 
much was now Pakistan. And therefore, the sensible thing for us to do was to 
cozy up to these martial races; they would be a great value to us in the fight 
against communism” (Rotter, 1994, p538). 
 
Hence, Pakistan, despite sharing common cultural and ethnic relations with 
India, continued to produce and reproduce America’s orientalised and 
gendered view of South Asia. As a product of British colonialism, the US 
followed suit and incorporated it into its foreign relations17. Pakistan thus 
benefited not only from the desired military equipment that would enhance 
her capacity towards war-preparedness with India, but also from an orientalist 
and gendered conception of South Asia, used to reproduce colonial discourses 
                                               
16 For an in-depth account of race, martial races and links to masculinity, see Streets (2017), 
who demonstrates how the so-called martial races were integrated through pro-Empire 
political discourses, whereas anti-colonial subjects were usually perceived and represented 
as effeminate. This applied in particular to men from the Bengal region, “from whence many 
nationalists originated”, since Bengali men had “long been believed to be ‘of weaker frame 
and more enervated character’ than other Indians” (2017, p162). This is particularly 
important in understanding the relationship between West and East Pakistan. 
17 Andrew Rotter’s cited article (1994) offers a rich collection of examples from which one 
can observe how US relations with South Asia during the first years of the Cold War were 
gendered and orientalised. 
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on martial races. In the case of Pakistan, this was also reflected in how 
Punjabis ascended further in the political and military domains in the 1950s, 
exercising greater control over the other provinces, including East Pakistan 
where the majority of the population lived. 
 
Thus, by entering security and military agreements with the US, Pakistan 
replaced one imperialist power with another, in her desperate attempt to 
contain the Indian menace. If the independence process that ultimately ended 
British colonial rule was practically negotiated by civilians with little 
interference by the military, the newly independent Pakistan invited the 
interference of a neo-colonial power to South Asia. However, the result 
turned out to be altogether different. For instance, as historian Anita Inder 
Singh notes, “neither American military assistance nor the displacement of 
the British gave Pakistan security against India. (…). In 1954, the main 
American achievement was to dislodge the British from Pakistan and 
simultaneously to quicken the ebbing of British influence in the Middle East” 
(1993, p156). This certainly supports the argument that Pakistan’s foreign 
policy not only became increasingly militarised since the 1950s, but also 
contributed towards the continuation of imperialistic politics in the Middle 
East, where war and conflict continue to this day. 
 
Whilst the 1950s may be seen as crucial to the establishment of a foreign 
policy orientation that is deeply rooted in ideas of masculinity, there are two 
other key moments in the country’s history through which it is possible to 
establish how a militarised and masculinised foreign policy is related to the 
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interlinking of security and identity. Those moments are the 1971 war and the 
nuclearisation of Pakistan. Let us examine each in turn. 
 
 
1.2.2  The 1971 War and Bangladesh Independence 
 
In this sub-section I analyse in what ways the Bangladesh Liberation War in 
1971 represents yet another example of how foreign policy in Pakistan is 
militarised, gendered, and how it reproduces past colonial practices. It is also 
another moment in which the interlinking between security and identity 
shaped the country’s foreign policy, perhaps most strikingly so since 1947. 
Whilst the liberation of Bangladesh is mostly perceived as an inter-state war 
between India and Pakistan, in fact the moment comprises several wars18, and 
still generates different meanings for the various parties involved. 
 
Feminist and postcolonial scholars have demonstrated how nationalist zeal, 
gender, war, and militarism are intrinsically connected (see Sjoberg and Vita, 
2010). The Bangladesh Liberation War constitutes a distinct moment 
associated with Pakistan’s foreign policy that mirrors these connections. 
Whilst there is now a considerable amount of literature about the 1971 war, a 
critical reading of Pakistani foreign policy focusing of the connection 
between colonial practices, gender, sexuality, and war still seems to be 
                                               
18 Ananya J. Kabir (2013) and Yasmin Saikia (2011), in studying how the politics of memory 
and amnesia are discussed in relation to the creation of Bangladesh, make reference to this 
four-fold war: a war between Pakistan and India (international); a war between West and 
East Pakistan (civilian); a war between Bengalis and Biharis (ethnic); and a gender war 
carried out by all the factions involved in the other wars against vulnerable women (Saikia, 
2011; Kabir, 2013). 
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lacking. Accounts of Pakistan’s foreign policy usually refer to the 1971 war 
as a “disaster” (Sattar, 2017), with the event usually being perceived as a 
national humiliation, as the Pakistani army had to surrender to India on 16 
December 1971. Most foreign policy narratives analyse the 1971 war from a 
realist India-centric perspective, focusing on how Pakistan and the US related 
during this period, and how India and the USSR entered into a Friendship 
Treaty. These macro-narratives reproduce the logics of the Cold War, and 
therefore leave no space for an alternative understanding of what happened 
in East Bengal, particularly in respect of genocide and the widespread rape of 
women.  
 
An unsurprising lacuna within Pakistani foreign policy accounts and the state-
sanctioned narrative of the 1971 war is the dismissal of genocide perpetrated 
by the Pakistani army. Reportedly, Bengalis and Bengali Hindus were the 
preferred targets of the army and its collaborators, leading to claims of a 
concerted genocidal plan (see Alamgir and D’Costa, 2011). Moreover, 
Wardatul Akmam takes up a definition of genocide proposed by the UN, and 
concludes that what happened may be qualified as such, since it 
 
includes as victim group “any recognizable group which the perpetrator 
defines” and requires the “intent to destroy the victim group either fully or in 
part.” Judging on the basis of this definition, the massacre in Bangladesh can be 
called genocide in terms of the Bengali nation and the Hindu Bengalis as the 
victim group. It can also be called genocide on the basis of the systematic mass 
rape carried out by the West Pakistanis. (2002, p557) 
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Thus, a civil and inter-state war and a genocide are usually dismissed as a 
‘disaster’. Pakistanis have produced a specific kind of amnesia, often justified 
by the whims of geography, and India’s desire to destroy their country. 
Behind it, state-sanctioned narratives provide a smokescreen for the atrocities 
perpetrated by the Pakistani army. Concerning the major significance and 
consequences of the 1971 war, only one interviewee, AC1, raised the issue 
with me. Significantly, I found that the Pakistani Army Museum in Lahore 
includes a zone dedicated to the 1971 war. According to their interpretation, 
what happened in East Pakistan was “India’s State Sponsoring of Terrorism” 
(Pakistan Army Museum, Lahore). In the same section of the museum, the 
army justifies the 1971 war with reference to “India’s defeat in the 1965 war”, 
and the latter’s wishes to weaken and destroy Pakistan. The Pakistan Army 
denies the existence of 93,000 prisoners of war and invokes “massive acts of 
human rights violations” (ibid.) carried out by the invaders. 
 
This interpretation of the war on the part of Pakistan’s main foreign policy 
actor reveals the military’s capacity and willingness to revise history. For 
instance, the 1965 war with India is widely considered to be a stalemate 
(Burke, 1973; Sattar, 2017). Yet on every 6 September, the Pakistani military 
celebrates the event as a victory. The “massive acts of human rights 
violations”, however, have been documented as being mostly perpetrated by 
the Pakistani army. Whilst there is evidence that extreme wartime violence 
was carried out by both sides – the Pakistani army and the Mukti Bahini19 – 
the former carried the weight of being a professional state institution, 
                                               
19 On the Mukti Bahini, see Bass (2013), Ch. 12. 
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allegedly constituted to defend citizens and not to exercise violence against 
them. 
 
The narration of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War continues to be based 
on disagreements, particularly as to the extent of the violence perpetrated by 
the Pakistani army (Zakaria, 2019). Whilst the latter continues to promote 
narratives that deny the genocidal violence20, research has concluded that the 
Pakistani military is responsible for the death of nearly three million people21, 
including the use of rape as genocide (Jahan, 2013; Sharlach, 2000; Akmam, 
2002; Rummel, 1997). Moreover, the genocidal violence exercised by the 
Pakistani army has been described as an example and a consequence of the 
hegemonic masculinity that characterises military institutions. 
 
In the case of the 1971 war, this hegemonic masculinity was combined with 
the reproduction of colonial concepts in relation to gender and ethnicity. Bina 
D’Costa (2014) provides an important account of the relationship between 
military hegemonic masculinity and the reproduction of a colonial ethos by 
the Pakistani army during the 1971 war. She examines the memoirs of four 
Pakistani generals who participated in the war. In those books D’Costa found 
that those generals viewed the Bengalis through the lens of colonial Britain. 
The Pakistani generals reproduced the meaning created by the British 
                                               
20 For instance, an article published in Hilal English (December 2020 edition) clearly intends 
to contribute towards the denial of the Pakistan Army’s war atrocities. The article may be 
found here: https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/1971:-the-need-to-reconcile-with-actual-
facts/NDcxMg==.html  
21 Ronaq Jahan highlights the fact that “the genocide in Bangladesh, which started with the 
Pakistani military operation against unarmed citizens on the night of March 25, continued 
unabated for nearly nine months until the Bengali nationalists, with the help of the Indian 
army, succeeded in liberating the country from Pakistani occupation forces on December 16, 
1971” (2013, p254). 
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concerning the existence of certain ‘martial races’ and therefore of an 
idealised masculinity best suited to the military. Thus, the Bengalis were 
described as weak, short, and with darkened skin in comparison to the 
emasculated, predominantly Punjabi, Pakistani army. 
 
This is relevant for understanding how Pakistanis could not, and indeed still 
do not, accept the humiliation they faced upon being defeated by those whose 
combat skills and masculinity were deemed inferior. In the same work, 
D’Costa notes that the generals dismissed and delegitimised the role of the 
Mukthi Bahini on this account of being a ‘weak race’ and claimed that “the 
military conflict was fought between the Indian and Pakistani armies” (2014, 
p464). Because the Pakistani army could not come to terms with the defeat 
they encountered at the hands of a less manly enemy, and because they were 
also perceived as being associated with Hindu India, the army seems to have 
justified its genocidal actions by resorting to what D’Costa calls ‘genocidal 
masculinity’, in order to save the state (2014, p465). D’Costa goes on to note 
that  
 
the Pakistani military believed that Hindus were responsible for the revolt and 
that as soon as the Hindu problem was solved, the trouble would cease. As such, 
the construction of Hindus as enemies and disloyal citizens resulted into the 
annihilation strategy of the Pakistani military that could clearly be recognized 
as genocide, and a variety of rituals formed the social practices within a meaning 
system governed by genocidal masculinity. (2014, p466) 
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The fact that to date Pakistan has never officially apologised for the 1971 
events and is unable to acknowledge the genocidal practices carried out by 
her army might explain why in the Army Museum one can read about 
“massive acts of human rights violations”. The Pakistani army believes, and 
wishes to normalise the narrative, that only an enemy of inferior military 
formation and inferior rationality and manliness could carry out human rights 
violations, and not a professional army. Thus, it is possible to understand how 
Pakistani identity after 1971 became further masculinised, further 
‘Punjabinised’, and yet the ‘Hindu India’ threat became further enhanced. 
It is important to note that the centrality of India remains intact on this 
interlinking between identity and security. The 1971 events and the 
consequent liberation of Bangladesh are an example of how the state of 
Pakistan is able to use its monopoly of violence to the extreme to preserve 
what it has imagined as the ‘ideal Pakistani identity’, i.e., one that must be 
disentangled from its Indic origins, one that fits into the binaries created 
during the British Empire, where certain concepts of masculinity and racial 
hardiness are associated with power, virility, strength, and combativeness 
which are opposed to those of an Other that is viewed as weak, effeminate, 
lazy, irrational, and therefore unable to effectively engage in combat. 
However, whilst a new Pakistani identity emerged after 1971, arguably the 
flawed two-nation theory that had been used to justify India’s partition 
collapsed against her Other. The very act of capitulating to India took on a 
specific meaning. The idea of a Pakistan equated with the ‘homeland’ for 
Indian Muslims collapsed. This collapse was certainly fuelled by how West 
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Pakistanis and the Punjab-based army perceived East Pakistanis – namely, as 
‘Hinduised Muslims’, not true Muslims, or Hindus. The Pakistani leadership 
was unable to sustain the idea of a ‘Muslim homeland’, based on cultural and 
religious diversity. While the ‘two-nation’ theory was never abandoned by 
the state elite, the reality is that in present-day Pakistan, the ‘two-nation’ 
theory has been principally enacted and appropriated by the Sunni, Punjab-
based leadership. In an interview with GO2 during 2017, he corroborated the 
idea that it is Sunni institutions that built Pakistan’s national identity 
narrative. 
 
To worsen Pakistan’s foreign policy options in South Asia, after 1971 India 
reconfirmed her hegemonic status in the region, and an independent 
Bangladesh did not become an Islamic state and instead adopted a secular 
constitution. The outcome of the 1971 war confirms how the Pakistani 
leadership was unable to govern in a multi-ethnic society, whose demands 
and feelings never fully coincided with how Pakistan was imagined and then 
amalgamated. To be sure, ethnic/sub-national conflicts did not end in 1971, 
nor did the blame cease to be directed at India. A key example is how, a few 
years after Bangladeshi independence, Z.A. Bhutto once more became 
involved in the suppression of a ‘rebellion’ in Balochistan, with brutal force 
(Cohen, 2016). Under Bhutto’s orders, “The Pakistan army sent in 
approximately 80,000 soldiers to crush the rebellion with logistical support 
from the Shah of Iran who was afraid that the disturbance would spill over 
into western Balochistan” (Jaffrelot, 2015, p364). 
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Pakistan may have partially recovered from self-inflicted damage, by 
skilfully controlling a politics of amnesia and distorting the facts. Pakistan 
never apologised to Bangladesh (see D’Costa, 2011). Rasul Bakhsh Rais 
suggests that in the case of Bangladesh, “Pakistan was unable to translate 
emotive Muslim nationalism into a concrete social contract which would have 
been broad and open, and flexible enough to provide room for the 
accommodation of interests” (2017, p199). Whilst this is true, it does not 
explain why the elite based in West Pakistan acted in a typical colonial 
manner towards citizens living in the East (Ahmed, 1973; Zakaria, 2019; 
Jahan, 2013). A possible explanation is offered by D’Costa (2011), as she 
enumerates four factors, based on findings by South Asian scholars that 
possibly led to the break-up. These factors are: territorial; economic; cultural; 
and political. The interlinking of these factors, however, reveals how a 
postcolonial state put into practice the colonial practices of British India, as I 
explained earlier. 
 
However, the desire of attaining a ‘truly Islamic’ identity, which would not 
be associated with perceived Hindu cultural and linguistic practices, appears 
to be Pakistan’s great achievement after being defeated in the 1971 war. A 
lost war was seen as an opportunity to not only further militarise, given that 
the ‘Indian threat’ indeed materialised, but also to imagine an identity that 
could finally part ways with Indic origins. Hence, the possibility of having an 
identity that could be distinguished from perceived physical weakness, 
enervation, and effeminacy came to be viewed as compensation for the 
humiliation suffered, which state-sanctioned narratives portray as ‘saving 
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Pakistan’. The army’s masculine genocidal practices have enabled this 
process. Yet, the 1971 war also accelerated the militarisation and 
masculinisation of Pakistan’s identity and foreign policy. It opened the door 
to the nuclearization of Pakistan, as I will examine in the next sub-section. 
 
1.2.3  Re-affirming Islamic identity: a pathway to nuclear Pakistan 
 
In this sub-section, I am interested in analysing how the nuclearization of 
Pakistan became a decisive factor in consolidating military might and its 
associated hyper-masculinity, and how this impacted the interlinking between 
identity and security. In the previous sub-section, I explained how the 1971 
Bangladesh Liberation War constitutes a moment of great humiliation for the 
state of Pakistan, and yet the latter has created a specific kind of amnesia that 
veils the genocidal atrocities. 
 
The post-war moment in Pakistan became one of redefinition with regard to 
state identity. This redefinition happened via the pursuit of two interlinked 
goals: to redefine the Islamic credentials of state identity, and to achieve the 
status of a nuclear power. Feroz Khan, a former Brigadier General closely 
associated with the nuclear project, suggests that in the quest to become a 
nuclear power, national identity is a driving factor and becomes its own 
symbol (Khan, 2012, p9). The author also highlights how the scientific and 
technological challenges associated with the whole process of mastering 
nuclear energy (for civilian use or otherwise) are crucial in constructing a 
national identity discourse bound up with modernity. Khan suggests that “for 
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countries that might have quite a mixed bag of indicators of modernity and 
progress, nuclear weapons are a potent symbol of the national scientific 
establishment” (2012, p10).  
 
This is certainly true in the case of Pakistan. Whilst some nuclear armed 
countries do not usually associate this symbolism with their national identity 
discourses (France and the UK, for example), others like Pakistan and India 
have fully integrated this symbolism into the discourse around their national 
identities. In the case of Pakistan, there are two sub-factors that are articulated 
in the nuclear weapons’ discourse on national identity. One is that of sacrifice, 
while the other is Islam, with the latter spanning several different levels of 
the discourse of national identity. 
 
Whilst the 1971 war increased Pakistan’s perceptions of the ‘India threat’, it 
also caused further dissatisfaction with security alliances and bilateral 
agreements with the US. These did not produce the predicted goal of 
preventing a war with India. Ultimately, as I will examine later, this sense of 
renewed insecurity prompted Pakistan to end the policy of nuclear abstinence 
(Sattar, 2017). Abdul Sattar justifies Pakistan’s choice in this regard as being 
based on “India’s exploitation of Pakistan’s internal political troubles, 
encouragement and assistance to separatism in East Pakistan, violation of the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs … the reluctance of allies to 
come to Pakistan’s rescue, and the powerlessness of the United Nations … 
[As a result,] Pakistan had to devise its own means to ensure its security and 
survival” (2017 p165). Feroz Khan, however, justifies the pursuit of a nuclear 
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weapons programme on account of it being “the only way to prevent such 
humiliation in the future and to preserve Pakistan. Never Again would 
Pakistan be subject to disgrace at the hands of others” (2012, p8). 
 
It is problematic to dismiss ‘internal troubles’ when these have often been 
described as genocide, or as ‘genocidal masculinity’ (D’Costa, 2014). 
Pakistan’s leadership sought to make up for its humiliation by constructing a 
national identity narrative that involved a re-asserting of its Islamic elements 
and powerful weaponry. This is the pervasive rationale that underpins 
Pakistan’s justification to go nuclear. Ultimately, Pakistan’s decision on 
nuclear weapons helped to iterate the representation of India not only as an 
enemy, but also as an Other belonging to a different civilisation. 
 
The state leadership’s need to re-design a new context for the flawed two-
nation theory is significant. Whilst the 1971 war exposed the flaws of the two-
nation theory, the state elite perceived it otherwise and retained it at the centre 
of the country’s raison d’être, together with the belief that Pakistan must 
defend Islam. Thus, the ‘defending Islam’ narrative was incorporated into the 
state’s identity as a departure from its Indic South Asian origins, as it also 
became a foreign policy goal. In this respect, C. Christine Fair notes that 
Pakistan and India are thus locked “in a civilizational struggle”, as Pakistan 
“must defend Islam and the two-nation theory against what many Pakistanis 
believe to be an India dedicated to undermining it and thus the very legitimacy 
of the Pakistani state” (2014, p10). 
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This perspective on how Pakistani state-based identity constructs her Other 
(India) is further intensified by the Hindu nationalist theory of Akhand Bharat 
(or Undivided India) in India, and the representation of the same in Pakistan 
as hegemonic designs on the part of India. Aparna Pande suggests that whilst 
this ‘theory’ “has been disproved by historic reality […] its salience endures 
in Pakistani strategic thinking” (2011, p57). The Pakistani state is also 
represented as being solely responsible for its insecurity predicament, mainly 
because of its smaller territorial size and resources. Avtar Singh Bhasin 
(2018), for instance, makes a pertinent observation that connects Pakistan 
with a masculine, ‘hard rule’ legacy of the Mughal Empire in India. Bhasin 
notes:  
 
Pakistan believed that the legacy of the Mughal Empire had fallen on its shoulders, 
and its superiority over the Hindu India was a historical fact. The believers of the 
two-nation theory had a misplaced faith on the superiority of the Muslims vis-à-vis 
the Hindus. Obsessed with history, they believed that in any war against India, their 
victory was assured as they were the ghazis or the chosen people. (2018, p415) 
 
In addition, Dibyesh Anand notes that, in Hinduised India, particularly 
amongst the proponents and defenders of Hindutva, it is Pakistan/Muslims 
that “are solely responsible for the partition of Akhanda Bharat (united 
India)” (2016, p15). Thus, Pakistan is represented in India as a state that has 
created the conditions to endure self-inflicted insecurity, based on a shared 
Indian past, whilst being held responsible for having partitioned India. Yet, 
in Pakistan, Akhanda Bharat theory also lives on. In September 2017, I 
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interviewed AC6,22 who added that “if India would have the opportunity, it 
will attack us”. Therefore, Pakistan’s state elite, and a large percentage of the 
public, perceives and represents India as an enemy. The threat here is 
perceived as being directed toward the ‘Muslim identity’ and Pakistan’s 
territorial sovereignty. 
 
Until now, I have examined how different foreign policy related events have 
accentuated Pakistan’s alterity in relation to India, and how defending an 
Islamic identity and territorial sovereignty entered into and inflected the main 
goals of the country’s foreign policy. However, post-war isolation did not last 
very long. In 1974, with the Islamic Summit held in Lahore, isolation 
subsided, as Pakistan was desperately looking to improve her image in the 
international community. As Tahir-Kheli suggests, “the fact that a Pakistani 
leader was elected Chairman of the Conference reflected the new-found 
identity which enabled Islamabad to play a more dynamic role in Islamic 
affairs than warranted by virtue of its size and economic resources” (1983, 
p82). The Lahore Summit was of cardinal importance for Pakistan’s foreign 
relations, and it had a significant impact on domestic politics as well. It 
consolidated Z.A. Bhutto’s leadership, as he could easily oscillate between a 
Pakistani nationalist and a Muslim socialist (Syed, 1982, p132). Pakistan 
expressed solidarity with the Arabs thus attempting to dissipate the 
consequences of previous closer ties with the US. This solidarity, as 
mentioned earlier, would be converted into economic benefits. Crucially, 
                                               
22 During the same interview, AC6 affirmed: “I’m a hawk”; “I’m in favour of nukes”; and 
“I’m a military child”. 
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Ishtiaq Ahmed suggests that the “Islamic Summit was a grand exercise in 
national projection by Bhutto. It greatly exaggerated Pakistan’s military 
capabilities but was consistent with earlier examples of Pakistani leaders 
marketing their state and nation to foreign powers in the hope that such 
services would return dividends in the form of economic and military aid” 
(2013, p221). Furthermore, economically it proved crucial to Bhutto’s 
ambitions to develop nuclear technology.  
 
The instrumental role of Z.A. Bhutto in Pakistan’s politics since 1971 would 
now bear fruit in terms of foreign policy and the recasting of a new identity 
for Pakistan. At Bhutto’s hands, Islamic ideology was extensively 
manipulated and pragmatically introduced into foreign policy. The 
dislocation of identity throughout the Middle East23, where oil revenues 
easily mixed with religious orthodoxies, extended their influence into 
Pakistan’s domestic policies, where legitimacy was given at the expense of 
further undermining the already weak basis for Pakistani citizenship24.  
 
After a chaotic period initiated with the 1971 civil war, Pakistan was able to 
re-engage itself into its international community of choice, the Muslim world. 
With it, the conditions of possibility for finding a new identity, one dislocated 
                                               
23 In 1992 at a seminar dedicated to foreign policy, organised by the Institute of Policy 
Studies, Islamabad, a senior associate, whilst discussing the media impact on foreign policy, 
suggested that: “Today, if we have this intense longing for pan-Islamism, if we entertain 
those notions of establishing a universal Islamic State, it is only because the essence of our 
nation is Islam, because it is committed historically and constitutionally to the Islamic 
aspirations of the Muslim Ummah. Likewise, when we turn our back on the Indian continent 
and face radiantly the emerging Muslim nations of Central Asia and Middle East, it is because 
ours is a Muslim people” (Tarik Jan, 1993, p107).  
24 The Ahmadi controversy became the exponent of Bhutto’s government towards the 
Islamisation of the country. Marc Gaboriaeu correctly observes that Bhutto opened the gates 
to fundamentalism (2004, p247). 
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from South Asia and South-East Asia towards West Asia, were forged. 
Barbara Metcalf cites a 1977 publication by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
in which it is stated: 
 
After the confusion of the past … after the hypocritical separation of the Islamic 
loyalty from the Islamic imperatives of justice between people and regions which 
was responsible for the disaster of 1971, Pakistan has now rediscovered its Islamic 
identity and set its feet firmly on the path ordained for it by its everlasting faith. The 
path is that of promoting the brotherhood of all Muslim peoples and helping to 
banish divisive prejudices. (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
cited in Metcalf, 2004, p230) 
 
This desire to disengage from the ideational origins of the subcontinent also 
emerged during my fieldwork in Pakistan. The interviews I conducted 
revealed that Pakistanis wish to be seen differently from India. AC2 
mentioned that Pakistan’s “historical and cultural ties with Iran, Afghanistan, 
Turkey and Central Asian states have been overshadowed by the history of 
animosity with Indians – more specifically ‘Hindus’”, while AM1 intimated 
that “because of national identity”, “Pakistan opens to three predominantly 
Muslim regions: Middle East, West Asia, and Central Asia”. Also, in the 
words of GO1: “Pakistan tends to have closer relations and affinity with the 
Middle-East”; “Iran and Turkey are important to Pakistan”; “Persian 
language is part of culture, and Iqbal wrote better in Persian”; “The Mughal 
Empire lasted for a long period of time, and Pakistan shares this cultural 
identity with the Mughal Period”. 
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With an imagined identity now freer from Hinduised South Asia, the 
Pakistani state elite could concentrate on striving for what it saw as the 
ultimate solution to the India threat: a nuclear weapon. Thus, after a moment 
of re-orientation in search of a national origin and identity away from a 
perceived weaker, effeminate Hindu, in preference of those perceived as 
stronger and of a combative nature. To be sure, the establishment of the 
Mughal Empire in South Asia constitutes a proud and glorious memory in 
Pakistan’s identity and culture. 
 
 
US opposes a nuclear Pakistan 
President Z.A. Bhutto initiated the démarches towards the establishment of a 
nuclear weapons programme. Plans to construct a reprocessing plant were 
implemented. Also, India’s 1974 nuclear explosion reinforced Bhutto’s 
commitment to turn Pakistan into a nuclear power. Initially, Pakistan trod 
carefully in persuading the UN to approve a resolution to make South Asia a 
nuclear-weapons-free zone (Sattar, 2017). However, Z.A. Bhutto had 
different plans, and under his leadership, Pakistan tried to pursue a foreign 
policy based on bilateral relations, which, to a certain extent, was successful 
in maintaining a proactive relationship with the US. The latter continued to 
provide economic and military aid to Pakistan in the post-war period. 
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However, as soon as Bhutto announced Pakistan’s intentions to begin a 
nuclear programme, the US25 voiced its disapproval. The latter tried 
unsuccessfully to persuade Pakistan to give up its nuclear ambitions. Though 
Bhutto was determined, so too was Henry Kissinger, who had latterly been 
fully against the weaponisation of Pakistan. Kissinger visited Pakistan on 
several occasions, offering more advanced military aid, but also threatening 
to cut funds, thus attempting to dissuade Pakistan from pursuing its plan 
(Ahmed, 2013, p222). Nixon’s exit and the transition to Gerald Ford’s 
administration brought no significant changes to Pakistan-US relations. The 
major theme remained confined to military aid, backed by Washington. 
However, the nuclear issue did not disappear. The US continued to reiterate 
its opposition to a Pakistan-owned nuclear programme. 
 
While a more forceful US stance on Pakistan’s nuclear programme ambitions 
was toned down during the Reagan administration, the US did not leave the 
issue unchecked. The US promoted ‘incentives’ for Pakistan not to go 
nuclear, which included the sale of F-16 fighter jets, under a relaxation of the 
Symington Amendment (Ahmed, 2013). These offers notwithstanding, 
Pakistan resisted the bait, and continued clandestinely to pursue its first 
nuclear bomb. During the 1980s, however, the United States chose to bypass 
non-proliferation legislation, so that Pakistan could continue to receive aid in 
support of the Afghan war (Chakma, 2002). In view of non-proliferation 
legislation and in order to maintain Pakistan’s key strategic status as a 
                                               
25 The Unites States and Britain laboured intensively to prevent Pakistan from obtaining a 
nuclear weapons programme. See Craig (2016). 
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frontline state, the US had to turn a blind eye to Pakistan. As Chakma 
explains:  
 
from 1985 to 1989 President Reagan and President Bush certified every year that 
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device … They did so despite strong 
evidence that Pakistan had been making significant advances in acquiring nuclear 
weapons capability … Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold by 1987 … The 
Reagan and Bush Administration in 1987, 1988, and 1989 improperly certified that 
Pakistan did not possess this capability, in order to avoid the imposition of sanctions 
under the Pressler Amendment. (2002, p896) 
 
Yet, Pakistan remained undeterred. With the end of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the consequent loss of US patronage, the nuclear 
programme shifted from a nuclear energy one to a military-oriented project 
(Chakma, 2002, p873). Pakistan perceived there to be a rise in insecurity, and 
the state elite remained committed to their desire to go nuclear. 
 
The pursuance of nuclear weapons was, to a greater extent, made possible 
because in the first stages, the US could not fully implement the NPT 
requisites or its domestic legislation. The fact that the US turned a ‘blind eye’ 
(Akhtar, 2018) must be accounted for. The US’s interests in the Afghan war 
overlapped with non-proliferation policies, and that certainly benefited 
Pakistan. The relationship that initially sought to bring about security, after 
many decades of disappointment, finally bore results, if one believes that 
nuclear weapons are the ultimate security provider for a state26. Pakistan’s 
                                               
26 I am opposed to the existence and possession of nuclear weapons by any country, as well 
as an international order determined by their existence. The question posed within the critical 
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irreversible decision to opt for the most radical security solution altered not 
only the ways in which the US related to Pakistan, but also how Pakistan 
performed her national identity from that point on.  
 
If until the end of the Afghan war, Pakistan escaped the non-proliferation 
sanctions regime, namely the famous Pressler Amendment, the same did not 
happen during the 1990s, when the US President stopped certifying Pakistan. 
However, Pakistan denied that it possessed such capacity and reportedly 
dismissed the fact that the US would implement the Pressler Amendment, a 
move that would prompt heavy sanctions (Kux, 2001). The Pakistani 
leadership wrongly assessed the US’s intentions, which, coupled with the 
irreversible decision of rolling back the nuclear programme, led to the 
effective implementation of the Pressler Amendment, which was on hold 
since 1985. 
 
The imposition of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment resulted in 
important losses for Pakistan in terms of arms and military supplies, as “all 
US military assistance and government-to-government transfers of weapons 
and equipment were halted” (Kux, 2001, p309). The impact of the sanctions 
was thus felt at both civilian and military levels; however, it did not stop 
Pakistan from continuing to develop nuclear weapons. The implementation 
of the Pressler Amendment carried an important meaning for Pakistan-US 
relations. Unlike in past decades, when the relationship had endured several 
                                               
security studies literature of ‘whose security?’ in relation to nuclear weapons is rather 
pertinent as a starting point to question the real value of nuclear weapons. 
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challenges, including sanctions, this time Pakistan had already endured the 
traumatic experience of a loss of territory, and the Afghan war, compounded 
with other regional developments, including the Iranian Revolution, all of 
which aggravated the country’s sense of insecurity. Once the possibility of 
obtaining the ultimate security assurance had been opened up, Pakistan 
engaged in the dual task of pursuing security and forging a national identity 
that could compensate for previous losses. Pakistan endured the severity of 
the Pressler Amendment, helped by China. The rupture with the US created 
sufficient space for Pakistan to enhance her security capabilities, to bolster 
her relations with China, and to assert her national identity vis-à-vis India, as 
if Pakistan had to prove once and for all that she was no longer vulnerable to 
her Eastern neighbour.  
 
AC6 stated in an interview in 2017, while discussing whether Pakistan had a 
foreign policy27, that this question arose merely to “show Pakistan as a weak 
state, and to create a dependency engineered narrative”. AC6 went on to 
suggest that the nuclear programme, “which was obtained under a strict 
regime of sanctions”, showed that “Pakistan is not a weak state, it is not 
cunning, it is clever [and] it has used its space”. Indeed, sanctions did not 
deter Pakistan, and, taking into account the restrictions imposed, the fact that 
in 1998 Pakistan conducted a nuclear test, thus making official her status as 
a nuclear power, certainly leaves room to examine not only the determination 
of Pakistani state elites to pursue a long-term plan, but also how security came 
                                               
27 This question has been raised on several occasions by different commentators. To be sure, 
even if the foreign policy of a country may appear inadequate, or ineffective, by definition, 
foreign policy will always exist so long as a nation-state exists. 
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to occupy such a central place within Pakistan’s external and internal 
relations.  
 
Hitherto, I have explained how nuclear weapons played a significant role in 
the construction of a state-level imagined national identity, which is perceived 
to be supported by a generalised national solidarity28. While there are critics 
and so-called ‘nuclear cautionists’ in Pakistan, in general, and for the duration 
of my fieldwork, I found evidence of acceptance and pride in the idea of a 
nuclear Pakistan. During an interview with AC6, I was told that “if it was not 
because of nuclear weapons, India would have already invaded”. When I 
asked the interviewee which international political event(s) posed a bigger 
challenge for Pakistan foreign policymakers, she stated: “guarding Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons development (which was clandestine to begin with) has been 
the biggest challenge throughout the decades of 1970s and 1980s”. 
 
Nuclear Pakistan has generated and indeed continues to generate a significant 
number of representations that are reflected in the construction of the 
interlinking between security and identity. Earlier I analysed how the 1950s 
marked an important phase in Pakistan’s foreign policy, and how the 1971 
war contributed towards the militarisation and masculinisation of the state 
                                               
28 I had the opportunity to see first-hand how close A.Q. Khan is to the hearts of (young) 
Pakistanis, and how he is revered as a ‘national hero’. He was the Chief-Guest at the annual 
convocation of the university I worked at during my fieldwork in Lahore. As soon as he 
reached the main stage, he received a prolonged standing ovation, in front of nearly 5,000 
people. I recall being taken by surprise, somehow shocked, given Khan’s direct involvement 
in illegal nuclear proliferation, which caused Pakistan to be represented as an irresponsible 
and dangerous nuclear state, and more like a ‘nuclear bazaar’. As my research progressed, I 
became more aware of how ‘national heroes’ are narrated, how replicas of nuclear missiles 
serve as urban decorations, how during national holidays – 23 March and 14 August, for 
instance – national flags with printed missiles are displayed. In sum, Pakistanis display a 
great degree of outward support for their nuclear weapons. 
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identity. Nuclear Pakistan is not just a continuation of these processes, which 
are seen to structure the country’s relations of power specifically towards 
India; it is also considered to be the ultimate strategy in striving to make 
Pakistan invincible and most powerful, again specifically in relation to India. 
 
A feminist approach to IR, which valorises anti-militarism, is useful in 
analysing how Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are interlinked with security and 
state identity. Several scholars (for instance, Cohn, 1987, 1997; Duncanson 
and Eschle, 2008; Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick, 2005) have analysed how 
language associated with nuclear weapons is highly gendered and sexualised 
to invoke notions of masculine potency29. This translates into how for 
instance the nuclear jargon is a technostrategic one (Cohn, 1987), whilst at 
the same time it is expressed in euphemisms. In her work, Cohn highlights 
how this language is a “sanitized abstraction” full of “sexual imagery” that 
“seemed to fit into the masculine world of nuclear war planning” (1987, p19). 
She also mentions expressions such as “escalation dominance”, “preemptive 
strikes”, or “strategic stability”, which are strongly connected with the 
symbolism associated with gender roles and the masculine sexual imaginary. 
Also, Duncanson and Eschle (2008) identify how the feminist critique of 
nuclear weapons exposes the language that states use: “first, the deployment 
                                               
29 The work of Helen Caldicott (1984) is also noteworthy in this regard. She discusses the 
post-WWII arms race and how “missile envy” can be likened to “penis envy”. Interestingly, 
an article published in Hilal Magazine (July 2020) on “India’s Arms Obsession and Power 
Psychosis” uses an image representing a Hindu Indian, dreaming of becoming a strong, 
muscly man, while two large nuclear missiles are also pictured side by side. It can be seen 
here: https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/india%E2%80%99s-arms-obsession-and-
power-psychosis/MzgxNw==.html 
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of sexualised, phallic imagery; second, a tendency to abstraction; and, third, 
a reliance on gendered axioms” (2008, p548).  
 
Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick note that weapons of mass destruction are political 
objects whose “gendered terms and symbols are an integral part of how 
political issues are thought about and represented, and an integral part of the 
image-production associated with political leaders” (2005, p3). Thus, when 
AC6, talking about nuclear weapons, mentioned to me that Pakistan is not a 
‘weak’ or ‘cunning state’ and that it is a ‘clever state that used its space’, she 
is providing a representation of Pakistan that is highly heterosexually 
masculinised;30 it is a state that should not be portrayed as a ‘transgressor’ 
(despite the clandestine nuclear weapons plans). This speaks to the 
interrelation of identity and security through a conception of a state that could 
achieve a nuclear weapons programme because it is perceived to be strong, 
intelligent, and rational. These representations are in line with the findings of 
the feminist, anti-military critique of nuclear weapons. 
 
Another aspect that is relevant in seeking to understand how nuclear weapons 
in Pakistan have contributed towards the militarisation and consequent 
                                               
30 Charlotte Hooper provides important insights on the importance of contextualising 
masculinity, and of considering it a “fluid and plural construction as soon as it is historically 
contextualized” (2001, p75). Thus, as she notes, whilst the feminist critique of masculinism 
is often useful in terms of establishing identifications of masculinity with power, it tends to 
provide a monolithic view of it (ibid.). Thus, masculinities can be represented in different 
categories, including subordinated masculinities. To be sure, heteronormativity means that 
heterosexual masculinity is represented not only as hegemonic, but also as the kind of 
masculinity that is not ‘transgressive’ and therefore can be associated with power, control, 
and performance. In this case, reiterating that Pakistan is not weak, that despite its clandestine 
nuclear programme the country was able to undertake and control it, is but an enforcement 
of a masculinity that is perceived as the ‘right’ one capable of being ‘in control’ and of 
‘performing’. 
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masculinisation of the state concerns how Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and the 
language employed appear to emulate that of NATO. In an article published 
in the 2019 Winter edition of The Washington Quarterly, Sadia Tasleem and 
Toby Dalton explain how the Pakistani discourse and thinking on nuclear 
weapons has less of an indigenous influence, and instead appears to be 
adapted from Western nuclear and strategic thinkers, who inspired the 
Western Cold War and NATO approaches to deterrence. The authors 
highlight that several writings by Pakistani nuclear strategists perform a kind 
of emulation in what appears to be an attempt to secure legitimacy, borrowing 
concepts and language, and in some cases deducting lessons from Western 
nuclear experience (Tasleem and Dalton, 2019, p137). 
 
Thus, the nuclearisation of Pakistan also represents how power relations 
between the West and developing countries is articulated. As Pakistan 
endured a continuous process of militarisation, following a strategic line of 
thinking associated with a military alliance seems unsurprising given that 
NATO is considered to be an institution of international hegemonic 
masculinity (see Kronsell, 2005; Wright, Hurley, and Ruiz, 2019). This 
dovetails with what nuclear weapons represent and how Pakistan’s search for 
greater empowerment is closely linked to a notion of attaining the status of a 
strong, hard country. It is also possible that those Pakistani nuclear scholars 
have an orientalised notion that the West is technologically more advanced, 
rational, and better able to control risk (all features that are attributed to a 
gendered symbolic system that represents a dominant heterosexual 
masculinity), and therefore are aiming to be perceived as such. For instance, 
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Hugh Gusterson notes the existence of a “nuclear orientalism”, based on the 
fact that the Western, and in particular the US, defence establishment believes 
that the existence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries, and 
particularly Islamic ones, is extremely dangerous (1999, p112). Gusterson 
further develops this argument and concludes that nuclear policies often 
represent neo-colonial power relations between developing/Third World 
countries and the West. He argues that existing non-proliferation policies are 
derived from a system of domination of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, which represents 
the latter as ineligible to possess nuclear weapons (Gusterson, 1999, p132). 
There are several reasons why Western leaders perceive other countries as 
unfit to have nuclear weapons. Third World countries are represented as 
‘criminals’, ‘infantile’, and ‘emotive’, and therefore lacking the legitimacy 
and rationality deemed necessary to have nuclear weapons.  
 
However, whilst introducing a caveat that nuclear weapons must be 
abolished, an orientalist discourse on nuclear weapons is not acceptable. It 
reinforces a colonial view of international politics where different states are 
positioned within a hierarchy that is represented by pejorative terms, and, as 
Zubairu Wai observes, these representations create “a paradigmatic binary 
opposition between what is constructed as normal and what is pathological: 
if what is Western is defined as normal, then the non-Western … Other has 
to be abnormal, inadequate, deviant or pathological” (2012, p37). 
In the concrete case of Pakistan, this orientalist view on the part of Western-
centric narratives has been partly reinforced, mainly due to the actions of a 
few men involved in the nuclear weapons programme. Some of Pakistan’s 
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nuclear scientists developed key connections with international terrorist 
groups. A certain Mahmood Sultan Bashir-Ud-Din, as described by Levy and 
Scott-Clark (2007), developed connections with the Taliban. He also wrote 
and published a pamphlet entitled “Mechanics of Doomsday and Life after 
Death” in which he argued that natural catastrophes were inevitable in 
countries that succumbed to “moral decay”31, while predicting in another 
treatise that “by 2002 millions may die through mass destruction weapons … 
terrorist attack, and suicide” (Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, p310). Mahmood, 
according to the authors, was forced to retire when, following the 1998 
nuclear tests, he described them as “property of the Muslim Ummah, and 
publicly advocated that KRL should provide gas centrifuges and enriched 
uranium to arm other Islamic states” (ibid.). According to the authors, 
Mahmood and another colleague had joined a religious-militant-group-cum-
charity32 named Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (translated as “Reconstruction of the 
Muslim Community”) and entered into contact with Osama Bin Laden in 
Afghanistan. Allegedly, the latter showed great interest in obtaining nuclear 
weapons. 
 
                                               
31 “Moral decay” in Pakistan is often referred to certain aspects of culture associated with the 
West, and with Indian culture too. Such culture is perceived as yet another threat to Pakistan. 
A full catalogue of what is perceived as “moral decay” may be found in the following article, 
written by a retired Brigadier General in 2018, under the title “Pakistan: Declining Moral 
Standards”. Available at: https://www.globalvillagespace.com/pakistan-declining-moral-
standards/.  
32 The group has been classified as a terrorist organisation linked to Al-Qaeda. According to 
the United Nations: “Ummah Tameer e-Nau (UTN) was founded by Pakistani nuclear 
scientists with close ties to Usama bin Laden (deceased) and the Taliban. UTN provided 
Usama bin Laden and the Taliban with information about chemical, biological and nuclear 
weapons. UTN’s directors included Mahmood Sultan Bashir-Ud-Din (QDi.055), Majeed 
Abdul Chaudhry (QDi.054) and Mohammed Tufail (QDi.056)” (UN, 2015). Available from: 
https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/umma
h-tameer-e-nau-%28utn%29 
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Moreover, when it was revealed in 2004 how A.Q. Khan ran his “nuclear 
bazaar”, Pakistan’s aspirations to match India’s global image were buried. 
Pakistan’s foreign policy, already facing much discredit, except for in the US, 
due to the GWOT, had hit a new low (see Levy and Clark, 2009, p2). The 
critical question here is how and why Pakistan’s military clique risked so 
much, theoretically putting in danger the stability of a world order, given that 
A.Q. Khan proliferated with countries like North Korea and Libya, together 
with close contacts with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Yet, despite the serious 
proliferation issues that took place in parallel with the development of the 
whole nuclear weapons programme, Pakistanis continue to feel great pride in 
their nuclear weapons, including on the part of the man who contributed both 
to their “glory” and “shame”: A.Q. Khan. What threat could indeed justify 
the dangerous and clandestine activities of a network headed by someone who 
has become a national hero. There is only one answer: India. 
 
Thus, in the domestic realm of politics, nuclear Pakistan is now represented 
as a fusion between the needs of security and a much sought-after identity. 
This identity is infused with vainglory that is compared to other great 
achievements of the Muslim Civilisation, and is seen as being on a par with 
India. However, this new state identity is also internationally equated with 
discourses that construct nuclear weapons as abhorrent and morally 
indefensible. Because of the orientalist perspective of the Western nuclear-
armed states, which portray themselves as “responsible, prudent, rational, 
advanced, mature, restrained, technologically and bureaucratically competent 
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(and thus ‘hegemonically masculine’)” (Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick, 2005, p8), 
Pakistan, a highly masculinised country, finds itself at a crossroads. 
 
Despite Pakistan’s hyper-masculinity and desire to be recognised as a ‘hard’ 
country with aims of becoming a leader in the Muslim world, time and again 
her leadership has been confronted with the problem of being one of the 
West’s Others. The country is often represented as an ‘unruly other’, a realm 
of unpredictable politics and incompetency, thus relegating her to a position 
of perceived ‘subordinated masculinity’.  
 
However, nuclear apologists in Pakistan are unwilling to accept the narrative 
of subordination. For instance, Rabia Akhtar (2018) examines how US 
administrations from Ford to Clinton have turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s 
nuclear activities. She argues that “each administration shifted non-
proliferation goalposts and red lines for Pakistan and prioritized foreign 
policy over non-proliferation policy” (Akhtar, 2018, p15). The sense of 
defiance toward the US one can detect in the book is indeed significant. Thus, 
defiance, security, and nuclear weapons form an integral part of Pakistan’s 
foreign policy and have helped to shape the nation’s state identity. In the case 
of Pakistan, a neo-colonial and orientalist discourse on nuclear weapons has 
not deterred the state elite from building a powerful nationalist narrative, or 
from remaining oblivious to the consequences that a militarised and 
heterosexual masculinised establishment may have on a multi-national, 
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In this chapter, I have explained how three key moments of Pakistan’s foreign 
policy have helped to shape the interlinking between identity and security. 
These key moments are but representations of aggression, war, conflict, and 
military might, despite the losses incurred therein. Pakistan’s aligned years in 
the 1950s, represented by her decisions to join international military alliances, 
the Bangladesh Liberation War and its aftermath that led Pakistan to become 
a nuclear armed state, all contributed towards the construction of a new state 
identity based on the pursuit of security.  
 
These foreign policy stages, which generated the interlinking between 
security and identity, represent a state identity that is deeply gendered and 
gendering, and which is reiterated in the process. The hyper, heterosexual 
masculinity associated with military alliances, war, including rape and 
genocide, and nuclear weapons, have all been performed by Pakistan’s main 
foreign policy actor, namely the military. To be sure, it is the militaristic 
background of bureaucratic-military leadership that has accentuated (and 
perpetuates) the conditions of possibility for it to happen, thus enhancing an 
ideological militarism. 
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Hence, whilst the majority of literature on Pakistan’s foreign policy highlights 
security and the ‘India threat’, it largely ignores how militarism has shaped 
the state’s security and identity. This chapter also demonstrates how 
militarism became enhanced at critical foreign policy moments, and how this 
enhancement created the conditions for the following moments to happen. 
From military alliances, which are institutions of hyper-masculinity, to 
genocidal practices, and to building nuclear weapons, the Pakistani state elite 
has sought to construct an identity that is clearly distinct from that of India. 
This process has been aided by militarism and notions of heterosexual 
masculinity linked to violence. In the next chapter, I will explain how 
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CHAPTER II  




2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to provide a background on the origins of the state of 
Pakistan in order to understand how the distinct roles of religion, the military, 
and intelligence agencies contributed to shape the country’s foreign policy, 
which continues to be sustained by a focus on security. In the previous 
chapter, I outlined how key stages of Pakistan’s foreign policy have 
contributed to the militarisation and masculinisation of foreign policy. This 
chapter engages more intimately with militarism in order to demonstrate how 
it has been a determinant factor in Pakistan’s foreign policies with China, 
India, and the US. 
 
In the introductory section, I provide an overview of the main theories related 
to the emergence of Pakistan, and how they have generated contested views 
on the country’s origins. In the subsequent sections, I analyse the roles of 
religion, the military, and the intelligence agencies, as the main intervening 
factors in the construction of Pakistan’s foreign policy narratives.  
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The emergence of Pakistan as an independent state in 1947 results from the 
assemblage of political initiatives carried out by a group of Indian Muslims. 
These political initiatives were mostly headed by the All-India Muslim 
League, and may be perceived as a dual struggle against British Colonialism 
and the political dominance of a Hindu majority. Thus, the idea of a Pakistan 
as a product of Muslim politics involved a struggle to obtain more political 
rights. However, as a minority, Indian Muslims did not form a unified front, 
neither in their political claims, nor in respect of their ideas about 
nationhood33. Notwithstanding, a more consensual narrative that serves the 
state of Pakistan’s claims for existence as a nation independent from India is 
the one that describes its origins as “a civic, republican project of the 
modernist Muslims in undivided India under the British rule (…) 
intellectually influenced by the enlightenment ideas of European modernity 
(…) which they skillfully applied to the question of Muslims’ empowerment” 
(Rais, 2017, p15). 
 
This description of the origins of Pakistan overlooks a variety of issues which 
have been highlighted by different scholars, and to date there is no consensus 
on the real motivations behind the creation of this new state in South Asia. 
Muslim politics during British colonial rule in India were neither 
unidirectional nor consensual in relation to themes like Muslim nationalism. 
However, modernist Muslims’ politics were controlled by an educated elite 
with strong roots in Northern India, mostly in the United Provinces, and just 
a few in the regions that would become Pakistan (Adeel Khan, 2005, p69). 
                                               
33 See for instance Qasmi and Robb (2017) and Shamsul Islam (2015). 
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The question of separatism based on the idea of being distinct from and 
opposed to the numerically dominant, more affluent Hindu population, 
became central in those regions of India, and by the end of the nineteenth 
century, Muslim separatism had firmly settled in Muslim elite politics. 
 
Christophe Jaffrelot (2015) notes that socio-political interests and cultural 
factors constitute the main explanations for this separatism. The former are 
part of an instrumentalist approach, highlighting how nationalist ideas 
become established, whilst offering “a convenient repertoire to elite groups 
whose domination over society is threatened by upwardly mobile others and 
which therefore try to mobilise behind them ‘their’ community by 
manipulating identity symbols (including religious and linguistic ones)” 
(Jaffrelot, 2015, p181). The latter, framed as a the main approach, defends the 
view that the “Muslims of India were so clearly different from the Hindus in 
civilisational terms that they were bound to become separatists” (ibid, p182).  
 
These two approaches have been of service in providing and perpetuating the 
idea that the new country of Pakistan, based on the idea that Muslims are a 
separate nation, became an inevitability. The primordial approach had gained 
much currency amongst the AIML leadership; it continues to form the basis 
of the two-nation theory as it is sanctioned by the Pakistani state narrative. 
However, the two-nation theory – either the Muslim argument, or the Hindu 
one34 – reflects how nationalism, essentially a Eurocentric concept, was 
                                               
34 See Shamsul Islam (2015, pp55-61) for a detailed discussion of what each one entails, and 
particularly how Hindu Nationalists have also constructed a variant of the two-nation theory 
before the Muslim League. 
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exported to and assimilated by those struggling against British/European 
colonial rule. 
 
The diversity of nationalist views among Muslims during British colonial rule 
is often glossed with the nationalist narrative of the AIML. The latter indeed 
followed the “colonial argument of two nations” (Thapar, 2016), thus 
prolonging the exercise of colonial thinking throughout the creation of 
Pakistan and beyond. As this argument has been cited and repeated time and 
again by Pakistan’s state elites, other histories of Muslim nationalisms in 
Colonial India were seen as less relevant. This led to “dangerous over-
simplifications that actually hinder deeper understandings of nationalism 
themselves” (Sarkar 2008, p432). This act of glossing over the diversity of 
nationalist narratives, including key elements relating to class and gender, is 
significant. For instance, Ayesha Jalal (2007) suggests differences in 
nationalist sentiment amongst Indian Muslims:  
 
Even as far afield as Bengal, it was Muslims from the ashraf classes with knowledge 
of Urdu and Persian who seemed most eager to make common cause with their co-
religionists in northern India and the Punjab. … For the vast majority of Indian 
Muslims, outside the realm of privilege bestowed by the colonial state, the concerns 
and activities of Muslim ashraf classes were for the most part distant, if not 
altogether irrelevant. (2007, p153) 
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Jalal also notes how, in general, women were detached from the Muslim 
nationalist discourse in pre- and post-partition moments35, which contributed 
to the “silencing and erasing of suffering of those women which bespoke of 
the inhumanity that had greeted the arrival of independence in South Asia. 
The women from the lower social strata remained on the margins” (ibid, 
p565). Thus, any explanation of Pakistan’s creation will be subjected to 
critique, given the diversity of political motivations, as well as in light of 
those who opposed the country’s very creation.  
 
Whilst the prevalent narrative used by the state of Pakistan suggests that there 
was a consensus of all Indian Muslims in respect of the creation of a separate 
state, which they imagined as a “homeland”, there is now research that proves 
otherwise. In Muslims Against the Partition, Shamsul Islam (2015) builds this 
case. He demonstrates how and why “patriotic Muslims”, i.e., those who 
believed that “religion could not be the basis of a nation” (Islam, 2015, p167), 
opposed the creation of a state based on the amalgamation of religion and 
nation. Those “patriotic Muslims” were also often targeted and attacked by a 
quasi-military body associated with the Muslim League – the Muslim League 
National Guards (ibid, p168).  
 
The existing literature on the history of the origins of Pakistan does not 
directly focus on the role of the MLNG. In The Sole Spokesman, Ayesha Jalal 
(1985) includes two footnotes from which it is possible to grasp its 
                                               
35 Jalal also notes that the same happened across the border, and highlights the feminist 
literature on the partition as a source for further readings. 
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communalist, para-military, and violent nature, as well as its role in the 
carnage before and during partition. In Creating a New Medina, Venkat 
Dhulipala (2015) briefly mentions the group as a youth body with strong links 
to Aligarh36, which has contributed towards Muslims’ social mobilisation. 
However, it is Ian Talbot (1996) who provides a more extensive account of 
the MLNG in Freedom’s Cry. Talbot notes the lack of research and available 
resources on this group. He dedicates a full chapter to the para-military group, 
highlighting its origins and its changing role in the years that led up to the 
partition. The group, whilst initially in charge of providing law and order to 
where the AIML political activities were taking place, increasingly engaged 
in acts of violence, including the use of live ammunition and the bombing of 
bridges and railway lines in Punjab (Talbot, 1996, p70). Interestingly, it was 
in the Punjab where MLNG activities found less support due to the political 
importance of the Unionist party. 
 
Another relevant characteristic of the MLNG is its meaningful symbolism 
that linked concepts of hyper-masculinity, militarism, nation, and religion. 
Talbot (1996) highlights the importance accorded to the ideals of “discipline, 
truthfulness, and social service with a concern to meld together a cohesive 
Muslim community” (1996, p63). Reportedly, the para-military group had 
also dedicated time to “drilling in order to improve physical fitness and instil 
discipline and esprit de corps. Guards were trained in club-handling and 
exercised with dummy rifles. During the exceptionally tense period of May 
                                               
36 Ian Talbot’s (1996) research mentions that large numbers of MLNG were drawn from 
Bengal and Bihar, based on the autobiography of the para-military group commander. 
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1947, illegal training with live ammunition was given in some camps in the 
western districts of the United Provinces” (ibid, p67). These characteristics 
fit into a masculinised representation of a Muslim national identity, which by 
then was already associated with representations of a “Hindu threat”, which 
instilled the need to guarantee protection through discipline. The MLNG 
appear to have taken up such a role with great commitment. 
 
Talbot (1996) also observes how the group played a significant role in 
uniformising an imagined identity for Pakistan, through symbolic actions and 
attire. He highlights the importance of the group’s flag salutation, and in 
particular the uniform, which “contained a deeper meaning than the ‘surface’ 
show of smartness and discipline. It also epitomized a commitment to a sense 
of Islamic community which transcended loyalties to particularist identities. 
Turbans, caps and clothes which bespoke of regional or biraderi allegiances 
were replaced by the common uniform and Jinnah cap of the Muslim 
volunteer” (ibid, p71). Another historian, David Gilmartin (2014) concurs 
with Talbot concerning the role of the MLNG, and notes how the group 
adopted “trappings associated with the state, helping thus to define the 
Muslim League, like a state, as both the expression and the guarantor of the 
cultural identity of the Indian Muslims” (2014, p285). 
 
It is significant that the political group that was a leading proponent of having 
a separate government for the Muslims of India had adopted a militaristic 
ethos from the outset. This cultural identity that the MLNG helped to 
inculcate pre-partition has been irremediably linked to a process of 
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militarisation of a Muslim national identity that is also idealised as masculine, 
and that continues to be prevalent in present-day Pakistan. Pakistan’s national 
symbology, whilst interlinked with religion, also carries a militaristic 
component. During my fieldwork in Pakistan, I was able to ascertain the 
importance carried by national symbols, and how they continue to be applied 
so as to make every effort to attain a representation of a coherent imagined 
national Muslim identity. They are on display almost everywhere. Wearing 
shalwar kameez, particularly by men, not only represents a commitment to 
Muslim culture, but also serves as a symbol of unity (that armies represent 
well) and perhaps a higher morality through religiosity. 
 
Hoisting and lowering the flag, a militaristic ritual, carries great significance. 
The daily ritual and theatrical flag lowering before sunset at the Wagah border 
is a notable example of how the militarisation of national identity happens, 
through processes of citation and repetition. I had the opportunity to go to the 
border on what constituted a significant symbolic moment of my fieldwork. 
The whole parade is fully controlled by the army. Whilst the objective is to 
lower the flag, simultaneously with the Indian counterpart, the performance 
that takes place is a display of powerful, vigorous movements intended to 
enhance the belief that Pakistan and Pakistanis are stronger and more 
masculinised than the Indian side, which, for its part, does exactly the same. 
 
As such, this is exemplary of how militarisation is carried forward over the 
course of decades and how it continues to be performed. Furthermore, 
educational institutions take great pride in hosting flag ceremonies, 
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particularly during national holidays. I noted this at the university where I 
was placed during my fieldwork. During an interview with AC2 in September 
2016, he mentioned that every 14 August, his family, wife and children 
assemble to hoist the flag at their home. These examples reflect how the 
creation of Pakistan, despite the sanctioned version favoured by the present-
day state elites, may be seen as resulting not only from the perspective of the 
historical competing interests of high politics, but also through 
representations that would later mirror current state practices, and, more 
importantly, a pre-independence inclination towards a militarised and 
masculinised national identity, through which the association between 
religion and the nation could be expressed. 
 
2.2  The role of religion in constructing foreign policy, identity and 
security 
 
In this section my aim is to highlight how religion has contributed towards a 
sustained focus on security in Pakistan’s foreign policy. As Islam is a state 
religion, Pakistan is considered to be an ideological state (Nasr, 2001; Roy, 
2002). Islamic ideology is an undeniable attribute of the state of Pakistan. The 
importance of the ideological leanings of the Pakistan Movement are often 
overshadowed by Jinnah’s secularist credentials. However, the Movement is 
believed to have tilted towards ideology for the sake of expediency. Historian 
Ayesha Jalal (1991) notes: “the role of Islam in the processes leading up to 
the partition of India was to amplify and dignify what remained from first to 
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last a political struggle launched by the Muslim League under the secular 
leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah” (1991, p277).  
 
However, soon after partition, Islam started to be asserted in politics, despite 
Jinnah hinting at a separation between politics and religion. The Pakistani 
leadership created a new political identity, whilst not being certain about how 
best to work it out; it also urgently needed a constitutional frame. 
Constitutional arrangements to frame the role of Islam in governing the new 
state became a matter of controversy and disagreement in Pakistan’s early 
leadership. However, the ideological role of Islam framed as a process of 
alterity appears to have remained well defined. Ayesha Jalal explains how 
Islam became also a source of legitimacy and of “non-Indianess”: 
 
proclaiming Islam, however defined, as the ideology of the state proved to be an 
irresistible expedient for the temporal authorities quite as much as for the religious, 
although for very different reasons. It emphasised Pakistan’s distinctiveness in 
relation to India; gave the “appearance” – if not the reality – of unity to an otherwise 
disparate people and allowed the state more room in which to manoeuvre its way 
towards establishing dominance over a society with highly localised and fragmented 
structures of authority. (1991, p278). 
 
Once Islam had become an incorporated feature of Pakistan politics, despite 
the difficulties encountered, particularly at the constitution-making level37, at 
the level of foreign policy things were more straightforward. Pakistan needed 
to engage with the international community and her desire to acquire a unique 
                                               
37 For an in-depth account of the process, including the first constitutional efforts under “The 
Objectives Resolution” of 1949, see Hamid Khan (2009). 
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status within the Muslim world led to a particular emphasis on Islam. The 
construction of such status has been maintained, albeit with fluctuations in 
external recognition, by a strong ideological imprint in foreign policy 
(Askari-Rizvi, 1983, 1993).  
 
2.2.1  Mapping Islamic religion in Pakistan’s foreign policy 
 
In this subsection, I chart the historical importance of Islam in Pakistan’s 
foreign policy. Whilst Islam has had a chequered influence on Pakistan’s 
foreign relations, its relevance resides in helping to cement Pakistan’s state 
identity as Islamic, and concomitantly exposing the state’s ambitions to 
become an international leader within the Muslim world.  
 
The history of Pakistan’s foreign relations reveals that Islam is part and parcel 
of foreign policy making. Pakistan’s external relations have shaped the 
affinity Pakistan has tried to maintain with the Muslim world. This affinity 
has been moved, on the one hand, by historical, cultural and traditional 
elements in society, and on the other, by the skilful use of these elements to 
advance Pakistan’s interests. Furthermore, Article 40 of the Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan demonstrates how enshrined the religion is 
in the country’s last constitution of 1973: 
 
40 – The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among 
Muslim countries based on Islamic Unity, support the common interests of the 
peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, promote international peace and 
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security, foster goodwill and friendly relations among all nations and encourage the 
settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. (The Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, p20) 
 
The 1973 Constitution was written after the breakup of Pakistan in 1971, and 
it coincides with a new stage in the relationship between foreign policy, 
security, and identity. Islamic ideology became even more central in the 
construction of a newer version of Pakistan. Until 1971, Pakistan had sought 
close relations with Muslim countries; however, that led to some 
unpredictable results concerning foreign policy goals. Pakistan’s support for 
the anti-colonial struggles across the Muslim world translated into an 
aggrandisement of her Pan-Islamic38 sentiments. As S.M. Burke suggests, 
“the unification of a part only of the Muslims of the world under the flag of 
Pakistan was thus not viewed by the founding fathers of Pakistan as the 
culmination of their efforts but merely as a necessary milestone on the 
journey towards the ultimate goal of universal Muslim solidarity” (1973, 
p65). 
 
Pakistani foreign policy towards Muslim countries in the 1950s was marked 
by the former’s leadership ambitions. However, a different social, cultural 
and political reality, particularly in terms of what concerns the Arab people 
in the Middle East, led to some disappointment, due in part to a certain level 
                                               
38 Chengappa uses the term “Pak-Islamism”, as flowing from “the idea that the Islamic 
crescent runs from Morocco to Indonesia” (2004, p105). In the context of the discussion, the 
term to use would be “Pan-Islamism”; however, “Pak-Islamism”, whether a typo or used on 
purpose, expresses quite well the motivation of Pakistani leaders post-independence. 
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of naivety. This much is acknowledged by Z.A. Bhutto when, in November 
1962, as Minister of Commerce, he stated:  
 
Relying too literally on the Islamic precept that all Muslims are brothers, we sought 
to create a brotherhood of Muslim peoples at a time when the force of Arab 
nationalism was in full flood; and its ideological basis was different from that of our 
own nation. The Arab States were under various types of political regimes, and were 
divided amongst themselves. (1962, p20) 
 
Bhutto rightly identified how until 1954 Pakistan’s naïve Islamic leanings 
towards foreign policy were about to complicate its relationship with the 
Middle Eastern countries, whose nationalist movements were not driven by 
Islam, but rather by anti-Western/anti-imperialist sentiments (Rizvi, 1993). 
The different nature of the struggle against Western colonial dominance 
carried out by the Muslims of India and by the Arabs was not fully understood 
by Pakistani leaders. Instead, the Muslim-Hindu binary remained central to 
the construction of their processes of otherness. Subsequently, the Pakistani 
leadership became oblivious to the socio-cultural differences between 
Muslims across the world. For instance, this was reflected in how Pakistan 
perceived the Arab nationalism question, and how the Suez Crisis threw 
Pakistan into a rather obscurantist position concerning her foreign relations, 
since, at that time, she was already engaged in SEATO and CENTO, and 
hence allied with the West. 
 
Muslim solidarity and the search for a new identity both served the urge of 
Pakistan’s leaders to part ways from India, now a foreign country dominated 
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by a different religion, despite the country’s official secular character. Indian 
scholars have been able to grasp this fact in a more detached way, as, for 
instance, Bidanda Chengappa notes:  
 
The Muslim nation was founded in order to thwart the threat of Hindu domination. 
This inspired Pakistan to distance itself politically, historically, culturally and 
geographically from India. In the process, Pakistan sought to disown her linkages 
with the subcontinent and align herself with the Islamic states of West Asia. 
(Chengappa, 2004, p93)  
 
Chengappa’s suggestion becomes particularly relevant in the wake of the 
1971 events, together with Z.A. Bhutto’s foreign policy options. This desire 
to disengage from the ideational origins of the subcontinent also emerged 
during my fieldwork in Pakistan. The interviews I conducted revealed that 
Pakistanis wish to be seen differently from Indians. AC2 mentioned that 
“[Pakistan’s] historical and cultural ties with Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and 
Central Asian states have been overshadowed by the history of animosity with 
Indians – more specifically ‘Hindus’”, while AM1 intimated that “Because 
of national identity”, “Pakistan opens to three predominantly Muslim regions: 
Middle East, West Asia, and Central Asia”. 
 
2.2.2  Bhutto’s Islamic imprint on Pakistan’s foreign policy 
 
Muslim nationalism, which had defined Pakistan, suffered a major set-back 
with the rise of Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan. Eastern Pakistanis did 
not receive the same degree of fraternal Islamic warmth emanating from West 
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Pakistan, in comparison with, for instance, the Middle East. After 1971 
Pakistan was a doubly defeated country. Pakistan’s state leadership had to re-
invent and re-structure itself. It sought to revive ties with the Middle East and 
the Arab world. During my interviews, the events of 1971 were mentioned 
only twice as being of relevance to the construction of national identity. AC1 
highlighted the critical relevance of the historical event for the country’s 
national identity, while AM1 commented: “Pakistan gained a new 
opportunity for an Islamic identity”. 
 
Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto became the main architect of Pakistan’s 
makeover. During that period, foreign policy came to be of chief importance 
as a way to advance the country’s national interests, and as a tool to rebrand 
the nation’s identity. Tahir-Kheli (1983) highlights the main aspects of 
Bhutto’s usage of Islamic ideology and their impact on Pakistan. This 
rapprochement with Islam permitted a reinforcement of national interests 
based on one of the main world’s religions, and at the same time opened the 
door to more comprehensive relations with oil-rich Muslim countries. 
However, the use of Islam in foreign policy did not supersede security as the 
main driver. After being defeated by India, Mr Bhutto’s intentions to develop 
nuclear weapons were turned into a national priority. Middle East 
monarchies, once brought close to the imagined realm of Islamic solidarity, 
were then expected to disburse the funds needed to pursue the nuclear 
programme. 
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The organisation of the 1974 Islamic Summit in Lahore marked the peak of 
Bhutto’s foreign policy endeavours. To be sure, by 1974 Pakistan was 
desperately in need of improving her image in the international community, 
after the 1971 war. Pakistan had yet to recognise Bangladesh, and “the 
conference presented an opportunity for Pakistan to afford recognition to 
Bangladesh without losing its face” (Pasha, 2005, p90). Bhutto’s diplomatic 
experience was instrumental. Not only did he create a situation in which 
Pakistan’s damaged reputation and ego could somehow be repaired, but at the 
same time it brought Bangladesh closer to the Muslim world, turning the 
whole political issue into a “multilateral affair of the Muslim states” (ibid, 
p91).  
 
The Lahore Summit was of major importance for Pakistan foreign relations 
and it had a significant impact on domestic politics. It consolidated Z.A. 
Bhutto’s leadership, as he could easily oscillate between the identities of a 
Pakistani nationalist and a Muslim socialist (Syed, 1982, p132). Pakistan 
expressed solidarity with the Arabs, thereby attempting to dissipate the 
consequences of previous closer associations with the US. This solidarity, as 
mentioned earlier, would be converted into economic benefits.  
 
2.2.3  The Zia-ul-Haq legacy or the politics of continuation  
 
The dismissal of Z.A. Bhutto at the hands of his chosen COAS, Zia-ul-Haq, 
has been widely debated, and is well documented within the literature on 
Pakistan’s political history (Nawaz, 2008; Talbot, 2012; Ahmed, 2013; Jalal, 
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2008, 2014; Jaffrelot, 2015). Shuja Nawaz suggests that “Zia’s regime was a 
watershed for Pakistani politics” (2008, p361). General Zia followed a very 
strict interpretation of Islam. The Islamisation programme that Pakistan 
underwent during his eleven-year rule is usually attributed to his personal 
influence aided by the country’s religious parties, particularly the Jamaat’ 
Islami. As far as foreign policy is concerned, Zia’s dictatorship did not depart 
from the ideological turf laid down by Bhutto. However, Zia would be 
confronted with external pressures that exacerbated the ideological nature of 
the country’s foreign policy. Shuja Nawaz (2008) highlights that India’s fast-
growing military and nuclear capacity, the invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979, and the Iranian Revolution all impacted Pakistan’s foreign 
policy. 
 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan revealed how ideology further became 
entrenched in foreign policy in Pakistan. While Pakistan’s rapprochement 
with the US impacted and drove foreign policy, Sujah Nawaz (2008) argues 
that the Americans were not the first to initiate opposition against the Soviets: 
“immediately after the Soviets rumbled into Kabul, Prince Turki recounts 
how the Saudi king received a call from Zia, who wished to send General 
Rahman to the kingdom to brief its leadership” (ibid, p372). Certainly, the 
US was instrumental during the ten-year-long war in Afghanistan, by funding 
an ultra-ideological training programme for rebels on Pakistani soil. 
However, the Saudi link proved to be of great significance, not only during 
the Afghan war, but in the continuation of an ideologically driven support for 
the Taliban during the 1990s.  
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As noted by Pasha (2005), due to the Afghan war, Central Asia turned out to 
be a fertile ground for the propagation of conservative Islamic ideology, 
fuelling the Pan-Islamic sentiment that had never been abandoned by 
Pakistani leaders. The consolidation of a conservative ideology 
notwithstanding, with the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan had at her disposal organised jihadist machinery, ready to be 
transferred to Kashmir, the perennial source of conflict with India. If during 
Bhutto’s government the ideological imprinting on foreign policy was mainly 
aimed at obtaining economic gains and repairing the country’s identity both 
internally and externally, during Zia’s era, an ideological foreign policy 
became an instrument of political violence. 
 
Of course, conflict in Afghanistan persists to this day. The surge of the 
Taliban and how successfully they controlled the country is associated with 
the support Pakistan lent to the group, under the imagined “strategic depth”. 
Riaz Mohammad Khan, a former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador with 
extensive experience in Afghan politics, explains how Pakistan incorporated 
into her political and social settings an Afghanistan dominated by the Taliban:  
 
the religious elements in Pakistan vociferously eulogized the Taliban for their 
simplicity, honesty, piety and commitment to Islam and as harbingers of peace in 
Afghanistan … At times, these exaggerations were deliberate and calculated to 
bolster public acceptance of the Taliban in Pakistan. A combination of political 
ambitions of religious forces and the prevailing military view that Afghanistan 
under Taliban could best serve the interests of Pakistan in the area [so-called 
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“strategic depth”] was the underlying impulse of this campaign, a heady blend of a 
revivalist Islam and simplistic Realpolitik. (2011, p85). 
 
The tribulations that Pakistan has continued to experience since the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, and their aggravation post-9/11, result from the 
foreign policy decisions taken by her leaders ever since. Zia-ul-Haq, Benazir 
Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Pervez Musharraf all sustained a foreign policy 
which ultimately generated political violence and dehumanisation. Pakistani 
leaders relied on ideology to defend a perceived national interest, which itself 
was grounded on the precarious security complex constructed around 
perceived threats emerging from her inimical relations with India.  
 
Pakistan never abandoned the idealist and ideological imprint of her foreign 
policy, and continued to pursue it beyond Afghanistan. Despite some irritants 
and disagreements, Pakistan maintains straight relations with Iran and enjoys 
almost unconditional support from Saudi Arabia. Further afield, Pakistan 
considers Turkey as not just a “brother”, but a role model39. Furthermore, 
since the collapse of Soviet Union, reaching Central Asia has been an 
important objective for Pakistan. According to the former Ambassador 
Akram Zaki, “developing friendship with the Muslim nations is one of the 
cardinal principles of Pakistan’s foreign policy and reflects the ethos of the 
Pakistani people” (1992, p10). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the consequent independence of the Central Asian republics, Pakistan saw a 
unique opportunity to forge closer ties with those countries which, according 
                                               
39 The same has been recently reciprocated by the Turkish President. See: 
https://tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/100428/-turkey-and-pakistan-are-two-brotherly-countries-
whose-friendly-ties-date-back-a-long-time-in-history- 
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to Zaki, have been cut off from South and West Asia, where they share 
historical, cultural and traditional ties (ibid, p13). As such, Pakistan saw a 
significant opportunity to embrace the Central Asian region. 
 
2.2.4  Foreign policy and Islamic ideology – making the Indian Other 
 
In the previous sections, I discussed how Islam as a religion was deployed for 
the creation of Pakistan, and how it has been relevant in historically 
significant foreign policy developments. Relations with Afghanistan and 
India have played a central role in how religious ideology has shaped the 
interlinking between identity and security. The complexity of these two 
foreign relations will be dealt in the next chapters. However, before doing so, 
the specific role of religion in the construction of the interlinking between 
security and identity needs to be grasped. 
 
Relations with India, which are mostly represented as ones of enmity and as 
a source of threat, form the key context for understanding the importance of 
religious ideology, as the latter has a constitutive role in shaping the 
relationship. The “ideology of Pakistan”, based on the two-nations theory, 
continues to constitute the background of Pakistan’s engagements with India, 
including the former’s incessant efforts towards preparedness for war.  
 
As the military continues to be the state institution that most influences 
foreign policy, it is relevant to understand how religious ideology has also 
shaped the military’s thinking about the perceived threat of a hostile India. 
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For instance, using texts produced by the Pakistani military, C.C. Fair 
demonstrates that the military continues to use “Islam, the ideology of 
Pakistan, and the two-nation theory to sustain popular appetite for unending 
conflict with India and the army’s continued dominance over Pakistan’s 
internal and external affairs” (2014, p394). Fair’s detailed analysis of a few 
texts from defence literature highlights how the military has nurtured the idea 
that an Islamic ideology builds national character (2014, p383). Through 
those texts it is possible to acknowledge how this articulation takes place. For 
instance, Fair cites an essay written by a Brig. Jamshed Ali, who suggests 
that:  
 
National culture and military performance and achievements are closely inter-
linked. An army mirrors the true state of its society and is as good and as bad as the 
people who constitute it … the armed forces must at all times maintain a state of 
cultural purity and mirror the idealistic virtues of an army steeped in Islamic military 
traditions. It is only by maintaining an integrated, cohesive and puritanical military 
system that the armed forces can retain their pristine, tradition oriented military way 
in a liberal society. (Ali, cited in Fair, 2014, p390, italics as in citation) 
 
Another excerpt that Fair cites relates to a text published in the Pakistan Army 
Green Book (2000). The author, Maj. Gen. Asif Duraiz Akhtar, criticises the 
country’s politicians, accusing them of failing to “capitalize on [the] Two-
Nation Theory and consolidate the national integration” (Akhtar, 2000, cited 
in Fair, 2014, p397). He also makes an interesting reference to foreign policy 
and suggests that the army “has tried to provide stability, pursued aggressive 
foreign policy and developed a semblance of cohesion in the society based on 
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Nationalism or Pan-Islamism” (ibid). Further in her discussion, Fair engages 
the writing of another military figure, who explicitly establishes this 
articulation between the two-nation theory, militarism, and Islam. An essay 
written in 1992 by Major Qaisar Farooqi, entitled “Islamic Concept of 
Preparedness” (ibid, p402), exemplifies this. The excerpt that Fair cites is 
particularly interesting. As she mentions, it relates to the Pakistani military’s 
“perpetual struggle”, which, in turn, gets articulated with the militarist 
concept of a permanent status of “war-preparedness”. Major Farooqi thus 
writes: “if the conflict is everlasting between the believers and the non-
believers, or in other words between the forces of light and darkness, the fight 
has to go on till one of the belligerent forces is completely wiped out” 
(Farooqui, 1992, cited in Fair, 2014, p402). Fair quotes a lengthy passage 
from Major Farooqi’s essay, which is relevant for understanding how 
militarism, religion, and national identity are interlinked in Pakistan: 
 
Preparation for war is thus a sacred duty not only of an individual but of the entire 
Muslim Ummah; the Quranic message (read out on every passing out parade in the 
Pakistan military Academy, Kakul) enjoins upon all Muslims to take to the highest 
standards of preparedness, as it says, “And make ready your strength, to the utmost 
of your power including sinews of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies 
of Allah, and your enemies, and others besides them, whom you know not but Allah 
doth know. And whatever you expend in the cause of Allah shall be repaid until you 
and you shall not be treated unjustly.” (Al Anfal-60) … Islam does not visualize the 
total annihilation or complete extinction of the non-Islamic forces and people but 
ordains the Muslims to keep their enemies either subjugated or restrained. (ibid, 
p403). 
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Thus, a military whose ethos is shaped by sedimented binaries of 
believers/non-believers (read: Muslims and Hindus), pure/impure, 
subjugator/subjugated, and by the notion that war-preparedness is a duty 
associated with the realm of the sacred, creates the conditions of possibility 
for a concept of security that is also gendered and patriarchal. In turn, such a 
concept of security is also bound up with the gendered notion and duty of 
protecting the “nation”, including going to war to protect women and children 
(Enloe, 1990; Yuval-Davis, 1997), as the latter are perceived and represented 
as those who can assure the “biological reproduction of the nation” (Yuval-
Davis, 1993; 1997). This is particularly relevant in the relatively newly 
created state of Pakistan, in order to understand how security and identity are 
interlinked and how they retain a central role in foreign policy. 
 
Interpretations of Islam as a religious ideology are frequently associated with 
male-dominated, patriarchal, and gendered forms of cultural and societal 
organisation, albeit to varying degrees, in view of local constructions of 
cultural beliefs (see for instance Moghissi, 1999; Ross, 2008). These 
patriarchal constructions often aim to control women’s sexuality and bodies, 
associated with the need to defend motherhood, wifehood, and fertility, and 
as such they are vital to the sustained reproduction of the nation. The role of 
the military, given its power to shape Pakistani societal and cultural norms, 
in association with religious ideology, thus calls for more in-depth analysis. 
 
In October 2018, Hilal Magazine (published and controlled by the ISPR) 
began publishing a separate online edition for women and children. The 
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women’s edition is labelled Hilal for Her40, while the children’s version is 
called Hilal for Kids. Both publications use English, whilst, interestingly, 
Hilal for Kids is bilingual and downloadable in PDF format. This fact raises 
a few questions as to why Urdu is used for children and not for women, and 
how women and children are represented. As my analysis is based on Hilal 
for Her, it suffices to say that the children’s version is often infused with 
Pakistani religious nationalism, so that the latter may be inculcated into the 
minds of the younger generations. 
 
The cover of the first edition of Hilal for Her is worth studying. The title of 
the first issue is Empowered Women, Empowered Nation41. The portrayed 
women, mostly well-known, celebrated women, from the fields of politics, 
music, the military, are those whom the state accepts, sanctions, and deems 
to be suitable role models. However, it is interesting to note who is not 
portrayed: Malala Yousafzai, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and 
human/girls’/women’s rights activist; Asma Jahangir, an internationally 
renowned human rights lawyer and activist; and Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, a 
film director, documentary maker, and recipient of two Academy Awards. It 
is little surprise that such prominent figures have been omitted from the 
magazine cover since they have all documented and exposed the parlous 
situation of women in Pakistan. In their work, Yousafzai and Obaid-Chinoy 
have denounced and uncovered Pakistan as an international and human and 
women’s rights offender. They have also challenged the role that the state has 
                                               
40 See the online version here: https://www.hilal.gov.pk/hilal-her-magazine/2018-10 
41 Unfortunately, the image of the magazine cover is not included in the online archive. It is, 
however, available by searching Google Images. 
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constructed for and peddled to women. As a result, the military publication 
refuses to acknowledge them. 
 
The magazine has become a regular publication. However, the first issue is 
the most revealing for our purposes, since it includes a message from the 
patron in chief, the director of the ISPR, Major General Asif Ghafoor, which 
unveils the relationship between religion, militarism, and the state-idealised 
woman. The text is a prime example of how militarism shapes and controls 
the country’s identity and security. First, Ghafoor addresses the readers, 
expressing his appreciation of Pakistani women’s achievements, and how the 
latter are linked to Islam, by quoting the exemplary first wife of the Prophet 
who was a successful businesswoman. Two paragraphs later, he finally 
addresses the women: “Dear Ladies”, he begins. The following passage is 
worth quoting at length: 
 
Thanks to the institution of motherhood, and the willingness on part of their male 
partners; women have withstood difficulties and paved their way through 
challenging environments. Today’s woman is greatly contributing to actually 
revolutionizing and bringing positive fortune to the society. Now she is in every 
field; she is a banker, a soldier, an artist, an astronaut etc. We have women excelling 
and outshining in the defence forces, law enforcement & intelligence agencies, 
government and semi-government organizations, private and industrial sectors, IT 
and communication, media and transport and more importantly, at home. Hilal for 
Her is a tribute to this fact of life. Pakistan Armed Forces are providing women full 
representation and opportunity of a career. We believe in encouraging them, 
promoting and protecting their sense of identity and conviction, galvanizing their 
talent and potential through education and knowledge. Hilal for Her is just one part 
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of the role the Armed Forces are playing in contributing to the cause. We are 
confident that this will inspire and educate our womenfolk, who can play an 
effective and vibrant role towards bringing a progressive change in the society. (Asif 
Ghaffor, 2018) 
 
This quote exemplifies how the Pakistani military, an active agent on the 
building of security, identity, and foreign policy, selects and attempts to 
integrate the role of women into their imagined idea of nationhood. The 
willingness of the armed forces to represent women, to educate them, and to 
promote and protect their identity is a sign of the gendered and patriarchal 
role of the military. The latter’s role is thus extended beyond guarding the 
state’s sovereignty. It expands into controlling and regulating women’s 
bodies and livelihoods in order to ensure the production, reproduction and 
control of the imagined nation-state.  
 
As highlighted by Sylvia Walby, “the relationship between feminism and 
nationalism is crucially mediated by militarism, [and] militarism is often seen 
as an integral facet of a national project” (Walby, 2012, pp838-839). Thus, 
the publishing of Hilal for Her, using a medium of communication with the 
potential to reach a vast number of readers, contributes to the growing 
evidence that shows how feminist approaches are useful to understand how 
militarism and nationalism are often interlinked. It also suggests that the 
Pakistani military, which embodies an ethos shaped by an articulation of 
religious ideology and hyper-masculinity, strives to exercise control over 
Pakistani women, as a way of ensuring the continuation of the nationalist 
project. The military, then, represents and enacts this production and 
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reproduction of the tight connection between security and identity that is both 
gendered and masculinised. 
 
In this sub-section I have examined how religious ideology impacted the 
construction of Pakistan and its main foreign policy actor: the military. In this 
construction, the interconnection of security and identity occupies a central 
space, with the military controlling and dominating both areas. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the Indian-centric orientation of foreign policy 
determines how issues of security and identity become dependent on the role 
of religious ideology, as the latter continues to be an important signifier and 
guarantor of Pakistan’s relation of hostile distinction from India. Thus, 
perpetuating a status of war-preparedness, which determines foreign policy 
decision-making, involves more than mere control over weaponry. It also 
requires control over civilian and in particular women’s bodies and 
nationalistic views. In the next sub-section I analyse how the military has 
reinforced that status by controlling a key element of the state: the 
bureaucracy. 
 
2.3  The role of the military in foreign policy 
 
Masculinist, militarised representations of the nation do not occur in vacuum. 
They are closely connected to the Pakistani military and its affiliates as 
institutions. The military has managed to occupy a ubiquitous role in the 
country’s institutions, extending its influence into different sectors of society. 
Concerning foreign policy formulation and decision-making, Pakistan’s 
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military and the army in particular constitute more than simply another 
influential factor. Their input has extended to foreign policymaking almost 
since the country’s independence, a fact that continues to be reflected in the 
current moment and which could well persist in future challenges facing 
Pakistan’s foreign policy. 
 
The military in Pakistan, and particularly the army, has attracted a substantial 
amount of research concerning its organisation and historical foundation 
(Cohen, 1984, 1998; Rizvi, 2001; Nawaz, 2008; Cloughley, 1999; Schofield, 
2011), as well as analysis of its involvement in political and economic affairs 
(Jalal, 2001; Siddiqa, 2007; Shah, 2014; Ahmed, 2013; Fair, 2014). The 
literature dedicated to Pakistan’s politics and history usually offers at least 
one chapter dedicated to the military (Cohen, 2005; Shaikh, 2009; Lieven, 
2012; Jalal, 2014). The scarce indigenous literature dedicated to Pakistan 
foreign policy (Amin, 2000; Sattar, 2013, 2016) does not include any specific 
sections or chapters dedicated to the military and foreign policy. Kasuri’s 
(2015) long book of memoires evolves through his professional appointment 
during General Musharraf’s regime, thus providing a tailored account of the 
matter. Aparna Pande’s (2011) Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy also 
does not dedicate a specific chapter to the army’s influence on foreign policy, 
although the matter is addressed at least. Under these circumstances, in order 
to grasp the involvement of the military in Pakistani foreign policy, it is 
necessary to navigate through a multifarious body of literature. 
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Pakistan is often portrayed as a praetorian state, with the army assuming the 
role of the “guardian of the state” (Waseem, 2009; Siddiqa, 2007, 2016). The 
army’s ascendency to this status is deeply rooted in the post-partition chaos 
of domestic politics compounded by external conflicts. Several factors are 
responsible for this construction, all of which have immediate connections 
with foreign policy.  
 
What is unique about constructing an army as a “guardian of the state”? After 
all, armies around the world are dedicated to the ultimate end of defending 
the state. Yet, in Pakistan, the role of “guardian” was supplanted by that of 
“state-builder”, hence the different manifestations the Pakistani Army often 
takes: “guardian of the state” or a “state within a state”. Stephen Cohen makes 
an accurate observation about the nature of the Pakistani Army: “There are 
armies that guard their nation’s borders, there are those that are concerned 
with protecting their own position in society, and there are those that defend 
a cause or an idea. The Pakistan Army does all three” (1984, p105). 
 
Pakistan’s militarised foreign policy has its origins in its conflict with India 
over Kashmir. This propitious domestic scenario, which led to the formation 
of a coalition of interests between the senior civil bureaucracy and the 
military, has enhanced foreign policy militarisation. Pakistan’s first decade 
of existence turned out to be a game-changer, in which foreign policy 
decisions would guide not only the country’s external engagements, but also 
its domestic politics. In the next sub-section, I analyse how the Pakistani 
bureaucracy and the military forged a strong partnership and how this 
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strengthened the connection between identity and security and its 
militarisation. In the chapters to follow, I will examine this further, with a 
particular focus on Pakistan’s relations with China, India, and the US. 
 
2.3.1  Bureaucrats and militaries  
 
The study of civil-military relations occupies a specific niche in political 
science. The topic has generated a considerable amount of research, albeit 
mostly focused on the case of the US. While the term “civil-military 
relations”, as Charles Byler explains, is used to describe the relationship 
between civil society and the military, the broader character of the term 
encompasses “political, economic and cultural relationships between civil 
society and the military at all levels” (2013, p323).  
 
A civil-military relationship involves agency, recognition, and power-
sharing. In Pakistan, these two institutions have mutually created the 
conditions to retain and enhance their own power and to enable some degree 
of power-sharing to be institutionalised (Ahmad, 2006). In the pursuit of 
mutual advantage, the civil bureaucracy and the military, particularly the 
army, have formed what the sociologist Hamza Alavi has labelled a 
“bureaucratic-military oligarchy” (2002, p65), a centralised authority. This 
co-habitation, despite some setbacks, has always been present. The army has 
framed the civil bureaucracy as an ally to counter the politicians (Waseem, 
2009). The latter have been regarded with disdain, a flawed group in the 
society. With the exception of the period between 1971 and 1977, when Z.A. 
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Bhutto held the office of Prime Minister and to a certain degree curbed the 
army’s further consolidation of power42, the military establishment has 
enjoyed an accumulation of political and economic power in Pakistan. The 
origin of this civil bureaucratic-military oligarchy can be traced back to the 
first decade post-independence, and it has been the subject of research (Jalal, 
1991; Chaudhry, 2011). Hassan Askari Rizvi notes that 
 
the Army served as the brain and the civil servants as the hands of the new regime. 
The Army was conscious of the fact that it needed the help of the civil servants to 
run the administration. The civil servants knew that they could not continue in 
service if they worked against the wishes of the new leaders. (2011, p92).  
 
The oligarchy was directly responsible for the control of power, and for 
controlling the state’s means of coercion and violence. The rise of this 
oligarchy emerged out of two military coups, the first in 1958, and then a 
second in 1969, with the latter often being seen as an extension of the former 
(Siddiqa, 2019, p226). 
 
In The State of Martial Rule, Ayesha Jalal (1991) provides an in-depth 
account of the processes that led to the formation of the oligarchy, as well as 
its domestic and international consequences. Pakistan’s first decade was, 
according to Jalal, crucial to the formation of this coalition of powerful 
interests. In the international realm, the mutual interests of the oligarchy 
found their main interlocutor in the US, which resulted in Pakistan becoming 
                                               
42 During this period, the Army’s image and morale was at a low ebb, due to the defeat in 
East Pakistan. 
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a member of the former sponsored military alliances (CENTO and SEATO). 
These treatises were successfully joined because the bureaucracy and the 
army had privileged international connections. As Jalal (1991) notes, this also 
shaped the country’s internal politics. Whilst Jalal focuses on demonstrating 
that the advent of military rule in Pakistan cannot be simply attributed to a 
weak political party system, she highlights the relevance of international 
factors. For instance, she brings to the fore the question of how Pakistan’s 
involvement in American-led projects of international security created a 
financial burden, as it increased the cost of maintaining its defence systems. 
Hence, Jalal suggests that “the interplay of domestic, regional and 
international factors had brought about a decisive shift in the institutional 
balance of power; bureaucrats and generals had triumphed over politicians 
and the complex dynamics of Pakistan’s political process were no longer 
relevant to the actual building and consolidation of the state” (1991, p193).  
 
The history of how the military dominated and controlled Pakistani society, 
however, is not just restricted to military coups. The clientelist web of 
partners that the military built around itself over the course of decades 
includes sections of the media, the judiciary, and even some NGOs and 
foreign expatriates (ibid, p232). Hence, as Ayesha Siddiqa (2019) notes, the 
military appears to have learned from its permanent involvement in politics, 
and is now mastering how to simultaneously deploy hard and soft power to 
target civil society and to maintain its dominance. It is thus of great 
significance that the institution responsible for security has converted its 
primary role into one that targets practically all spheres of the polity. 
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The advancement and availability of electronic and social media platforms 
has enhanced the military’s practices of state control, whilst continuing to 
deploy soft power where necessary. Not only has the military increased its 
presence on these platforms, thus enhancing its national militarised narrative, 
but it has also enabled a more visible form of censorship (see for instance 
Ellis-Petersen and Baloch, 2019). The urge to dominate a soft apparatus of 
coercion, however, may be read in two different ways. On the one hand, it 
represents how the military appears to have mastered the neoliberal 
interlinking between economics and electronics, while on the other, this move 
speaks to the military’s own insecurities, given the need to continue to 
reiterate concepts like national unity against the perpetual Indian threat. 
Evidence may, for instance, be gathered from commemorative videos 
produced and released by the ISPR43 to mark occasions like 23rd March 
(Pakistan Day), 14th August (Independence Day), or 6th September (Defence 
and Martyr’s Day). 
 
In recent years, the events of February 2019 (the Pulwama attack in ICK and 
the Balakot incident), which culminated in Pakistan capturing an Indian pilot, 
reiterate that militarism – even outside war – involves a permanent extension 
of war-related activities and into social and political spheres, following 
Sjoberg and Vita’s (2010) definition of militarism. As in previous 
nationalistic commemoration videos, Pakistan Day (23rd March) is an 
                                               
43 ISPR videos from the past four years may be seen at: 
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=ispr+pakistan 
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expression of how the military desires to dominate Pakistani society. The 
video from March 2019 portrays the moment when the Indian pilot is shot, 
followed by the moment when presumably university students are attentively 
waiting for the “good” news of the pilot’s capture. The rest of the video 
deviates little from those of previous years, where images of cheerful, 
chanting civilians are interposed with images of military combat and parades, 
including the police force and women in military uniform. In sum, in keeping 
with other visual productions launched by the ISPR, the outcome is an 
assemblage of militaristic values, translated by the use of force (in this case 
live combat), obedience, and hierarchy. 
 
2.3.2  A secret foreign policy tool? The role of the ISI 
 
The Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence agency (the ISI) is often praised in 
Pakistan as one of the top intelligence agencies in the world. It is considered 
to be the country’s “first line of defence” (Pakistan PM, Imran Khan, 2018). 
The agency was established in 1948, resulting from the first war between 
Pakistan and India. The reasons behind its establishment relate to the residues 
of colonial power in South Asia. Hein Kiessling suggests that “the creation 
of the ISI was therefore not only a consequence of the 1947–8 war over 
Kashmir but also the result of British political interests in the post-colonial 
region” (2016, p14). Indeed, the independence of India and Pakistan certainly 
did not mark an end to British interests in Asia and in the Middle East region. 
Whilst South Asia saw the beginning of decolonisation, the British Empire 
continued to exist and exert power in Asia, chiefly due to her links with 
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Pakistan and with India, as historian Anita Inder Singh notes (1993, p48). 
Thus, Pakistan’s newly established intelligence services contributed towards 
Britain maintaining its colonial presence in Asia, which perhaps may be 
indicative of how a post-colonial state like Pakistan never really abandoned 
colonial practices of government; rather, it perpetuated them. 
 
Shuja Nawaz refers to the ISI as “one of the world’s better known and most 
effective counter-intelligence agencies” (2008, p577). However, the ISI’s 
involvement in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War and the role it played – 
whether gathering information about India’s army operations with the Mukti 
Bahini (Pakistan lost the war) or acting as a brutal force against Bengalis in 
East Pakistan (Ali and Patman, 2019) – suggest the opposite. Yet, the 
agency’s most significant role in political processes, particularly those related 
to foreign policy, started in 1979, following the USSR’s invasion of 
Afghanistan. Previously, the ISI had participated in external operations in 
collaboration with counterpart agencies, and on India-centred operations44. 
The events in Afghanistan led to an intensification of its involvement in 
foreign affairs. Although the prevalent narrative is that the ISI collaborated 
with the CIA soon after the Soviet invasion, a less explored version relates to 
the immediate contacts established with the Saudi Arabian government and 
its secret services (Nawaz, 2008; Sinnott, 2009). 
 
                                               
44 Allegedly, the ISI has been involved in supporting separatist groups in India’s Punjab, 
North East of India (Assam), and of course Kashmir (Jaideep Sakia, 2002). Kiessling 
dedicates a chapter of his Faith, Unity, Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan to the theme, where 
he mentions ISI support for separatist movements in Northern India, particularly in relation 
to arms procurement, from Thailand and China (2016, pp163,164). 
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However, Christine Fair is of the opinion that the ISI’s influence in 
Afghanistan started in the late 1950s, where it supported Islamist parties as a 
strategy to gain influence (2014, p101). Indeed, relations were strained since 
1947. Afghanistan did not recognise Pakistan as an independent state until 
1948. However, in 1955 Afghanistan received much encouragement and 
economic aid from the Soviet Union, following Khrushchev’s visit, to 
maintain its hostile stance towards Pakistan45 (Leake, 2013, p791). Pakistan’s 
ever-present sense of threat, with hostile neighbours, may have pragmatically 
deployed Islam to gain what would later be called “strategic depth”.  
 
Hence, Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan had started before the Soviet 
invasion of December 1979, with the background of the Cold War 
developments in the Middle East and the close ties between the Soviet Union 
and India. Pakistan’s gradual perception of an Afghan-Soviet-India threat led 
Z.A. Bhutto’s leadership in the mid-1970s to play the Islamic card, which 
translated into supporting Islamic dissenters (Pande, 2011, p71). 
Furthermore, an “Afghan cell” was also created in the Foreign Office, an 
official site on which the influence of the ISI has been acknowledged (ibid). 
 
However, the Soviet invasion marked the beginning of a new phase of 
Pakistan’s external politics. General Zia imposed a strict and authoritarian 
Islamic orthodoxy across Pakistani society. Islam would be instrumental in 
                                               
45 This is corroborated by Arnold Fletcher in his analysis of Soviet and US economic aid to 
Afghanistan, as he suggests: “in this new economic battleground of the Cold War, the 
U.S.S.R. has had the advantages of proximity to Afghanistan, freedom from concern over 
internal political considerations, and a willingness to support the Afghans against Pakistan” 
(1965, p270). 
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the conduct and formulation of foreign policy. This time, the ISI became the 
main player, in a movement that would confer on the intelligence agency “a 
permanent role in foreign policy” (Nawaz, 2008, p360). This permanent role 
would not be confined to the Afghan War. It would be extended to Kashmir, 
where the ISI has used non-state actors, the mujahedeen, as a strategy to 
promote unrest within the Indian-controlled territory.  
 
The agency’s financial independence enabled its involvement in foreign 
policy, a role that has been widely acknowledged46. Large cash sums were 
flown in by the CIA, Saudi public and private entities, and other elements47 
allegedly to finance the Afghan Jihad, which have enabled the ISI to extend 
its jihadist strategy to Kashmir (Ali and Patman, 2019). The exponential 
growth of the ISI is linked to how the organisation became involved in the 
war in Afghanistan, which involved the training of 83,000 mujahedeen 
(Winchell, 2003).  
 
The involvement of the ISI in Afghanistan was sponsored by the military 
dictatorship of General Zia. After consulting with the DG of the ISI 
(Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdul Rehman), Zia followed the former 
recommendations in favour of extending support to the mujahedeen 
(Kiessling, 2016, p50). Furthermore, the anti-communist rhetoric dovetailed 
                                               
46 See for instance former Pakistan High Commissioner in Britain to the BBC, where he 
describes the ISI as a “State within a state” and admits that “Pakistan foreign policy has been 
run by the ISI rather than the foreign office” (Shamsul Hassan to the BBC, January 2002). 
Furthermore, Schofield, in her book Inside the Pakistan Army, was able to confirm that 
foreign policy towards Afghanistan was decided by the ISI (2011, p107). 
47 In The Pakistan-US Conundrum, Yunus Samad writes of the important Saudi influence on 
the Afghan Jihad, in a process that tried to bypass the ISI and the CIA, under the guise of 
humanitarian intervention (2011, p101).  
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with the Islamisation project that Zia chose for Pakistan. Carey Schofield, 
who has gained privileged access to a former DG of the ISI, relays what she 
was told: “this was the first-time intelligence-gathering had become mixed up 
with running operations, but the system worked well. It was an odd situation. 
Afghanistan’s politicians were all in exile in Pakistan, while the fighters 
pitched themselves against the Soviet troops” (2011, p107, citing a former 
DG of the ISI).  
 
These observations are worth considering, given the lack of access to the 
institution and the prevailing narratives about the mujahedeen fighters in 
Afghanistan. Whilst the leadership stayed in Peshawar, hundreds of 
thousands of Afghan refugees were kept in camps. These camps subsequently 
turned into recruiting centres for the Jihad. The pragmatic mindset of the ISI 
and the Pakistani leadership was mostly concerned with safe-guarding 
Pakistan’s national interests, which were directed towards the conflict with 
India. Anatol Lieven contends that “the Islamists were initially intended to be 
tools, not allies; and the goal was not Islamic revolution as such, but to further 
Pakistan’s national interests (as perceived and defined by the Pakistani 
military and security establishment), above all when it came to attacking 
those of India” (2012, p185). 
 
While the Afghan War was a decisive factor in strengthening the ISI’s role in 
foreign policy matters, the agency’s engagement in the country’s external 
affairs can be traced and shown to have an important link with state identity 
and foreign policy. In order to map out these connections, it is necessary to 
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go back to the 1970s period of Z.A. Bhutto’s government, when the ISI’s 
activities grew in both volume and significance. Mr Bhutto understood the 
importance of having a strong profile in South Asian intelligence, and with 
the nuclear weapons plan on the table, the need to procure nuclear technology 
also turned out to be a key aim for the ISI (Kiessling, 2016). The growing 
influence of the ISI during the Z.A. Bhutto years cannot be dissociated from 
the East Pakistan war of 1971. While an enhancement of its role and 
competencies may be read as a consequence of perceived insecurity, the 
reality is that, as Shaun Gregory suggests: 
 
the breakup of Pakistan burned into the psyche of the Pakistan military and the ISI 
the overarching importance of safeguarding, at almost any cost, the territorial 
integrity of what remained of Pakistan. It is this that has since shaped the ferocity 
of the military and intelligence community’s response to separatism in Pakistan, 
whether in Balochistan, in Jammu and Kashmir, in Sindh, or among those dreaming 
of uniting the Pashtun communities across the Durand line dividing Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. (2007, p1015). 
 
This “ferocity”, associated with ideological and material factors, led the ISI 
to occupying an idiosyncratic role in Pakistan’s foreign and domestic political 
affairs, a role that has expanded from Afghanistan to Kashmir and to 
Balochistan. The significance of the loss of East Pakistan is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. It suffices to say that the consequences of the 1971 war are 
usually understated. The loss of territory is a highly meaningful event at 
different levels, including geopolitical and geo-economic, since Pakistan 
ceased to belong to South-East Asia. However, the meaning of the defeat by 
India, and by East Pakistanis/Bengalis, when the latter were patronised by the 
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Punjab-based statist elite as “Hinduized Muslims”, and a 20 per cent Hindu 
population, created still greater rancour48. 
 
The events in Afghanistan, the association and collaboration between the ISI 
and the CIA, which translated into important sums of money and weapons 
that would be directly administrated by the ISI leadership, infused with 
ideological overtones, help to explain why and how the role of ISI was 
extended to key areas of Pakistan’s governance. From foreign intelligence to 
political issues, the institution enjoyed the status of a centre of power, which 
could not be controlled by different governments, but only managed (Stratfor, 
2008).  
 
The same intelligence firm suggests that the ISI’s relations with Islamist 
militants, which were nurtured both during and after the Soviet invasion into 
Afghanistan resulted in the use of the former as a foreign policy tool. The 
next sub-sections illustrate how it was possible for the ISI to gain the upper 







                                               
48 Gary Bass’s (2013) The Blood Telegram offers an important account of the events, thus 
joining the literature that explains the 1971 events in Bangladesh, while capturing the 
extension of such rancour. 
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2.3.2.1  The ISI’s influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir 
 
Pakistan in Afghanistan 
In Afghanistan, the post-war period did not bring an end to conflict. The 
withdrawal of Soviet troops did not stop attempts to exert political influence. 
After the Geneva Accords, a pro-Soviet government in Kabul was headed by 
Najibullah. This situation was, however, averse to Pakistan’s interests. 
Pakistan’s preferences, orchestrated by the ISI and General Zia, were directed 
towards a Pashtun-dominated government of Islamist orientation. The ISI’s 
pressure on the Tanzeemat (an organisation that represented the Islamists’ 
mujahedeen) to be part of an Afghan Interim Government (Khan, 2011) was 
a sign of Pakistan’s intentions to maintain political control over Afghanistan. 
Indeed, Pakistan continued to interfere with Afghan politics49, and instead of 
helping to usher in a stable solution for the war-torn country, it acted in 
accordance with its perceived national interests. Pakistan has forged alliances 
of convenience with different factions of mujahedeen. This situation 
continued after Zia’s death, with civilian governments in Pakistan (Benazir 
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) unable to negotiate a viable and stable solution in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Afghanistan fell into the hands of warlords, who retained control of different 
regions of the country. The different mujahedeen groups began major 
infighting, bringing the country to the brink of civil war. The Southern 
                                               
49 See the chapter in which I analyse Pakistan’s relations with the US for a 
more detailed account of this situation. 
 130  
provinces of Kandahar and Helman were the most affected, as no clear 
warlord power was imposed, leaving the population at the mercy of rival 
commanders (Khan, 2011, p57). The dire situation into which Afghanistan 
fell prompted the rise of the Taliban, the so-called “theology students” raised 
in the madrassas of Pakistan. These madrassas experienced a great influx not 
only of Afghan students during and after the war, but also of cash from the 
Gulf monarchies. The latter saw a window of opportunity to propagate a most 
rigid and orthodox interpretation of Sunni Islam. Afghan students were 
groomed towards armed jihad. In Kandahar, these students are believed to 
have started actions against the “corrupt and rapacious commanders and bring 
peace to the city. The local population supported the Taliban action and 
welcomed the new rulers, who appeared to bring safety and order to the city” 
(ibid, p58). The rise of the Taliban would be rapid, given the disorder and 
chaos sown by the warlords and commanders, and the promise of safety 
offered by the latter. According to Riaz Mohammad Khan, Pakistan’s initial 
position on the Taliban was one of:  
 
considerable suspicion, especially among the religious-political elements who sided 
with Gulbadin Hekmatyar or other Mujahedin parties. Outlandish speculation 
included the conjecture by the Jamaat e Islami-backed Weekly Takbeer that the 
British and the CIA conjured up the Taliban after their failure to prop up pro-King 
Zahir Shah elements in Qandahar. (ibid, p59)  
 
Pakistan’s support for the new actors in Afghanistan increased gradually and 
continued after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban. The Taliban regime was 
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backed by Pakistan50 and Saudi Arabia, albeit for different reasons. The 
former’s main concern was to maintain Pashtuns in power so Islamabad could 
put a term to the idea of an independent Pakhtoonistan, particularly on 
Pakistan territory (Cohen, 2005), whereas the latter’s support was driven by 
the Taliban’s extreme orthodoxy, closer to Wahhabi interpretations of Islam, 
thus a form of extending influence to South Asia, as well as curbing the rise 
of Shia politics and Iran’s influence in Afghanistan. 
 
Despite the often noted direct influence of the ISI on the creation of the 
Taliban, there appears to be no consensus over the issue51. Carey Schofield, 
in her conversation with an ISI general (DG), recounts what she was told: 
“Pakistan retained its presence in Afghanistan but did not influence the course 
of events as the country collapsed into brutal civil war … The ISI did not 
create the Taliban or plan its takeover of Afghanistan. But we certainly 
interacted with it, once it emerged” (2011, p107). The extension of Pakistan’s 
ISI interaction with the Taliban turned into a foreign policy practice, such that 
the ISI was seen as an institution that was able to deal with the ruthless regime 
in Kabul. As Schofield comments: 
whenever anyone had to deal with the Taliban, even on fundamental foreign policy 
issues, the ISI was consulted and so its ownership of the relationship was 
strengthened … The Afghan issues as a whole came to be seen as an ISI 
                                               
50 It is important to note the support for the Taliban during Benazir Bhutto’s government. 
Although the reasons for why support was extended to the extremists are debatable and linked 
by some to a forthcoming pipeline project with its origins in Turkmenistan, thus crossing 
Afghan territory (see Jaffrelot, 2015, p504), the paradoxical nature of Bhutto’s policies are 
striking, taking into account the supposedly secular inclinations of the Pakistan’s People 
Party.   
51 The ISI may not have directly created the Taliban, but it certainly produced the conditions 
for the Taliban’s rise. As Jaffrelot points out: “Beyond the Afghan mujahideen, the Pakistanis 
equipped Islamists who came from all over the world … The ISI relied on the JI, which had 
gained a share of power under Zia, to carry out its strategy” (2015, p502). 
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responsibility. Nothing could happen without ISI clearance, and this habit became 
so ingrained that even the ISI itself came to believe it. (ibid, p108).  
 
Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan War and the consequences for the 
Afghan people who saw the socio-political fabric of the country torn apart 
were arguably only grasped after the 9/11 attacks. The prevailing narrative is 
the one that attributes to Pakistan almost a glorious role in the war effort in 
Afghanistan, since it represented, according to Amin, “perhaps the only 
occasion in Pakistan’s 50-year existence when it has been able to directly 
influence global history” (2000, p98). The former diplomat congratulates 
General Zia for the achievement, acknowledging his “determination and 
clairvoyance” (ibid, p98), and for holding on “to Pakistan’s risky role in 
Afghanistan in the belief that any other option would be still worse. In the 
end, Pakistan managed to come out successfully through this critical test over 
a decade” (ibid, p98). This uncritical view of one of Pakistan’s most 
significant foreign policy moments is noteworthy. The post-war devastation 
of Afghanistan is silenced. General Zia wanted to extend patronage to a 
fundamentalist government in Kabul that would be convenient in placating 
Pakistan’s insecurity towards India. In 2000, the harsh reality of an 
Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban had become clear. Pakistan was 
already experiencing the consequences of religious extremism which had 
been brewing since the 1980s.  
 
The effects on Pakistani society at large were striking and have complicated 
the ways in which Pakistanis see themselves in relation not only to religion, 
but also to the world. Zia’s legacy, aided by ISI interference on external 
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matters, did not crash with him in the same plane. As Riaz Mohammad Khan 
puts it: 
 
the decade of Zia ul Haq’s rule and the rhetoric of the Afghan Jihad, which had 
boosted Pakistan’s international profile, served to fuse ideas of security, religiosity, 
and patriotism to create a mental makeup that suited the interests of the military, the 
clergy, the pro-status quo feudal classes, and the religiously inclined urban middle-
classes. The same period also saw a depletion of courage and intellect in the country 
and erosion of the capacity to withstand and counter the spreading of obscurantism 
and bigotry. (2011, p282). 
 
Sectarianism and a violent jihadist disposition turned out to be acceptable in 
many quarters of society, fuelled by the state-sponsoring of terrorist groups 
such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET).  This group, whose origins can be traced to 
the Afghan War and which reportedly maintained contacts with Osama bin 
Laden during late 1990s (Jaffrelot, 2015), would also be instrumental in the 
jihad efforts in Kashmir and beyond.  
 
Pakistan’s sanction of the Taliban regime was made possible thanks to the 
ISI’s role, which was transformed into a foreign policy practice. The ISI’s 
role in Pakistan’s foreign policy has left its discourses associated with a 
national state identity where militarism and Islam have become conflated. 
Through unconventional practices, successive Pakistani governments have 
opted for foreign policy practices that have co-constructed a national identity 
associated with religious extremism, which was used domestically to 
perpetuate an anti-India discourse that in turn would help to continue the 
country’s war-preparedness against India with a focus on Kashmir. 
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Kashmir 
With tensions rising in Kashmir after the 1989 riots, Pakistan sought another 
opportunity to achieve her aspirations over the territory52, and with the help 
of the ISI, Pakistani jihadists would open another source of conflict (Jaffrelot, 
2015). The ISI, emboldened by the results of the Afghan jihad, continued its 
unconventional foreign policy practices and expanded the mujahedeen’s role 
as a foreign policy tool. General Zia and his coterie envisaged Kashmir as the 
next jihad target. As Kiessling writes,  
 
from 1988, the ISI began to organize training camps for young militants from the 
Valley. At the beginning their partner was the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF), who were responsible for recruiting the fighters, while the ISI delivered 
training and equipment. Funding came from the Gulf region and the drug trade, and 
donations were collected in the mosques of Pakistan, US and Western Europe. All 
this ensured the recruitment and training of new young volunteers and the 
deployment of battle-hardened mujahedeen from Afghanistan. (2016, p192). 
 
Pakistan’s foreign policy choices gave rise to more issues with India. It also 
led to the radicalisation of many Kashmiris. Furthermore, it made Kashmiris’ 
lives even more vulnerable to India’s occupation. The latter responded with 
further militarisation of the Kashmiri territory it occupies. If Pakistan’s 
strategy was to “bleed India” (Jaffrelot, 2015), its chief result was further 
oppression of the Kashmiris. However, Pakistan’s position is to refuse to 
                                               
52 Victoria Schofield (2003) mentions that “Indian commentators maintain that as early as 
1982, almost immediately after Sheikh Abdullah’s death, General Zia has instigated a plan 
to train Kashmiri youth to launch an ‘armed crusade’ in the valley. But it did not meet with 
much success and it was not until the mid 1980s that the plan was again revived” (2003, 
p140). 
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provide military assistance to Kashmiris, thus limiting her role to political and 
moral support. Pakistan’s intentions over Kashmir could be seen as the desire 
to gain territory rather than offering support for independence. Anatol Lieven 
notes that the ISI “used pro-Pakistan Islamist groups to side-line the Jammu 
and Kashmir Liberation Front, which initially led the Kashmir uprising. This 
strategy included the murder of JKLF leaders and activists – even as these 
were also being targeted and killed by Indian security forces” (2012, p189). 
 
It is not possible to summarise Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir in a few 
paragraphs, for its complexity goes beyond the role of the ISI. It suffices to 
say that Pakistan’s foreign policy decisions in respect of India have 
contributed to the further dehumanisation of Kashmiris, while state-centric 
interests prevail. Pakistan has tried to instrumentalise Kashmiris and their 
lives. The influx of religious extremists into the territory, and in particular the 
Valley, since the 1990s has exposed Kashmiris to alien religious beliefs. 
Altering the ways in which religion is lived and understood has been one of 
the consequences of Pakistan’s sponsoring of resistance to India.  
 
The role of Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups, like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and 
particularly of the group’s leader Hafeez Saeed, is notable. In a speech at the 
end of 2000, Saeed said: “Jihad is not about Kashmir only. About fifteen years 
ago people might have found it ridiculous if someone told them about the 
disintegration of the USSR. Today I announce the break-up of India, 
inshallah. We will not rest until the whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan” 
(cited in Jaffrelot, 2015, p515). Saeed’s discourse results from the 
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empowerment given to his group and others like it. This empowerment was 
envisaged as a foreign policy practice.  
 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I discussed how some aspects of the history of Pakistan’s 
formation and independence are closely linked to the processes of 
militarisation that would subsequently take root in Pakistani society and its 
leading institutions. The militarisation processes are also at the core of the 
interlinking between security and identity, which, in turn, have gained a 
prominent place in the country’s foreign policy. As the military has been able 
to control and inculcate a religious, identitarian and nationalist narrative that 
is intrinsically gendered and gendering, foreign policy has increasingly 
become an instrument that ensures that such control over the polity remains 
in place. Pakistan’s hostile relations with India remain the major reason as to 
why security remains so central to foreign policy, while the latter remains 
anchored in patriarchal processes that seek to control, shape and dominate the 
domestic realm. 
 
Throughout the decades of Pakistan’s existence, the influence of religious 
ideology and of the armed forces, including the ISI, has ensured the 
enhancement of militarism. As a result, the national identity narrative, the 
transformation of values, and the sedimentation of a gendered, masculinised 
identity are transformed to ensure the continuation of military power, and 
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consequently the centrality of security. Hence, the military constructs a 
representation of the state which includes the interlinking between security 
and identity. Indeed, the conspicuous display of military might is destined to 
represent the state as one that is fully ready to confront her enemy, India. As 
a result, the country’s foreign policy is shaped by primary concerns with 
defence and war. In this way, the state’s representation through foreign policy 
maintains the close connection between security and identity not only as a 
cornerstone that shapes relations with other countries, but also as one that 
generates processes of identity/otherness. The next chapters, which examine 
in detail these foreign relations, will demonstrate how the state elite in 













3.1  Introduction  
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This chapter critically examines Pakistan’s relations with China, with a focus 
on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Currently, China is 
seeking to a consolidated place in global leadership. In Asia, this position 
already appears a fait accompli (Shambaugh, 2005). As such, Pakistan and 
China’s relations form part of the latter’s plans to establish its position within 
the global order. However, Pakistan-China relations have evolved over seven 
decades, under very specific political conditions. Whilst Pakistan’s relations 
with the US and India embody discourses of hostility, mistrust, enmity, and 
political violence, here relations with China have been constituted differently. 
Sino-Pakistan relations, from Pakistani side, as this chapter will show, have 
been shaped by how the interlinking of identity and security has been 
constructed in Pakistan, and how, in turn, this relationship has contributed to 
Pakistan’s militarisation. 
 
The history of Sino-Pakistan relations involves other relevant actors in the 
international community, namely India, the US, and the USSR/Russia. There 
is a vast literature that establishes the importance of these actors. However, it 
is scattered across different fields, ranging from work that focuses on 
Pakistan’s foreign policy, which invariably includes a chapter on Pakistan-
China relations (Burke, 1973; Amin, 2000; Sattar, 2013, 2016; Ali, 2001), to 
literature that specifically looks at Pakistan-China relations (Jain, 1974; Syed, 
1974; Vertzberger, 1983; Jacob, 2010; Beckley, 2012; Small, 2015; Ali, 
2017; Garlick, 2018; Boni, 2020), to other works on Sino-India relations and 
foreign policy (Malik, 995; Foot, 1996; Roy, 1998; Malone and Mukherjee, 
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2010; Garver, 2001, 2016). In the following sections I engage with these 
works. 
 
In historical terms, both Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China have 
contemporary origins. The PRC was created in 1949, after the struggle that 
saw the Communists (Mao’s Red Army) fight against Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalist forces. Pakistan53 recognised the PRC in 1950. It was the first 
Muslim country and third non-communist one to do so (Azeemi, 2007). 
Initially, Sino-Pakistan relations experienced a period of tension, in view of 
China’s opposition to the US’s imperialist role and closeness to Pakistan. 
China followed its preference for postcolonial unity between African and 
Asian countries. Thus, Pakistan’s first foreign policy decisions associated 
with the US and participation in Western military alliances caused 
discontentment in Peking. However, it has been established (Sattar, 2017) that 
the latter understood the former’s motives, and thus did not perceive it as 
posing any threat to China. 
 
The 1955 Bandung Conference became an important moment in Sino-
Pakistan relations, as both countries’ foreign policy intentions were clarified 
(Syed, 1974; Burke, 1973; Garver, 2016). Subsequently, both countries 
forged a strong bond, enhanced by a shared hostility towards India, their 
                                               
53 Pakistan considered Chiang’s nationalists as the “lawful Government of China” (Burke, 
1973, p101), despite Pakistan’s unfavourable opinion on Chiang-Kai-shek, most likely due 
to the latter’s “partiality for Gandhi and Nehru” (ibid, p101). As such, there was no 
diplomatic exchanges until Mao’s victory in 1949, while India had established an 
Ambassador even during the period of struggle between Communists and Nationalists. It was 
with India, not Pakistan, that earlier in 1950–51 Communist China developed friendly 
relations (Sen Gupta, 1970, p111). 
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geographical proximity, and a genuine interest in amicably resolving border 
issues. The latter led to the Sino-Pakistan border agreement in 1963 (Syed, 
1974). Hence, the Bandung Conference marks one of the key events in Sino-
Pakistani relations. China’s initial displeasure with Pakistan’s involvement 
with Western security alliances was reversed. Pakistan’s PM Mohammad Ali 
Bogra was able to convince his Chinese counterpart of the logic attached to 
joining the alliances (Garver, 2016, p109). As Garver notes:  
 
Zhou tested the sincerity of Bogra’s assurances by reporting them to the Political 
Committee of the Bandung conference, lauding them as creating mutual 
understanding and agreement among conference participants on the key question of 
peace and cooperation. Zhou added, “I am sure the Prime Minister of Pakistan will 
have no objection to these views of mine.” Bogra rose to the occasion by publicly 
repeating his assurances to Zhou. (ibid, p109). 
 
Thus, the Bandung Conference served as a catalyst for the two countries to 
forge a relationship that would be tested time and again. However, during the 
mid-1950s, China also had a warm relation with India; something that 
deteriorated rapidly by the late fifties. This souring of Sino-Indian relations 
was a key factor in bringing China and Pakistan together. The following 
sections will demonstrate how Sino-Pakistan relations became one of the 
most close-knit foreign relations in Asia, enabling both to pursue common 
goals as well as specific national interests, namely in relation to India and the 
US. Of course, the initial years of Sino-Pakistan relations were profoundly 
shaped by the India-Pakistan conflict (Jacob, 2010) and the effects of the Cold 
War in Asia. These are crucial historical factors necessary to understand how 
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and why China and Pakistan, with two different ideological backgrounds, 
could form an entente cordiale.  
 
The Sino-Pakistani entente can be traced back to 1964. This entente was 
primarily based on a security relationship through which shared perceptions 
of security risks were tackled. Consequently, Pakistan’s relations with India 
were further aggravated by mistrust. However, to a certain extent, Pakistan’s 
security anxiety diminished somewhat due to her close relations with China. 
The entente with China also generated new dynamics concerning the Kashmir 
question, as “Beijing firmly supported Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute” (Roy, 
1998, p172). China’s former position of isolation must also be acknowledged. 
As John Garver argues, since China “was on the threshold of the Cultural 
Revolution, the Sino-Pakistan entente was one of the very few of China’s 
diplomatic relations to survive that upheaval without disruption” (2016, p192; 
Garver, 2004). 
 
Two more key features of this relationship are security and militarism. 
Andrew Small suggests that Sino-Pakistani relations are “a friendship forged 
by war” (2015). The relationship with China has helped Pakistan to enhance 
her permanent “war-preparedness” status; historically, China’s support for 
Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars ( Small, 2015; Sattar, 2017; Burke, 
1973) proved to be relevant not only in further cementing the countries’ bond 
and perceived interests, but also in advancing the militarisation of Pakistan. 
More specifically, post-1965, Sino-Pakistan relations were further 
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strengthened in the military domain, thus initiating a long and ongoing 
process of militarisation. 
 
Whilst China has never committed with “boots on the ground”54, it has 
handed key support by issuing credible threats to India. The importance of 
Chinese support during the 1971 war is also considered an important 
landmark in the development of this relationship. It is, however, Pakistan’s 
diplomatic role in bridging relations between the US and China that has 
gained historic importance in this relationship, in a year in which the country 
would be dismembered and defeated at the hands of a common enemy: India. 
 
Andrew Small further notes that China has been Pakistan’s “chief arms 
supplier” (2015, p2). During the 1965 and 1971 wars in India, despite China 
refusing to get involved directly, the supply of weapons was not interrupted. 
China’s internal problems, compounded by the delicate Cold War situation in 
Asia, a hostile USSR, and the Vietnam War discouraged the Chinese 
leadership from going beyond some moral, diplomatic, and arms support. 
Hence, China has made a constant contribution to Pakistan’s military build-
up and war-preparedness. Post-1965 war, the US withdrew military aid to 
Pakistan. In response, China stepped in and in the late 1960s, it “equipped at 
least two divisions of the Pakistan army” in addition to providing “substantial 
hardware to Pakistan’s air and naval forces” (Naqvi, 1986, p31). All this 
despite Pakistan’s insistence that China never committed to a defence pact 
                                               
54 Filippo Boni (2020) notes that it is very difficult to ascertain whether China would ever 
carry out operations on the ground on behalf of Pakistan. 
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with them (Small, 2015). Yet, China was instrumental in the development of 
the military industrial complex, particularly between the years of 1979 and 
1999 (Siddiqa, 2001), together with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme.  
 
Thus, the growth of militarism in Pakistan is closely associated with the 
state’s relations with China. To date, the Pakistani military, through ISPR’s 
statements, celebrates the country’s military bond with China. For example, 
Major General Asif Ghafoor tweeted a statement made by the former Chinese 
Ambassador in Pakistan, Mr Sun Weidong, during the celebrations of the 90th 
Anniversary of the foundation of the PLA that took place in Islamabad: “Pak 
China Military to Military coop is the pillar of our bilateral relation” 
(Ghafoor, 2017, abbreviations in the original).  
 
The Pakistani Army has continued to celebrate PLA’s Anniversary in 
subsequent years. The celebrations of 2020 were also marked by Pakistan’s 
COAS stating that the “Pakistan Army and PLA are the key components of 
Pak-China strategic relations and we are proud to be brothers in arms” (The 
News, 2020). On the same occasion, China’s ambassador to Pakistan 
reiterated the aim of “expanding and enhancing military cooperation to make 
new contribution to the consolidation of bilateral relations” (ibid). I will 
return to the militarism issue in Sino-Pakistan relations in the context of 
CPEC in due course. 
 
Whilst historical factors remain relevant to understanding the context of Sino-
Pakistani relations, it is in the countries’ contemporary relations that security 
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and militarism have entered into a new phase, with a greater regional and 
international footprint. With the advent of the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (hereafter CPEC), this foreign relation has reached a 
transformational point for both countries’ foreign relations. The current 
chapter is interested in analysing CPEC through the lenses of security and 
militarism, so as to unveil its representations, especially in respect of the 
interlinking between security and identity. Hence, the objective here is to 
discuss and analyse how it is that beyond parochial definitions linked to 
geopolitics and geo-economics, CPEC is a discourse that represents security 
and militarism. The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first frames CPEC 
within the broad context of Sino-Pakistani relations. The second explores 
critical issues associated with the project, including the seaport of Gwadar, 
CPEC’s impact on Balochistan, and on Kashmir. The third builds on the two 
previous sections and attempts to explain how Pakistan-China relations have 
contributed to Pakistan’s militarism, and therefore to a gendered conception 
of state identity. 
 
3.2  Introducing CPEC 
 
CPEC is a land corridor that aims to link the geographically distant Pakistani 
seaport of Gwadar to China’s most Western region of Xinjiang. However, 
CPEC continues to take in the above-mentioned dimensions and acquire a 
diversity of meanings to the different actors involved. At the outset, I should 
add that my fieldwork and experience of living in Pakistan practically 
coincided with the official launch of CPEC. During that time, I noted several 
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changes associated with it, particularly in the economic and infrastructure 
sectors. Academics also welcomed the opportunity to organise and host 
thematic workshops and conferences on the topic of CPEC. I had the 
opportunity to attend some of these events, including one hosting the Chinese 
Ambassador to Pakistan55. Moreover, I noticed a greater influx of Chinese 
citizens in Pakistan, and social media and online platforms engaged with 
CPEC, not only to promote it, but also to debate its various dynamics. 
 
The change in China’s Presidency in 2013 has been marked by a renewed 
global strategy to expand the country’s reach. Economic, financial, military, 
and diplomatic factors have been articulated under the leadership of Xi 
Jinping in order to place China at the centre of international politics. To be 
sure, it is necessary to also acknowledge the transition from Mao Zedong to 
Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s visionary plans, associated with economic reforms 
linked to the role of science and technology, have helped to generate the 
conditions for China’s “opening to the world”, as the country’s post-1978 
stage is usually called (see Garver, 2016). 
 
The current, most prominent stage is marked by the BRI56, previously the 
OBOR. The BRI, also known as the “New Silk Road” (Li, 2016; Shen and 
Hui, 2015), beyond being a global project for trade and connectivity, with 
specific implications for the lands it crosses, is also the result of China’s 
                                               
55 For details see: https://lcpr.pk/policy-dialogue-pakistan-china-relations-in-the-21st-
century/. 
56 See PRC’s National Development and Reform Commission for a full insight into the 
country’s expansion and connectivity plans associated with the BRI: 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html.   
See also: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1249618.shtml. 
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combination of national and foreign policies, under the leadership of Xi 
Jinping. The latter, according to Shen and Hui (2015), is trying to distinguish 
himself from the previous leadership by enhancing the role of nationalism. 
To this end, Xi aims to put forward the idea of the “Chinese Dream”. As the 
authors note:  
 
Xi often highlights dignity in his grand country’s patriotic expression, and that 
shows rooted sceptics on the current international order. That also unveils the 
intention to use nationalism as a means to gain popularity and support of the 
communist regime at home. Second, Xi changes the situation of the past decade. He 
focuses more on patriotism and less on social ideology and liberalism at the 
ideological level. To achieve that, Xi advocates the Chinese Dream slogan overseas 
and creates a set of shared value in Asia. (…) Xi revises the discourse around 
“Peaceful Development” by referring to the “New Asian Security Concept,” 
highlighting China’s strong economy and military power, thus turning her identity 
as a stakeholder into a “co-decision maker”. (Shen and Hui, 2015, p2) 
 
Thus, it is within the ambitious agenda of Xi’s leadership, which conflates 
Chinese nationalism and global expansionism, that CPEC is nested. Whilst 
CPEC is mostly portrayed as project of economic development, its links to 
the security and military realms are now widely discussed. I will return to this 
point later in the chapter. CPEC, which has been described as one of the 
flagship projects of OBOR/BRI (Virk, 2018), may also be envisaged as a 
“rebranding of the long-term cooperation between the two countries which 
has been in progress since the 1950s” (Garlick, 2018, p519). 
 
The announcement of CPEC took place in 2013 during the Chinese PM’s visit 
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to Pakistan. Both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Cooperation for the Long-term Plan on CPEC. Significantly, this happened 
after the administration of the southern seaport of Gwadar in Balochistan had 
shifted from the Singapore Port Authority to China (Ali, 2017, p204). 
However, its formal launch only took place in April 2015 when the Chinese 
President finally visited Pakistan, his visit having been delayed by political 
protests in the country (BBC, 2014). Xi announced investments of GBP 30 
billion (The Guardian, 2015), and thereafter, Sino-Pakistan’s contacts have 
intensified under the premiership of Nawaz Sharif. 
 
The Chinese and Pakistani governments have outlined their versions of 
CPEC. The former’s foreign ministry provides a concise one: an “economic 
corridor is mainly about cooperation in three areas, namely, transport, energy 
and industrial parks. It builds a new platform for the growth of China-Pakistan 
strategic cooperative partnership in the next five to ten years” (FMPRC). In 
China’s Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road57, issued in March 2015, the Chinese 
government suggests that “the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor are closely related to 
the Belt and Road Initiative, and therefore require closer cooperation and 
greater progress” (NDRC, 2015).  
 
                                               
57 This is a comprehensive document in which the aims and imagined results of BRI are 
mapped out. 
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Pakistan, by contrast, provides a more ostentatious definition. Pakistan’s 
Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform introduces CPEC as:  
 
a framework of regional connectivity. CPEC will not only benefit China and 
Pakistan but will have positive impact on Iran, Afghanistan, India, Central Asian 
Republic, and the region. The enhancement of geographical linkages having 
improved [the] road, rail and air transportation system with frequent and free 
exchanges of growth and people to people contact, enhancing understanding 
through academic, cultural and regional knowledge and culture, activity of higher 
volume of flow of trade and businesses, producing and moving energy to have more 
optimal businesses and enhancement of co-operation by [a] win-win model will 
result in [a] well connected, integrated region of shared destiny, harmony and 
development. (CPEC.gov) 
 
Similarly, the Pakistan-China Institute based in Islamabad issued ten 
fundamental points in relation to CPEC, defining it as:  
 
a major and pilot project of the Belt and Road Initiative which is proposed by 
Chinese President Xi Jinping. CPEC has become the framework and platform for 
comprehensive and substantive cooperation between China and Pakistan. CPEC is 
the important consensus reached by the leaders of both countries. … CPEC is of 
great significance to the development of China-Pakistan’s all-weather strategic 
cooperative partnership and the building of the community of shared destiny 
between China and Pakistan. (CPEC.info). 
 
Terms such as “strategic cooperative partnership”, “regional connectivity”, 
“co-operation by [a] win-win model”, “integration of development 
strategies”, and “shared destiny” are to be found within the respective 
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countries’ definitions of CPEC. Both countries’ foreign policies are currently 
aligned around these objectives. Pakistan’s governing elites have engaged in 
different fora to promote CPEC. For instance, since 2013 the number of 
academic conferences and seminars on CPEC and/or Pakistan relations with 
China has multiplied significantly. There is a burgeoning scholarship both 
indigenously and internationally on Sino-Pakistan relations, including CPEC, 
with a considerable number of articles and reports dedicated to the theme, 
from various points of view – economic, geopolitical and strategic (Rizvi, 
2015; Ahmar, 2015; Javaid, 2016; Adnan and Fatima, 2016; Hameed, 2017; 
Ahmad and Singh, 2017; Ali, 2017). 
 
3.2.1  Shaping CPEC’s discourse 
 
The construction of CPEC-related projects including the construction of 
motorways, dams, railways upgrading, power plants, and a seaport and airport 
at Gwadar, Balochistan, is currently underway. Pakistan and China are also 
engaging in a parallel discourse, based on a combination of public diplomacy 
and soft power tools, which are well managed by China (Chang and Lin, 
2014; Welsh and Fern, 2008; Nye, 2004, 2005; Wang, 2008). A good example 
is the Pakistan-China Institute in Islamabad58, launched well before CPEC, in 
2009. PCI is established as a non-partisan, non-governmental, non-political 
think tank. It promotes cultural exchange between the two countries and 
coordinates Chinese language courses in Pakistan.  
                                               
58 See: http://www.pakistan-china.com/index.php. 
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The PCI is also responsible for two online publications, with noteworthy 
names: Youlin (Good Neighbours), a cultural journal; and Nihao-Salam59, 
words for greeting in Mandarin and Urdu, respectively. Concerning Youlin, 
its online edition has been regularly updated since 2012. Monthly online 
archives are available. It is a bilingual publication in English and Mandarin. 
Its content is primarily focused on cultural activities and events taking place 
in Pakistan and China. While the Pakistani section highlights cultural events 
in Pakistan’s three main cities (Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi), the section 
on China entitled “Travel in China” is far more extensive. One can obtain 
information on a comprehensive selection of cultural and touristic events 
across China. Significantly, Xinjiang alone has gathered a total of twenty 
posts in five years, on what may be understood as an attempt to bridge the 
region with Pakistan, in an effort to represent the “Islamic bond”. It appears 
that there is also an intention to focus on places and regions which constitute 
the “Ancient Silk Road”, perhaps to draw attention to the present BRI. In 
cuisine-related posts, there is a focus on foods that are compatible with 
Muslim dietary requirements. 
 
Youlin magazine thus marks an attempt to frame China’s cultural diversity, 
albeit by resorting to a representation of what comes across as being culturally 
                                               
59 As of April 2019, Nihao-Salam is no longer available online. Since the new government 
of Imran Khan took office, the PCI appears to have downgraded its activities; however, 
Youlin magazine continues to be updated online. A new online magazine has been launched 
in 2019. It is called Diplomag. Unfortunately, there is no mention of who manages the online 
publication. The magazine is dedicated to publishing news related to CPEC, BRI, Pakistan 
and China. While it is not possible to establish the extent of its operations, the magazine 
appears to operate within the same frame as Nihao-Salam. It may be perused here: 
http://diplo-mag.com/category/pakistan/. 
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accepted Pakistani Islamic norms. The Silk Road receives a great deal of 
attention in this publication. The intention is to create a narrative that links 
China and Pakistan as having a centuries-old and significant history, so that 
BRI’s success may be contextualised, addressed and turned into a relational 
bond between Pakistan and China. However, the efficacy of this strategy is a 
point of contention. As a country of 207 million people, in Pakistan, access 
to the internet and to the English language is restricted to the privileged 
classes. It may be argued that it is precisely this niche of the population that 
must be primarily targeted. In this light, the benefit of CPEC to the whole of 
Pakistan can be called into question. For instance, one might ask who 
becomes excluded from this imagined relationship? Conversely, will the 
majority of Chinese citizens living and working in Pakistan be able to travel 
around the country and enjoy local cultural events and hospitality?60 I raise 
these questions as a result of empirical observation. During my experience of 
living and working in Pakistan, I noticed that Chinese citizens are mostly 
found living in heavily guarded and gated societies61, or frequenting shopping 
malls with high levels of security. Therefore, the full extent to which Chinese 
citizens are being targeted by the content of Youlin remains a matter of debate.  
 
Concerning Nihao-Salam, whilst also “dedicated towards promoting [the] 
Pakistan-China friendship and multi-sector cooperation, from diplomacy to 
economic development, from technological co-operation to enhancing people 
                                               
60 In January 2019, I had participated in a roundtable at the University of Lahore with a group 
of students from Tsinghua University, who were touring Pakistan. They have reported that 
while interacting with fellow Chinese citizens working in different projects, namely energy-
generating ones, the latter expressed distaste about their lack of mobility in the country. This 
was countered by some participants as preventive measures related to security. 
61 See for instance: http://cn.dailypakistan.com.pk/story/pakistan/2659/. 
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to people contacts” (Nihao-Salam, 2017), its content is unmistakably 
politically driven, as it is identified as a “public diplomacy E-magazine” 
(ibid.). The magazine’s relevance resides in the fact that it republishes a 
selected number of articles from China-controlled media outlets such as 
Global Times, China Daily, Xinhua, or People’s Daily Online. Those articles 
and many others appear to have been carefully curated in order to build a 
representation of how China has been imagining a non-Western world order, 
and how China has brought Pakistan within her sphere of influence, with the 
latter’s consent. 
 
The collection of articles – organised both by “location” (China, Pakistan, 
China-Pakistan relation, and Xinjiang) and by “discipline” (which includes 
diplomacy, politics, Pakistan-China Friendship, military, or culture) – 
provides an interesting insight into the importance of Sino-Indian relations, 
how China’s economic development is geared towards a changing world 
order, or how non-Western, anti-American sentiments are a reality within the 
politics of the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. The significance of 
this wide range of dialogues China and Pakistan have gathered on this 
electronic platform goes beyond the scope of China-Pakistan friendship, as 
many are linked to other regional and global interests of both countries. For 
instance, by acknowledging the existence of an anti-American sentiment 
among Muslim populations, China attempts to build the conditions for an 
approbation of her global politics in regions so far subject to American 
influence.  
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Nihao-Salam, under the pretence of being an e-magazine that celebrates and 
promotes the Pakistan-China friendship, has constructed an archive of highly 
significant texts, which, when read together, may acquire additional meaning, 
allowing one to discern how China views the world and how China has 
engaged globally since 2011 (the date of the first archived material from the 
e-magazine).  
 
The Sino-centric content is certainly one of the features of this constructed 
discourse. By assembling these texts under the banner Nihao-Salam, the CPI 
engages dialogically and performatively in the construction of Sino-Pakistan 
relations. In turn, national identity and foreign policy become co-constructed, 
due to existence of the archive that allows for the three dialogical dimensions 
of an utterance to occur. The set of texts comprises a unique utterance, 
through which Pakistan’s relationship with China is given a voice: on the one 
hand, theoretically, it addresses a global audience and expresses China’s 
dominant role in her relations with Pakistan; on the other, it idealises how 
foreign policy discourses enable the production of national identity 
narratives. Pakistan becomes a part of China’s constructed discourses in its 
quest to become a leading global power. The result is the construction of a 
national identity discourse linking Pakistan to the global sphere through 
China’s political practices. 
 
Simultaneously, the assembling of these texts is also performative, enhancing 
the co-construction of foreign policy and national identity. Nihao-Salam, as 
mentioned earlier, collects articles that reflect the voice of China’s ruling 
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Communist Party, serving not only to inform, but also to discipline global 
audiences, including Pakistani ones. On the other hand, the Pakistani-
controlled platform engages in the very same disciplinary task, through her 
own choices and actions. Hence, the dual task of discourse disciplining – by 
using processes of repetition (re-publishing) and citation (re-voicing CCP 
doctrines) – aims to normalise and naturalise this nexus of foreign policy and 
national identity. China’s indoctrination practices thus result in bringing 
Pakistan into her orbit of political influence, indicating that her national 
identity will be part of both countries’ perceived “shared destiny”. 
 
3.3  Contentious issues within the CPEC  
 
The impact of CPEC in Pakistan’s social and political spheres is diverse. 
Benefits and costs of CPEC continue to be central to political debate. Whilst 
there is great interest in CPEC’s economic impact and associated issues, my 
analysis is centred on its domestic and international political dimensions, 
which are involved in the interlinking of identity and security, and generate 
issues pertaining to militarist expansion. I will also consider how CPEC 
serves as a vehicle to enhance militarism. 
 
The media, particularly the English press, has acted as a lever for the domestic 
debate on CPEC, and in general criticisms and concerns about the project 
have been voiced. This is despite ongoing issues over freedom of expression. 
In the 2016 yearly report, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported 
that: 
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Freedom of speech and media, protest, movement and assembly are being violated 
and curbed on the pretext of “national security” or “national interest”. Even 
expression of genuine apprehensions over development plans or commitments made 
by the government are being rubbished as being against “national interest” [… and] 
in particular, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has acquired an aura 
of such official sanctity that any information sought on its details or airing 
reservations over its implementation are being denounced as acts of flagrant anti-
nationalism. Smaller provinces and Gilgit Baltistan have voiced numerous 
reservations, including with regard to issues of CPEC’s impact and discriminatory 
application in various federating units of the country: these merit urgent 
consideration. HRCP also demands an immediate and thorough environment impact 
assessment of the CPEC project. The impact on the people being dislocated and the 
economic benefits to the local people should also be assessed. In Balochistan, 
development of the Gwadar port has deprived thousands of fishermen of their 
livelihood and shelter. The local population is intimidated when they express their 
concern over the development policy in Gwadar. (HRCP, 2016, p300) 
 
During an interview with me in September 2016, AC3 expressed similar 
concerns in view of the “aura of sanctity” that CPEC has acquired. The senior 
academic mentioned the harsh criticism he once experienced by a member of 
the government, while attending a seminar. The “aura of sanctity” was also 
reflected in how the government reacted to a piece published by the daily 
Dawn62. On being granted access to a document labelled “Long Term Plan 
for China Pakistan Economic Corridor 2017-2030”, Dawn published a 
detailed summary of CPEC. From industry to agriculture, tourism and 
recreation, and perhaps more importantly, “fibre optics and surveillance”, it 
                                               
62 See: https://www.dawn.com/news/1333101. 
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appears that China and Pakistan have engendered a complex plan through 
which China’s presence will become almost irreversible. Interestingly, for the 
discussion that follows later in the chapter, there is little attention given to 
Gwadar Port in Balochistan.  
 
The Dawn piece of 18th May was quickly followed by a rebuttal in another 
media outlet ten days later. In a piece entitled “The Real CPEC”, by Hassan 
Khawar, a government adviser, the Daily Times tried to counter any 
possibility for speculation given by Dawn. While it is a healthy sign that 
CPEC is being widely debated, it must be added that such discussion will 
remain limited to the educated English-speaking elite, and most likely will 
not reach the masses. Furthermore, Chinese and Pakistan’s soft power 
discourses are also constructed by Chinese diplomats in Pakistan. The 
Chinese Embassy in Islamabad appears to be setting the rules of engagement 
with Pakistan’s civilian and military spheres. The use of metaphors and 
hyperbolic language has had an important role in the generation of discourse. 
Terms like “all-weather friends”, “higher than the Himalayas”, “deeper than 
seas”, “sweeter than honey”, “iron brothers” or “steel sisters”63 have gained 
currency within both official and unofficial utterances by Pakistanis and 
Chinese alike. Whilst the language used by both countries to describe their 
relationship is one that invokes trust and commitment, scholars and analysts 
have raised questions about the main purposes of CPEC and the project’s 
viability. Indeed, the reality on the ground seems challenging. 
                                               
63 The phrase “steel sisters” was first used by Pakistan Foreign Secretary Tehmina Janjua, in 
a recent visit to China, where she said that “China and Pakistan are not only iron brothers as 
President Xi Jinping has said, but also steel sisters” (cited in Mo, 2017). Janjua is the first 
woman to hold the post of Foreign Secretary. 
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For instance, Jeremy Garlick (2018) highlights some critical aspects 
concerning the economic viability of transporting oil and gas from Gwadar to 
Xinjiang, given that the latter is one of China’s regions that produces more 
oil and gas, notwithstanding the fact that supplies already flow from Central 
Asian countries through Xinjiang. He also makes reference to some notable 
geographical impediments. For instance, Gwadar port’s location is very 
distant from Pakistan’s main industrial belt (Lahore, Faisalabad, and 
Gujranwala in Central Punjab), with no reliable highways linking the regions. 
Moreover, the Karakoram Highway, a road built in partnership with China, 
crossing the mountainous northern areas of Pakistan towards China, despite 
a recent update, remains at the mercy of geomorphic features, like “hanging 
valleys, waterfalls, glaciers, snow-fields (…), extremely difficult terrain for 
the building and maintenance of pipelines [and] sections of the highway are 
subject to frequent landslides and rockslides” (Garlick, 2018, p524). Thus, 
whilst Gwadar is often viewed as a geopolitical advantage to Pakistan, 
including being at a location furthermost away from India (Khetran, 2014), 
indicating that state leadership cannot dissociate CPEC from a representation 




3.3.1  The Port of Gwadar: impact on security and identity 
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The seaport of Gwadar is one of CPEC’s projects that generates questions 
about the overall viability and purpose of the Sino-Pakistani venture. Located 
at the Southwest coast of Pakistan’s Balochistan, this seaport has been hailed 
as the fulcrum for CPEC in terms of connectivity, acting as a doorway to 
Western China. In its appealing geographical location, one can certainly 
imagine its potential as a connector, as well as becoming a source for 
development at national and regional levels (see Xinhua.net, 2020). However, 
port calls have been rather modest since it became operational (Boni, 2020). 
For instance, whilst recently the “CPEC Authority chairman said that the 
Gwadar port is becoming fully functional and Afghan transit trade has started 
to divert towards Gwadar” (Xinhua, 2020), in reality, marine traffic at 
Gwadar remains virtually non-existent64. Thus, Gwadar’s viability and 
purpose have prompted concerns to be raised over the different discourses 
generated around the project. 
 
The discourses generated by Gwadar are relevant in two principal ways. On 
the one hand, the relevance of geopolitical and historical factors are useful in 
analysing how colonial and post-colonial strategies of control and dominance 
persist in the region. On the other hand, the ambiguity about the real purpose 
of the port of Gwadar has raised concerns that the port may be utilised for 
military purposes. I will explain and analyse in turn how these two parallel 
discourses are constituted. 
 
                                               
64 Gwadar Port vessel movements may be viewed at:  
https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ports/19578/_:84c99f758ebcd3dbc08713be9e
40a68d. This website maintains a detailed update of all vessels and port movements around 
the world. 
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3.3.1.1  Geopolitics of control around Gwadar: past and present 
 
Concerning Gwadar as a locus that has come to represent control and 
dominance, it is necessary to understand Balochistan’s role in the geopolitical 
calculations of powerful neighbouring states. During British rule in South 
Asia, Balochistan was taken over in 1884, to prevent the rival Russian Empire 
from reaching the Indian Ocean, and to control a passage from Sindh to 
Afghanistan (Khan, 2009, p1073). Presently, China is the foreign actor that 
is seeking to increase and consolidate her presence; China’s current regional 
assertiveness, enabled by CPEC, is thus poised to benefit from any geo-
military strategies that may accompany this bilateral relationship. However, 
there are some narratives about how geopolitics are entangled with socio-
political struggles in Balochistan. The Pakistani state elite, time and again, 
has attempted to silence dissent in Balochistan. Despite its scarce population, 
Balochistan is rich in natural resources such as natural gas, copper and gold. 
The exploitation of resources, typical of colonial relations, particularly of the 
Sui natural gas fields, has helped Pakistan’s national economy to develop in 
past decades, while Balochistan’s population remains largely impoverished, 
in an under-developed region. The people of Balochistan have been unable to 
fully benefit from the wealth generated from natural resources. The 
ethnonationalist movement in Balochistan has exploited these two 
dimensions – that of geo-strategy (with a particular focus on Gwadar port) 
and that of energy – at different moments in their struggle and demands. As 
Farhan Siddiqi explains: 
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one of the defining hallmarks of the Baloch nationalist movement since 2002 has 
been its association with the “energy” dimension and the probable exploitation of 
the province’s natural resources and raw materials by China and global 
multinational companies [and] regarding Gwadar, the Baloch grievance relates to 
the fact that the Baloch are non-participants in the operation and management of the 
port. … The Baloch nationalists charge that the development of the Gwadar Port 
has the undesired effect of condemning the Baloch into a minority with the in-flux 
of non-Baloch blue and white collar workers from the Punjab, Sindh and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa. (2012, pp167-168)  
 
Yunas Samad, however, notes that unlike other conflicts, in Balochistan, 
resources  
 
are not a motive and opportunity for violent conflict. However, they are an important 
driver that underpins the discontent among the Baloch. At present resources are 
mainly hypothetical, as extraction has yet to take place, and the Baloch concern is 
that outsiders will reap the benefits at the expense of locals as the case of Sui gas. 
(2014, p305)  
 
To be sure, at the time of writing, it not possible to get a fully developed 
picture of CPEC’s real potential for economic transformation, or of the 
political outcomes for regional and international politics. Hence, the varied 
contours of the enterprise do not allow for any accurate forecasts for the 
Balochistan region and for Pakistan as a whole under CPEC65. For instance, 
the newspaper Daily Times recently reported that the province’s secretary for 
                                               
65 In November 2017, Dawn reported that China is set to receive 91 per cent of Gwadar port’s 
income. According to Ifthikhar Khan: “This was disclosed by Federal Minister for Ports and 
Shipping Mir Hasil Bizenjo after senators expressed concern over the secrecy surrounding 
the CPEC long-term agreement plan, with many observing that the agreement tilted heavily 
in China’s favour”.  
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mines, Mr Saleh Baloch, hinted that “the plan is for Chinese companies 
chosen by Beijing to team up with local firms to mine marble, chromite, 
limestone, coal and other minerals and set up steel mills and other plants” 
(Daily Times, 2017). 
 
That said, there are, however, possible scenarios that can be outlined by 
looking at past narratives on the role chosen for Balochistan as a land of routes 
and logistics. CPEC may turn out to be a continuation of those earlier 
narratives, reiterating earlier colonial narratives in support of their former 
political practices. The map in Figure 1 reveals that the area corresponding to 
Balochistan will, under CPEC, be a target for projects related to logistics, 
trade and mineral exploitation, whereas the area corresponding to Punjab and 
Sindh will be associated with “industrial and economic development”.  
 
 
Figure 1: Map published in Dawn, 18th May 2017 
 
The map appears to support China’s plans for Pakistan. Balochistan’s role 
remains confined to what it has been for decades: a region to be utilised as a 
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connector, oriented towards logistics, with extraction industries as key 
investments.  
 
Yet, the focus on the importance of routes in Balochistan is a longstanding 
one. In her book Roads and Rivals, Mahnaz Ispahani discusses the importance 
of routes in Balochistan during imperial times, as well as how access 
problems in Balochistan were a cause for US concern during the 1980s, as 
they were deemed vital to “its renewed political-military association with 
Pakistan, an association that was to result in U.S. economic aid for the 
infrastructural development of Baluchistan” (1989, p69). Those were the days 
of Cold War politics in South Asia, and Pakistan was embroiled in the war in 
Afghanistan. A nationalistic guerrilla movement in Balochistan was 
provoking domestic security concerns, reviving recent memories of East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh. The Soviet Union and India were allegedly supporting 
Baloch nationalist movements. Hence, General Zia pondered the costs of 
Baloch insurgency particularly in view of the ongoing Afghan War, and 
instead focused on US-sponsored development. Ispahani highlights key 
aspects of the plan for the year 1980-81, which “allotted the largest amount 
for the transport and communications sector. … Among the proposed 
roadworks were Makran’s coastal routes. The roads from Liari to Ormara and 
the whole route from Karachi to Pasni and onward to Gwadar and Turbat 
were to be improved” (ibid, p72). Ispahani states that the staff’s report 
assessment of the programme was unable to recognise that “any broader 
improvements in transport infrastructure could not be justified on economic 
grounds [and] the huge transport investments proposed by the government of 
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Pakistan were unlikely to improve the routine economic conditions of 
Baluchistan’s peoples in any substantial fashion” (ibid, p75). Thirty years 
later, the people of Balochistan are still the most under-privileged in Pakistan. 
Security concerns, masked with “economic development” that would trap 
Balochistan people in the quandary of regional power politics, infused with 
the politics of American aid was the choice made by the Pakistan state three 
decades ago. While the current political scenario is different, the similarities 
with the past are noteworthy.  
 
China’s influence in the region (and the decline in US influence), the renewal 
of India’s concerns, the instability generated by war, terrorism and 
sectarianism which are still significant in Afghanistan, all contribute towards 
Balochistan’s instability and the continuation of conflict. The people of 
Balochistan are thus likely to bear the brunt of an unstable economy, while 
dissent vis-à-vis the Punjab establishment is unlikely to diminish.  
 
Energy and geopolitical considerations are indeed crucial factors that help to 
understand why Balochistan people (ethnic-Baloch, but also Pashtuns living 
in the region) express such resentment towards the government of Pakistan, 
particularly in light of a recent past that coincided with Balochistan’s 
integration into Pakistan, which, despite the valuable natural resources of the 
former, did not lead to economic and social development. Dissent, whether 
related to the quest for independence or simply with more autonomy and a 
fair distribution of resources among Balochistan’s people, has been dealt with 
coercively by the state of Pakistan.  
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The above-mentioned issues concerning the historical relationship that 
involves Balochistan, logistical routes, and foreign interests in the region, 
together with the central role that the Port of Gwadar came to represent make 
it possible to question how China and Pakistan are currently renewing 
colonial practices of extraction and domination. If indeed Gwadar, which has 
been handed over to China for forty years, will be transformed into a 
significant hub of connectivity whose impact should improve the livelihood 
of Balochistan’s population, then one may look upon CPEC as a vehicle to 
promote social justice. However, thus far, the programme’s impact in Gwadar 
has generated more suspicion then clear blueprints for local communities’ 
development. For instance, since 2017, local fishermen have expressed 
concerns about the relocation of their coastal fishing villages and facilities, 
due to expansion of the port (Aljazeera, 2017). Whilst these fishermen would 
benefit from modernisation of their fleet and better access to markets, and 
indeed these are their main demands (Mariyam Suleman, 2019), thus far their 
demands have not been met. 
 
As Laleh Khalili notes, “Ports bind cities across the seas to hinterland 
economies and social relations. They are conglomerations of people from 
near and far” (2020, p1037). Gwadar may one day represent this kind of 
binding. However, the current scenario places CPEC and its key port at the 
centre of a number of critiques and speculations. CPEC continues to be 
framed as a project for economic development and regional connectivity. 
Whilst most these critiques have revolved around economic feasibility, 
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financial transparency, and compliance (see for instance, The International 
Crisis Group, 2018; Gillani, 2020), issues linking it to China’s expansionist 
politics and Pakistan’s militarisation generate less interest, particularly inside 
Pakistan. The latter, however, are key to understanding how Sino-Pakistan 
relations shape the interlinking between security and identity, and the role of 
militarism in this regard. 
 
3.3.1.2  Militarising Gwadar 
 
Historically, China’s foreign policy was built around security and defence 
matters against Inner Asia (Fairbank, 1969). China’s maritime expansion was 
mostly concentrated during the Ming dynasty, which translated into an 
increase in new tributaries. This turned Ming China into a naval power 
(Fairbank, 1969, p455), though this would not last, in view of the continued 
threat of Mongol invasions, from the West, and later the arrival of the 
Europeans in Asia by sea, which diminished China’s maritime power. This 
scenario has changed, particularly since the last two decades of the twentieth 
century. China currently enjoys an extensive overseas network, which has 
been established primarily as the result of increasing energy and raw material 
needs. 
 
Given the impact of militarism on Sino-Pakistan relations, it is worth noting 
China’s militarisation in connection with the BRI plans. The existence of a 
transnational network of lanes of communication, either by land or sea, has 
reinforced China’s sense of insecurity, which has been addressed through the 
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country’s foreign policy and security decision-making. For instance, a 
comprehensive military strategy was designed by Chinese authorities and 
made available to the general public in 2015, wherein certain aspects are 
skilfully disclosed. One of the most striking features, however, is how 
Chinese authorities communicate their policies, which are portrayed not only 
as helping to defend China, but also as a means to guarantee “world peace 
maintenance”, infused with a variety of images aimed at transmitting an idea 
of harmony and peaceful co-existence, a “community of shared destiny” and 
“neighborhood diplomacy of friendship, sincerity, reciprocity and 
inclusiveness” (White Paper on Military Strategy, 2015).  
 
At present, China considers it has entered into a new historical period, 
particularly as to what concerns the role of her armed forces, which ultimately 
will serve to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (ibid). In 
this vein, the Chinese government considers that the armed forces have 
specific strategic tasks, including:  
 
to deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively 
safeguard the sovereignty and security of China’s territorial land, air and sea; to 
resolutely safeguard the unification of motherland; … to safeguard the security of 
China’s overseas interests; … to strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, 
separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China’s political security and social 
stability. (ibid)  
 
It is China’s overseas interests and anti-terrorism operations that contribute 
towards a security relation with Pakistan. Seas and oceans are currently 
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envisaged by the PRC government as “critical security domains” (ibid). 
Furthermore, China’s Two Ocean Strategy, which dovetails with BRI’s aims 
(Sun and Payette, 2017), thus including the IOR, implies a Chinese 
encroachment in the region, together with a deepening of relations with IOR 
states, namely Pakistan (Walgreen, 2006). As Pakistan is one of China’s key 
foreign policy and security actors, their partnership in the IOR grows in 
relevance.  
 
Rabia Akthar (2015), a strategy and security scholar, suggests that Pakistan 
would benefit from facilitating the docking of Chinese conventional 
submarines involved in counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa, at 
Gwadar. However, Pakistani and Chinese officials have dismissed reports 
that Gwadar could become a military facility for China in the IOR, or that 
China would be willing to build a military base closer to Gwadar (VOA, 2017; 
The Frontier Post, 2018). For instance, in March 2017, Minnie Chan from the 
South China Morning Post reported on China’s plan to increase the capacity 
of the marine corps to 100,000 fighting personnel, which would be deployed 
in different regions, like Djibouti and Gwadar in Pakistan’s Balochistan. She 
cites “military insiders” as the source. Moreover, she writes: “Gwadar port is 
a deep sea port next to the Strait of Hormuz, the key oil route in and out of 
the Persian gulf, built with Chinese funding and operated by mainland firms. 
Although the port is not home to any PLA installation, navy ships are 
expected to dock at the facility in the near future” (Chan, 2017). 
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Significantly, one year later, the Global Times, which is CCP-controlled, 
published a piece emphatically titled “PLA Marine Corps conducts massive 
groundbreaking maneuvers”. The later article includes a reference to the 
earlier one, which may be read as a corroboration: 
 
China plans to expand its marine corps from 20,000 to 100,000 to better protect the 
country’s rising overseas commitments, the South China Morning Post reported in 
March last year. Some marines will be assigned overseas including Djibouti and 
Gwadar Port of Pakistan, the Hong-Kong based newspaper reported. The 
information bureau of China’s Ministry of National Defence said afterwards that the 
expansion of the PLA Navy’s Marine Corps relates to the reform of the Chinese 
military, which is being steadily implemented. (Guo Yuandan, 2018) 
 
In 2018, the same journalist, Minnie Chan, published another article 
indicating that Gwadar’s and CPEC’s militarisation will become a reality: 
 
Beijing plans to build its second offshore naval base near a strategically important 
Pakistani port following the opening of its first facility in Djibouti (…). Beijing-
based military analyst Zhou Chenming said the base near the Gwadar port (…) 
would be used to dock and maintain naval vessels, as well as provide other logistical 
support services. “China needs to set up another base in Gwadar for its warships 
because Gwadar is now a civilian port,” Zhou said. “It’s a common practice to have 
separate facilities for warships and merchant vessels because of their different 
operations. Merchant ships need a bigger port with a lot of space for warehouses 
and containers, but warships need a full range of maintenance and logistical support 
services.” (Chan, 2018) 
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More recently, Forbes Magazine carried an article66 linking China’s high 
security facilities at Gwadar with military plans, based on satellite images. 
These discourses lead one to consider the real possibility of the militarisation 
of the port of Gwadar. Hence, China’s military expansionism, which is being 
developed in tandem with the BRI, appears to include the port of Gwadar and 
its vicinity. The existence of China’s ‘Two-Oceans Strategy’, which is 
enabled by Pakistan, alongside Sino-Pakistani ambiguity over military 
activity being planned at the Makran Coast, consolidates militarism as a 
central concept that structures CPEC. 
 
While CPEC is an economic development project that is widely portrayed as 
a “game-changer” for Pakistan, it will also contribute to the further 
militarisation of the country. As Cynthia Enloe (2000) notes, as a step-by-
step process, militarisation transforms individuals and societies. This 
transformation results in the normalisation of values, and of military needs 
and presumptions (Enloe, 2000, p3). In turn, militarisation “involves cultural 
and institutional, ideological, and economic transformations” (ibid). It thus 
appears that CPEC, particularly in Balochistan, is enhancing militarisation.  
 
With Gwadar seen as being crucial to CPEC’s progress, it also appears to 
have a significant role in the transformative steps linked to militarisation. 
Militarism thus continues to be a key factor that shapes the interlinking 
between identity and security, enabled by foreign policy decisions. The Sino-
                                               
66 The article may be consulted here: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/06/02/chinas-new-high-security-compound-in-
pakistan-may-indicate-naval-plans/?sh=3514a1f01020. 
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Pakistani partnership, which is mostly approached from geo-economic and 
geo-political angles, also represents how militarisation processes take place, 
which, in time, will create a possibility to exercise dual control: control over 
local and regional dissent; and control over the routes and means of extraction 
and exploitation in Pakistan and beyond. 
 
Hitherto, I have examined how the various discourses around the Port of 
Gwadar demonstrate how militarisation has become a part of CPEC. To be 
sure, militarisation is a consequence of the ideological phenomenon that is 
militarism, with its expansion of a military ethos to the civilian realm. Whilst 
CPEC, since its inception, has been conceived as a civilian project, the 
military soon took it as a military enterprise, particularly in terms of what 
concerns the Balochistan-based projects. The words of ex-COAS General 
Raheel Shariff, speaking at Gwadar in 2016, indicate how militarism has 
indeed infiltrated and taken over CPEC: 
 
Since the onset of CPEC, Balochistan has seen unprecedented development of 
communication infrastructure. We mobilized Army Engineers for construction and, 
Army and Frontier Corps units for security of the projects. (…) As the Chief of 
Army Staff, I assure you that security of CPEC is our national undertaking and we 
will not leave any stone unturned (…) To this effect, a fifteen thousand strong 
dedicated force is already in place under the ambit of Special Security Division. 
(Raheel Shariff, 2006) 
 
As Enloe notes, the “more militarised the understanding of what national 
security is (and what it is not) the more likely it will be that the conversation 
about national security – and international security – will be a largely 
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masculinised affair” (2016, p56). Indeed, when the COAS says it will leave 
“no stone unturned”, he is representing the gendered nature of how security 
is being planned, as being “rigorous”, “vigorous”, and “forceful” in order to 
protect Chinese interests. Thus, CPEC generates an intertwining of national 
and international aspects of security, which are deeply gendered. 
 
Additionally, there are indications that Chinese private security companies 
are present in Pakistan (Legarda and Nouwens, 2018). As these authors 
explain, whilst these kind of companies are not allowed to operate in Pakistan, 
some “have evidently found loopholes around this and continue to offer 
consulting and hands-on security services” (ibid). One such company, The 
Frontier Services Group, is closely linked to China’s BRI projects and their 
security, which appears to be euphemised as “logistics businesses”67. It is 
important to note that this company is headed by the same founder of the 
controversial private security company, Blackwater.  
 
Whilst it is not clear whether this company is directly working on CPEC 
projects related to security, one can think of how Sino-Pakistan relations 
enhance the gendered phenomenon of private security and its links with 
neoliberal forms of globalisation (Stachowitsch, 2015). Thus, militarism in 
the context of Sino-Pakistan relations also becomes part of a more globalised 
scenario, in which militarism becomes associated with private, globalised 
economic power structures, which are traditionally dominated by highly 
                                               
67 See a 2018 report on from The Financial Times: https://www.ft.com/content/97c14e0e-
2031-11e8-a895-1ba1f72c2c11.  
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masculine corporate interests (see Via, 2010). Hence, whilst there is still not 
enough evidence of the involvement of private security companies in CPEC, 
the scenario is conducive to produce a representation of militarism that is 
profoundly gendered and governed by neoliberal principles. 
 
Concerning issues of representations and rights associated with CPEC’s 
development, these are not limited to Pakistan’s Balochistan. Kashmir, the 
thorniest issue in South Asian politics, is also being affected by the Sino-
Pakistani venture. In the next section, I will analyse the main critical aspects 
of this partnership in relation to the Kashmir question. 
 
3.4 CPEC and the Kashmir Question 
 
In this section, I analyse how CPEC poses a challenge to the Kashmir 
question. I will comprehensively discuss the Kashmir question in the chapter 
dedicated to Pakistan’s relations with India. However, in the context of Sino-
Pakistani relations, CPEC has become an influential factor with regard to the 
Kashmir issue, and consequently relations with India. Additionally, China is 
one of the three countries that currently occupies territory in the disputed 
region. China’s link with Kashmir is historically framed by her relations with 
Pakistan. It is important to understand how China has been politically astute 
in relation to the Kashmir issue. China has converted India’s and Pakistan’s 
failures into great political advantage. China has skilfully used her entente 
cordiale with Pakistan to remain relevant in respect of the Kashmir question 
whilst not becoming involved in direct, armed conflict. 
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John Garver’s (2004) discussion of China’s policies towards Kashmir offers 
a useful overview of the former’s main stances on the issue over time. Garver 
provides the context for China’s options, whilst noting that its policies on 
Kashmir have shifted over the years, yet without registering a radical shift. 
According to Garver, China held “an agnostic position in the 1950s [and 
shifted] to a distinctly pro-Pakistan [position] in the 1960s and 1970s, to an 
increasingly neutral position since Deng Xiaoping took over direction of 
China’s foreign relations in 1978” (2004, p1). China’s position on Kashmir 
is significant as it adopts an allegedly neutral stance, whilst demonstrating 
political nous in keeping the Kashmir issue alive in view of her own interest. 
As such, the issue does not become an irritant to China’s strategic partnership 
with Pakistan. 
 
As China opted for a neutral position on the Kashmir issue, thus appearing in 
line with other foreign policy options chosen by Deng (Garver, 2004), most 
statements coming out of Beijing insisted on the point that “it was a bilateral 
matter to be solved via peaceful negotiations between India and Pakistan” 
(ibid, p2). Furthermore, China considers the Kashmir question to be a 
“leftover from history” (ibid, p4). Hence, it discards the possibility of being 
seen as lending full support to either side in the dispute. However, Garver 
interprets it as a “slight nod towards India since it entails an implicit rejection 
of Pakistan’s view that Indian aggression and expansionism is at root of the 
Kashmir problem” (ibid, p4). Yet, China is able to skilfully maintain a 
profitable ambiguity on the issue, by adjusting her discourse. For instance, 
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after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, as Garver notes, China’s ambassador to 
the UN stated that “We are opposed to any action which pursues regional 
hegemony” (Qin Huasun, cited in Garver, 2004, p6). Garver adds that 
“regional hegemony” is “a longstanding code word for Indian policies 
objectionable to Beijing” (ibid). Despite its neutrality on the Kashmir dispute, 
China’s military and moral commitments towards Pakistan during the wars 
with India have not ceased. Moreover, China has enabled Pakistan to absorb 
shock-waves and injuries caused by those encounters. Thus, unsurprisingly, 
China’s apparent neutrality on the Kashmir issue is looked upon by New 
Delhi with suspicion. In addition, unsettled Sino-India border disputes68 
continue to prompt India to consider China as the greatest beneficiary of the 
Kashmir question. As Prashant Kumar Singh suggests: 
 
The Kashmir problem gives China extra-ordinary leverage against India and 
leverage over Pakistan. Besides, POK and the more than 5000 square kilometres of 
Kashmiri territory, ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, provide China with a smooth 
and assured connectivity to the Arabian Sea and West Asia, which has both strategic 
and trade significance for China. China will not like to lose this connectivity or 
compromise it in the event of a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. Here, at 
this point, China’s interests in J&K go opposite to those of Pakistan. The best case 
scenario for China in Kashmir is that the issue is never resolved; and if this issue 
inches towards any kind of resolution, China should be considered a party to the 
Kashmir dispute. (Singh, 2010) 
 
                                               
68 The 2020 standoff between China and India in the border regions of Eastern Ladakh (an 
Indian Union territory since 5th August 2019) is the most recent confrontation. 
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As Singh notes, a key theme of the three countries’ foreign policies is that of 
connectivity. China’s ostensible neutral position dovetails with her 
aspirations in the IOR region, including now CPEC. The corridor, however, 
passes through Kashmir’s regions of Gilgit-Baltistan (formerly known as the 
Northern Areas). This region is the only land link between Pakistan and 
China. As connectivity is one of the cornerstones of the project, territoriality 
comes to represent how identity and security issues are closely 
interconnected.  
 
CPEC’s relation to the Kashmir issue becomes a convoluted affair due to the 
territorial claims and their representation by India and Pakistan. The former 
considers Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the whole region of Kashmir, whereas 
the latter has continued to keep the region under an ambiguous constitutional 
arrangement which has prevented the region from being recognised as a fully-
fledged province69.  
 
An analysis of the intricate details of power transitions in Gilgit-Baltistan is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is important to understand that 
the new state of Pakistan became a dominant political power in this region, 
whilst preventing its full integration into the federation. The Gilgit-Baltistan 
region of Kashmir represents yet another British colonial leftover, which 
continues to impact the livelihoods of the region’s people. The colonial and 
post-colonial history of Gilgit-Baltistan is indeed filled with different 
                                               
69 Gilgit-Baltistan was part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947. The region 
does not have a full province status because, according to Pakistan, the full status of 
Kashmir is yet to be determined. Despite being administered by Islamabad, the region does 
not have direct representation in the Pakistani parliament.  
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nationalist perspectives (Sökefeld, 2005, p940). Martin Sökefeld (2005) 
explains how the British left the region hitherto under their control on 31st 
July 1947. A transition processed followed; the Gilgit Agency was placed 
under the control of Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir, who signed the 
instrument of accession to India (Sökefeld, 2005, p957). However, the author 
highlights how the region was under colonial rules of domination, either 
under British or Kashmiri control. The latter’s rule was prompted by a 
rebellion headed by the Gilgit Scouts (a military force trained and set up by 
the British). They also requested that Pakistan take control of the region 
(Bansal, 2008). An external administrator was dispatched to control the 
region, and later, as Alok Bansal highlights,  
 
Kashmiri leaders were made to sign an agreement to transfer the administrative 
privileges of the region to the government of Pakistan. The agreement was the result 
of the government’s desire to use Gilgit-Baltistan as a bargaining chip in a final 
settlement over Kashmir. It was assumed that in a plebiscite Gilgit-Baltistan would 
opt for Pakistan anyway. (2008, p86) 
 
Soon after Pakistan had taken control, resentment with the central 
government began to surface. Nosheen Ali notes the continuation of the same 
colonial policies: “indirect rule was perpetuated through a Pakistani political 
agent in place of a British one, while local monarchs continued to squeeze 
labor, produce, and taxes from their subjects. In some ways, the rule of the 
Pakistan state was even worse” (2013, pp87-88). It was not until 2009 that 
some reforms were introduced in the region, including changing its name 
from a cryptic geographical label “the Northern Areas” to the more 
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meaningful name “Gilgit-Baltistan” (ibid, p88). In the same chapter, Ali 
(2013) describes how the Pakistani state has militarised Gilgit-Baltistan, and 
how the work of intelligence agencies in the region contributes to the 
“paranoid militarism” of the Pakistani state. To be sure, the militarisation of 
Gilgit-Baltistan is directly linked with the Kashmir question and India’s 
claims over the region. According to Ali, the region resembles a garrison due 
to its military presence, whilst intelligence agencies have created the 
“paranoid state” (ibid, p105). 
 
Of course, the militarisation of Gilgit-Baltistan started well before the launch 
of CPEC. As the corridor’s success depends on border movements between 
Pakistan and China, and in view of India’s critical position on CPEC, it is 
likely that militarisation will be further enhanced in this region. This implies 
further control and surveillance over the lives of people and their political 
activities. CPEC in Gilgit-Baltistan thus comes to enhance the idea that a 
corridor is closely linked with territoriality and with borders. Without these, 
a corridor’s main goal – to facilitate the transit of goods and commodities – 
becomes compromised. Thus, in order to ensure that transit becomes possible, 
governing elites propagate the idea that security is paramount to ensuring that 
such transit happens. 
 
As the militarisation of Gilgit-Baltistan indeed started before CPEC, 
questions about this economic corridor acting as a reinforcer of old colonial 
patterns of power relations may be raised. Thus, the question of security for 
what and for whom should be posed in the context of Gilgit-Baltistan/Kashmir 
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and CPEC. Thus far, Pakistan appears to be mostly concerned with fulfilling 
China’s interests. Dissent and activism in Gilgit-Baltistan, including people 
raising questions about the local consequences of the Sino-Pakistan 
partnership, have been targeted and repressed (Kaswar Klasra, 2019). 
Moreover, the disputed status of the region and lack of constitutional status 
are also perceived as an issue, which may prompt China to press for 
governmental legitimacy in Gilgit-Baltistan.  
 
Pakistan is thus caught in a quandary, with implications for her claims on the 
Kashmir question. As Siegfried Wolf (2016) suggests, the region will be 
integrated in the constitution as the fifth province. This move rests on the 
argument that Gilgit-Baltistan never integrated Jammu and Kashmir, and 
therefore was never under the Maharaja’s rule, which is historically incorrect. 
If Pakistan pursues this path, her choice will mirror the regulations set by the 
former British colonial rulers in order to implement the transfer of power as 
well as the partition of British India (Wolf, 2016, p4). This would reify the 
idea that Pakistan is indeed a post-colonial colonial state. The downside of 
this option70, as Wolf notes, is that “Pakistan will indirectly lose its normative 
rationale against India’s incorporation of Jammu and Kashmir (the Indian 
administered part of Kashmir) as well as give up its claim over the respective 
territories” (ibid, p4). 
                                               
70 In November 2020, Pakistan’s Prime Minister announced a “provisional status of 
province” for Gilgit-Baltistan, which would ultimately elevate it to the status of province, 
thus bestowing it with constitutional recognition. There are reasons to believe that China is 
behind Pakistan’s decision, as one more step towards consolidating CPEC/BRI. However, 
this decision is unlikely to happen, unless a constitutional revision occurs. This decision 
leaves the Pakistani leadership with less space to advocate for the Kashmir cause against 
Indian aggression and occupation, particularly in view of revocation of Article 370 by the 
Government of India in August 2019. See for instance: https://www.voanews.com/south-
central-asia/pakistan-announces-provisional-provincial-status-part-kashmir.  
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Thus, Gilgit-Baltistan, which has historically been part of the colonial politics 
of control and militarisation, is likely to continue to experience the same fate. 
Whilst status as a province would bring the constitutional rights long 
demanded by its people, therefore bringing full citizenship recognition, 
colonial practices of domination and militarisation, which are already present 
and inculcated, are unlikely to wane. CPEC’s success and the need to secure 
it against its opponents, i.e., India, will be presented as issues of “national 
security” and “national interest”, hence as justification to continue the 
militarisation of Gilgit-Baltistan. The latter could potentially be 
constitutionally joining one of the most militarised states in the world. 
 
At the time of writing, it is not clear how CPEC will ever be a factor that may 
contribute to a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir issue. However, in 
September 2017, I asked AM4 whether China could be envisaged as an agent 
of peace in the region. He responded affirmatively, and justified his answer 
with reference to the amount of trade between China and India, but also with 
the fact that China, despite the current strong rapprochement between India 
and the United States, “has not yet concluded that India has gone forever to 
the United States, thus it is still keeping space for them” (AM4, 2017). The 
retired ambassador, who at the time was still affiliated with an influential 
academic institution, suggested that “Pakistan should be prepared for the 
Chinese to ask to mend fences with India, as in 2018 negotiations between 
China and India on the border issue may recommence” (AM4, 2017).  
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The above stance is in line with China’s official position on creating the 
conditions for a “harmonious neighbourhood”. Moreover, AC7, a senior 
academic and Dean of an influential university in Pakistan, suggested during 
an interview with me that CPEC could contribute to finding a solution thereby 
burying the Kashmir issue, if India would be slightly more generous. While 
he believes that a diplomatic solution is still possible, providing the three parts 
agree to negotiate (Pakistanis, Indians, and Kashmiris), he also noted that 
Pakistan is now more flexible than, for instance, during the 1980s. Whilst 
Pakistan’s foreign policy elite has expressed hope in terms of how CPEC 
could contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue, subsequent 
political developments in Indian-administrated Kashmir, the China-India 
border clashes in Eastern Ladakh, and the evolving political developments in 
Gilgit-Baltistan appear to be less conducive to an optimistic outlook. More 
certain, however, are the processes of militarisation which continue to be 
enhanced in order to ensure the success of CPEC/BRI as expansionist 
projects. 
 
Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan are two geo-politically and geo-strategically 
significant regions if CPEC is to become a successful economic corridor. 
However, as I have analysed, critical issues associated with the development 
of CPEC in these regions have an impact on how identity and security are 
interlinked. In Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan/Kashmir, the state of Pakistan 
faces important challenges linked to the impact of CPEC. In addition, the 
colonial practices of domination and extraction persist in those regions. 
Assuring CPEC’s success has become a priority for the Pakistani state. As I 
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examined in this section, militarisation has become central for CPEC’s 
execution. In the next section, I will discuss how militarism has been pursued 
so as to ensure Sino-Pakistani relations remain robust, like “iron-brothers”, 
as they are often epitomised, and therefore hyper-masculine. 
 
 
3.4.1  CPEC: Enhancing militarism 
 
In this section, I analyse in more detail how CPEC, being an economic 
corridor, has come to represent how militarism will continue to be a state-
ingrained ideology that shapes the relation between identity and security. In 
2016, a Special Security Division of the Pakistani Army was created in order 
to protect Chinese projects and workers. It is a force composed by 9,000 
soldiers, and 6,000 para-military personnel (Dawn, 2016). This force includes 
a “Light Commando Brigade” trained in amphibious and anti-terrorist 
operations (Hilal Magazine, n.d.). The SSD is thus deployed in all of 
Pakistan’s provinces and also in Gilgit-Baltistan. Writing to the Hilal 
Magazine, a Lt Col Fawad Qasim suggests that “CPEC is confronted with 
multiple challenges, particularly security threats from external as well as 
internal inimical forces. (…) Raising of the Special Security Division (SSD) 
by Pakistan Army has comprehensively addressed the concerns of Chinese 
government” (Fawad Qasim, n.d.). It is notable that threats to CPEC thus 
mirror those that are imparted to the state, particularly the “external inimical 
forces”, i.e. India. 
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Thus, it is evident that Pakistan’s foreign policy towards China results in an 
expansion of military forces, such that the army has created an additional 
division to uphold Chinese interests. It is important to note how an economic 
corridor, which will provide transnational circulation of goods and 
commodities, has become associated with military activity and conflict. Yet, 
as Deborah Cowen (2014) highlights, there is an old interlinking between 
trade and war. She also notes that more often than not, behind stories of 
logistics, of which economic corridors are included, there are “histories and 
geographies of conflict” (ibid, p4). This certainly applies to the case of CPEC, 
as discussed in the previous section. 
 
The initial vision that CPEC would be an enterprise primarily associated with 
civilian government has all but disappeared. Since the programme’s launch, 
the military has continued to justify its actions with the need to provide 
“security”. The demand for political and economic rights in Balochistan and 
Gilgit-Baltistan has resulted in an increased and brutal military presence. In 
Balochistan, where ethnonationalism has barely abated since the region’s 
controversial accession to Pakistan, intensified militarisation since the early 
2000s (Wani, 2016) has been the preferred response to engage a population 
that has been exploited and deprived of basic rights and facilities71.  
 
Military dictator General Pervez Musharraf had aggravated the effects of 
imposing militarisation, as a result of his policies to explore the region’s 
                                               
71 The region’s natural resources and their extraction, which have been given to foreign 
companies, compound the reasons for the resentment and dissent of Balochistan’s people, 
as they continue to see no benefits from this economic activity. 
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natural resources, accompanied by the establishment of new army 
cantonments in the region (see Rabia Aslam, 2011; Shakoor Wani, 2016). 
Musharraf’s military dictatorship has rekindled separatist Baloch 
nationalism, when most of the regional political groups were trying to 
envisage their future as part of the Pakistani federation (Grare, 2013).  
 
Whilst in the post-Musharraf regime, military operations have ended, human 
rights violations have become a constant. Enforced disappearances and 
“killing and dump” practices have been reported by national and international 
organisations. In 2012, when Baroness Catherine Ashton visited Pakistan, as 
the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the 
Human Rights Watch wrote her a letter setting out a long list of human rights 
violations in the country. Concerning Balochistan, HRW wrote: 
 
Across Balochistan province since January 2011, at least 300 people have been 
abducted, killed, and their bodies left on roadsides, in acts commonly referred to in 
Pakistan as “kill and dump” operations. (…) While Baloch nationalist leaders and 
activists have long been targeted by the Pakistani security forces, since the 
beginning of 2011 human rights activists and academics critical of the military have 
also been killed. (…) Research by Human Rights Watch suggests that Pakistani 
security forces are responsible for most of these killings. Human Rights Watch has 
documented how Pakistan’s security forces, particularly its intelligence agencies, 
have often targeted for enforced disappearance ethnic Baloch suspected of 
involvement in the Baloch nationalist movement. (2012) 
 
International media and EU institutions are not oblivious to the continuation 
of human rights violations in Balochistan, and have integrated this issue in 
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the context of CPEC/BRI72. More recently, an investigation by Drazen Jorjic 
of Reuters has linked the Pakistani military to the development of one of the 
largest world reserves of gold and copper, which is perceived to be a 
“strategic national asset”, but also a Chinese economic interest (Jorjic, 2019). 
If this were to materialise, it would represent yet another case of how 
militarisation flourishes at the centre of extraction and exploitation activities. 
 
Since CPEC’s launch in 2013, the project has been nested in Pakistan’s 
Ministry of Planning Development and Reform. However, as a new 
government came to power in 2018, the pace of CPEC’s development has 
slowed, due to a hasty approach headed by the new PM who suspects the 
project of being host to large-scale corruption involving the previous PML-N 
government. Reportedly, Pakistan’s new approach to CPEC has raised 
concerns in Beijing, whilst in Islamabad the Pakistani PM has sought to be 
perceived and represented as a pious, vigorous, heterosexual man, striving to 
reshape Pakistan’s image towards one of a principled, non-corrupt, and 
forthright state. Months later, as the CPEC appeared to be stagnating and 
Chinese pressure was growing, a new governing body for CPEC was created: 
the CPEC Authority. 
 
The creation of CPEC Authority is a precise example of how CPEC is a 
militarised project, and how militarism and masculinity are closely linked. 
This new governing body was to be headed by retired Lt General Asim 
                                               
72 See for instance: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-
001047_EN.html, and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38454483. 
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Saleem Bajwa. However, the body has not stood without controversy. 
Concerns about CPEC Authority’s legal status have been raised in 
Parliament73, and a journalistic investigation has uncovered how General 
Bajwa and his family have built extensive businesses abroad74. Yet, what is 
significant is the real purpose of this new department. In an interview75 in 
September 2020, the appointed retired General explains why CPEC Authority 
was created:  
 
the scope of CPEC is not expanding, and there is so much work to do, so many 
ministries involved, and then the provinces and all federating units are involved, 
therefore, I think, the government felt that they needed one window operation, 
where you could have the foreign investors come and get their job done from one 
place … we do the running around, we coordinate, we get things done in a 
coordinate[d] way and expeditious way … the mandate of CPEC Authority is more 
on the implementation of projects. (General Asim Bajwa, 2020) 
 
The idea that an institution headed by a high-ranked military man can resolve 
bureaucratic issues that state ministries apparently were unable to do, reveals 
how far militaristic values are already deeply rooted in the Pakistani model 
of governance. It also demonstrates how the military institution, closely 
associated with ideas of masculinity linked to rationality, order, efficiency, 
achievement, etc., is seen as the guarantor of success, whereas civil 
                                               
73 See how Pakistani media reported this issue: https://www.dawn.com/news/1586720. In 
November 2020, the National Assembly cleared CPEC Authority bill. Available here: 
https://www.geo.tv/latest/319135-na-panel-clears-cpec-authority-bill-2020.  
74 Details may be found here: https://factfocus.com/politics/1756/. Whilst there may be some 
speculation as to the motivations behind this investigation, it is data-driven and has caused 
the target general to resign from his role as a special advisor to Pakistan’s PM, and also as 
head of CPEC Authority. 
75 The interview may be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNta8dlbFL8. 
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government institutions are perceived as unable to deliver (“so many 
ministries”, as the General said) the services expected by Chinese/foreign 
investors, because they are perceived as disorganised, flawed, inefficient, and 
failing. Hence, CPEC, as an enterprise linked to foreign policy, has indeed 
turned into a deeply militarised one, represented by typical masculine 
features. 
 
3.5  Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I analysed Pakistan’s relations with China with a focus on 
CPEC. The Sino-Pakistani relationship has been constructed as one that raises 
reciprocal support for each partner amid challenging times. However, its 
regional extent continues to generate significant attention from other 
international actors, namely the US. Whilst CPEC has become a topic of 
research interest within China’s BRI foreign policy outreach, its links to 
militarism and militarisation have drawn less attention. The consequences of 
military impact and influence on CPEC have been identified (see for instance 
Boni, 2020); however, discussions on how this is translated into the 
enhancement of militarism as an ideology appear to be lacking. This chapter 
has sought to identify how in the context of CPEC, militarism becomes an 
ideological tool of the state to further enhance the control and submission of 
subjects and their livelihoods. 
 
CPEC generates geopolitical anxieties at the regional and international levels 
(for instance, India’s uneasiness with China’s presence in IOR), mainly due 
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its potential to raise China’s expansionist plans. On the one hand, CPEC 
bestows China with better and easier access to the IOR, and on the other, it 
ensures that the country continues to hold an important stake in the 
contentious border issues in the Himalayas. Hence, CPEC enhances and 
intensifies one of militarism’s key factors: permanent war-preparedness, as 
Pakistan stands to protect Chinese interests. Furthermore, as I explained, 
militarist expansion is also linked to colonial and neo-colonial practices of 
extraction, occupation, and exploitation. Indeed, it is no surprise that the 
regions through which CPEC crosses have long been associated with 
oppressive colonial practices, including occupation and the exploitation of 
natural resources.  
 
Whilst CPEC is described as an economic corridor, which is severely 
dependent on efficient connectivity, the political decisions made by the Sino-
Pakistani partnership are ones that will bolster militarism. As I analysed, the 
expanded role that the Pakistani military is taking on in relation to CPEC 
governing and security-related issues will result in a further inculcation of 
militaristic values, including the belief that the military/army is the ultimate 
solution to any conflict, be that ethnonationalist dissent or the perceived threat 
of India, and that having enemies is a normal condition, as Enloe (2014, p7) 
suggests.  
 
Hence, it is to be expected that Pakistan’s foreign policy towards China has 
an impact on the interlinking of identity and security, as the result of 
militarism. Additionally, in view of how militarism and militarisation, indeed 
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a multifaceted, socio-political process, have taken root in representations of 
Pakistani state identity, it is possible to suggest that the latter is one that 
privileges a hegemonic masculinity, represented by how CPEC is and will 
remain a foreign policy endeavour dominated and controlled by military, 
Punjabi men. Hence, as an economic development project, contrary to its 
main slogan of constituting a “game-changer”, CPEC in reality will be 
nothing of the sort. So long as CPEC’s governance continues to privilege 
practices that represent the continuation of militarised political solutions, neo-
colonial forms of governance, and an archetypal ensemble of heterosexual, 
conformist, masculine features, this “game-changer” will merely serve to 
further embed the Pakistani state with the ideology of militarism. 
 
CHAPTER IV 






4.1  Introduction 
 
Pakistan’s relations with India constitute a vital and complex chapter within 
the history of South Asia. Their independence in 1947 is marked by historical 
origins of the anti-colonial struggles against British colonialism, and by the 
abysmal violence caused by the partition, from which Pakistan emerged as an 
independent state. Yet, the two larger states in South Asia share a history of 
civilisation, including religion and culture, of common struggles, but also of 
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conflict and war. Post-independence, the shared history of the two post-
colonial states has primarily been narrated as one of war and conflict, and as 
the history of a territory that both countries occupy whilst claiming sovereign 
rights over it. Kashmir, a territory located in the Himalayan regions of South 
Asia, has a socio-cultural ethos that is distinct from both post-colonial states, 
and its right to self-determination has been disputed by Pakistan and India. 
Kashmir continues to be the main source of conflict between the two 
countries. Hence Pakistan’s relations with India are for the most part 
dominated by conflict and discord. As such, this relationship can be seen as 
one marked by antagonism, set against a militaristic background. 
 
In this chapter, I examine Pakistan’s relations with India, with a focus on the 
Kashmir question. Whilst Pakistan’s foreign relations with India include 
other relevant themes – such as water sharing, environmental issues, cultural, 
religious, and linguistic ties, nuclear weapons, terrorism, among others – the 
centrality of the Kashmir issue transcends all the others and yet retains a direct 
connection with these themes. In light of this, the main objective of the 
chapter is to examine how the centrality of the Kashmir issue contributes to 
militarism and its representations as a key factor in Pakistan’s interlinking of 
security and identity. The chapter also aims to establish how militarism is 
closely linked with occupation, and how Pakistan persists with an official 
discourse towards Kashmir that dismisses its own role as an occupying 
element and instead represents itself as a liberation force. 
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The chapter is divided into three parts. In the introduction I outline the main 
aspects that constitute the history of Pakistan’s relations with India. The 
second part is dedicated to the Kashmir issue, and the third part establishes 
the relation of this issue with militarism, and examines how the latter 
contributes to the perpetual occupation of Kashmir. 
 
The history of Pakistan’s relations with India has its roots in British 
colonialism. The partition of India in 1947, known to be responsible for the 
significant destruction of communities and the imposition of hitherto 
meaningless borders, represents more than the culmination of anti-colonial 
struggles and the creation of two independent states. The partition represents 
the beginning of a two-state conflict, which thus far has resulted in four wars, 
three of them fought over Kashmir. The partition also signals the beginning 
of the militarisation of South Asia, the apex of which can be seen in 
nuclearisation. 
 
Pakistan-India relations have drawn a significant amount of research in 
international and regional studies76. This literature is mostly dominated by 
the realist school of IR and its links to strategic and security studies. War and 
conflict remain central themes in the literature. Thus, according to T.V. Paul, 
“the India–Pakistan conflict is simultaneously over territory, national 
identity, and power position in the region” (2005, p8), whilst Arndt Michael 
adds that this conflictual relationship  
                                               
76 The academic literature on this theme is vast and is most concentrated on foreign policy, 
security studies, strategic studies. Going back almost as far as both countries’ independence, 
it is not possible to cite all the relevant works produced since that time. 
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has been shaped by a multitude of different and differing factors, including 
ideology, territory, the role and actions of neighbors and external actors such as the 
United States and the former Soviet Union, differences in internal and external 
capabilities and the acts and special role of individual leaders, to name but a few. 
(2018, p109)  
 
As both authors identify, territory is a common theme of this conflict. 
Kashmir is the territory that has come to represent interstate conflict, whilst 
political and human rights violations that continuously happen within that 
territory continue to plague Kashmiris. Hence, whilst mainstream IR 
literature in South Asia continues to focus on zero-sum arguments of 
territorial disputes, it is also important to recognise how conflict has also 
become de-territorialised. As Sankaran Krishna notes, South Asia conflicts 
are  
 
increasingly fought not so much between soldiers in uniform over well-defined 
territories, but rather among shadowy intelligence organizations and covert armies, 
paramilitary forces and mercenary outfits, insurgents and terrorist groups, [and] the 
majority of casualties in such conflicts in South Asia are ordinary citizens, not 
professional soldiers. (1999, pxx) 
 
Krishna also makes an important point about the de-territorialisation of these 
conflicts (Kashmir is one example, but the same applies to other regional 
ethno-nationalist conflicts such as those in Balochistan, Sri Lanka, or 
Northeast India) and how it is also connected with the way in which a global 
diaspora finances and supports these conflicts (ibid). Hence, restricting 
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discussions of the Kashmir issue to a more typical regional territorialised 
conflict, as Pakistan and India have done for decades, tends to erase the 
possibilities for Kashmiris to be self-represented, regionally and 
internationally, and to have their plight acknowledged outside of the Pakistan-
India antagonism. 
 
However, Pakistan’s relations with India also focus on identity issues, which 
work as a core factor in foreign policy. Aparna Pande (2011, 2016, 2018) 
explains that identity matters in this formulation. Pande suggests that it is 
India, perceived as a threat to a nationalistic ideology, that continues to 
provide the context for Pakistan’s foreign policy (2011, p174). Whilst 
Pande’s assertion describes correctly how Pakistan’s foreign policy towards 
India is framed, it also opens up a space to interrogate how major Pakistani 
foreign policy actors (the military and intelligence agencies) make use of 
India-centric inimical discourses to construct this relationship as one that both 
generates insecurity and grounds the country’s alterity. Hence, it is important 
to ask for whom this insecurity is generated, and if this alleged “insecurity” 
is perceived in the same way by the state as it is by Pakistani citizens. 
 
It is also important to establish how Pakistan and Pakistanis, broadly 
speaking, perceive India. Iftikhar H. Malik suggests that both countries, “at a 
basic level, have been largely governed by a mutually similar politics of 
misperceptions and misimages” (1999, p150). The author notes that these 
politics are underpinned by the specific South Asian historical context 
produced by the interactions between Hindus and Muslims. He suggests that 
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“to Pakistanis, the Indians (often described as the ‘Hindu communities’) have 
never accepted Muslims as fellow South Asians, but rather emphasised the 
‘foreignness’ of Muslims in the entire historical experience” (ibid). 
It is indeed these binaries – Hindu/Muslim, native/immigrant – that are often 
invoked by both states, so as to articulate their contemporary nationalist 
discourses. Thus, as discussed earlier, narratives associated with Pakistan’s 
state identity continue to be grounded on the two-nation theory (see First Post, 
2019), which, according to C.C. Fair, “locks India and Pakistan in a 
civilizational struggle: Pakistan must defend Islam and the two-nation theory 
against what many Pakistanis believe to be an India dedicated to undermining 
it and thus the very legitimacy of the Pakistani state” (2014, p10). Hence, the 
Kashmir question has become increasingly represented by the states that 
occupy the territory as a civilisational struggle. Pakistan, as this chapter 
examines, has been using this representation as a foreign policy tool. 
 
This perspective on how Pakistani state-based identity constructs its Other 
(India) is further ignited by the theory of Akhand Bharat (or Undivided India). 
Aparna Pande suggests that while this ‘theory’ “has been disproved by 
historic reality”, “its salience endures in Pakistani strategic thinking” (2011, 
p57). She also adds that despite adjustments made to this theory, it was never 
abandoned. In September 2017, I interviewed AC6, who stated that “if India 
would have the opportunity, it will attack us”. Therefore, the Pakistani foreign 
policy elite, and to a great extent a large percentage of the public, perceives 
India as an enemy. This perception of enmity is constructed in two principal 
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ways: as a threat to the “Muslim identity”; and as a threat to Pakistan’s 
territorial sovereignty. This is a clear example of how the Pakistani state 
identity is interlinked with the state’s security, and in particular her territory. 
The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War is a prime example of this interlinking, 
as Pakistan lost her Eastern wing.  
 
Pakistan and India have fought four wars and faced multiple crises of conflict 
escalation. The latest clash took place in February 2019, after a terrorist attack 
against Indian forces in ICK. However, since 2016, Pakistan-India relations 
have become further strained. The trust level has diminished and both 
countries have not hesitated in reiterating their preparedness for war. The 
absence of cordial relations between Pakistan and India, including a 
substantial trade relationship, which, according to a recent report published 
by the World Bank, would have the potential to create up to 37 billion US 
Dollars (Dawn, 2018), is undoubtedly a barrier that prevents both economies 
from growing and in turn their citizens from prospering. 
 
Pakistan-India relations have therefore prepared the ground for militarism to 
flourish in South Asia. “Excessive militarism”, a concept deployed by Swati 
Parashar to describe how militarism in India has flourished77 with the advent 
                                               
77 Swati Parashar notes that “In India, militaristic approaches of varying degrees of intensity 
are deployed to deal with the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, secessionist movements in the 
northeastern states, the Maoist insurgency, illegal immigration, acrimonious neighbours such 
as Pakistan, and cross-border terrorism. Every perceived security situation has militaristic 
solutions” (2018, p4). It is noteworthy that Pakistan uses the same militaristic approaches to 
deal with the Kashmir conflict, the internal fight against terrorism, Balochistan insurgency, 
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of globalisation (2018, p3), may also be applied to Pakistan. Although India’s 
military enhancement has different sources and motivations from Pakistan’s, 
the latter is mostly dependent on her relations with India, and it has increased 
on that basis. However, the mainstream history of India-Pakistan relations78, 
including those more focused on the Kashmir issue, despite describing the 
origins and consequences of the four wars and noting how both countries are 
in a permanent status of war-preparedness, pays little, if any, attention to 
militarism as an ideology. Nor does this mainstream history attend to the fact 
that this relationship has steadily contributed to the construction of these two 
post-colonial nation-states as the normalisers of violence in Kashmir, as well 
as in other regions of South Asia. 
 
To address this lacuna, as I will discuss in the next section, the Kashmir issue, 
which remains one of the most intractable international conflicts, continues 
to be the principal reason as to why Pakistan and India have become national 
security states, where militarisation continues to expand. Yet, as I will 
examine, the rights of Kashmiris, particularly of those who inhabit the 
Kashmir Valley, continue to be ignored and suppressed, as state security and 
identity continue to be the chief guiding force behind militarised political 
decisions. 
 
                                               
the militarisation of CPEC (as it sees an Indian-originated threat to undermine the project), 
as well as paramilitary forces deployed in urban areas, including airports. 
78 Various works from Pakistani authors, like Abdul Sattar (2016), Shahid Amin (2000), or 
Hasan-Askari Rizvi (1993), are a case in point. 
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4.2  The Kashmir Issue 
 
In this section I analyse what constitutes the “Kashmir issue” in the context 
of Pakistan’s relations with India, as well as how it generates representations 
of militarism and reflects Pakistan’s interlinking of identity and security. 
Most of the existing literature on the “Kashmir issue” adopts a state-centric 
approach, privileging Pakistan’s and/or India’s arguments that sustain their 
claims to ruling the region. In this chapter, I am specifically interested in 
examining how Pakistan’s claims to Kashmir in the context of her relation 
with India continue to enhance and promote a militaristic ideology, and how 
this in turn shapes the state’s identity. 
 
Kashmir is a region in which military occupation, violence, human rights 
violations, and generalised dehumanisation are pervasive. The region of 
Jammu and Kashmir is a territory that is occupied by three different nation-
states: Pakistan, India, and China. Yet, as Nitasha Kaul notes: “Kashmir is 
not India. Kashmir is not Pakistan. Kashmir is not China. Kashmir is the 
boundary zone of India-China-Pakistan. But it is distinctively Kashmir. And 
its people – whatever their religion or national identity – are Kashmiris” 
(Kaul, 2010). Being a Kashmiri, however, has become silenced within the 
discourses that Pakistan and India have engendered in the past seven decades. 
Regrettably, “being a Kashmiri” has also been incorporated into discourses 
of occupation, violence, militarisation, rape, and dehumanisation. Kashmiris, 
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as a people can therefore be seen as a kind of “managed” subjects by both, 
Pakistan and India.  
 
One of the ways in which Kashmiri subjects have become “managed” relates 
to how each state handles Kashmir’s cartographical representation and 
nomenclature. Hence, the region of Jammu and Kashmir is designated in 
various ways, depending on whom does it, and it represents a political 
statement. Indeed, Kashmir embodies a diversity of meanings, which have 
been simultaneously appropriated and generated by Pakistan and India in 
order to exercise control over the territory. Cartographical identification is 
turned into representations of political forces. For instance, Pakistan labels 
the Kashmiri territory that it controls and occupies as “Azad”79 Jammu and 
Kashmir (AJK). The state of Pakistan80 refers to the side of Kashmir occupied 
and controlled by India as “occupied Kashmir” or IOK. In August 2020, the 
state of Pakistan decided to undertake some cartography and adopted a new 
map showing the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh, not only 
part of Pakistan, but also designating those areas as “Illegally Occupied 
Jammu and Kashmir, or IIOK” (see Dawn, 2020).  
 
In India, AJK is known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). In a recent 
United Nations report on the “Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir”, the 
                                               
79 “Azad” means “Free”. 
80 Christopher Snedden notes that “Confusingly, when Pakistanis are talking about ‘Held 
Kashmir’, they often mean the Kashmir Valley, as they have almost no interest in Jammu 
and Ladakh” (2013, p19). In Urdu, “Occupied Kashmir” is called “Maqbooza Kashmir”. 
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territory is referred to as the “Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (consisting 
of the Kashmir Valley, the Jammu and Ladakh regions) and Pakistan-
Administered Kashmir (Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan)” 
(UN, 2018). Whilst the UN nomenclature is correct as an official discourse, I 
would suggest that it is also necessary to designate Kashmir, when needed to 
establish which side of the divide the text is referring to, the use of Kashmir 
(Indian controlled, IC) or Kashmir (Pakistan controlled, PC), as the word 
“controlled” is closely associated with colonial practices which are prevalent 
in Kashmir (ICK and PCK). 
 
 
4.2.1  Historical contextualisation of the conflicts in Kashmir 
 
The history of Kashmir is made up of multiple encounters with external 
actors. In the context of this study, the most relevant encounters are those 
pertaining to the British colonisation of South Asia and its aftermath. 
Geography is considered an important factor to explain why Kashmir raises 
nation-states’ anxieties around territorial possession. Unlike most areas of 
Northern India, Kashmir resisted successive invasions from the West; 
however, in 1586, it was finally conquered by the Mughal ruler Akbar 
(Snedden, 2015). Like the majority of Northern Indian regions, including the 
Punjab, Kashmir was subject to Mughal rule, Sikh rule, and the consequences 
of British colonialism.  
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The decline of Ranjit Singh’s empire after his death in 1839, fuelled by 
succession issues, and Britain’s desire to expand her influence in Northern 
India (ibid) dictated the fate of Kashmir. By defeating the Sikhs in 1846, the 
British captured Kashmir for a brief period of time; the former sold it to Gulab 
Singh, a Dogra ruler from Jammu. Kashmir was sold by 75 lac81 Rupees, 
under the treaty of Amritsar, signed in March 1846 (see Greater Kashmir, 
2010). According to Christopher Snedden, “The losers were the Sikhs and the 
people of Kashmir. … Whatever political desires Kashmiris had for their 
homelands were totally ignored. The sale was a cold, hard real estate 
transaction in which the Kashmiris were never allowed to offer a bid” (2015, 
p60). 
 
One hundred years later, once again British colonial politics dictated how 
Kashmiris’ rights were stolen, and how a full-scale conflict ensued between 
India and Pakistan. According to Raju Thomas, “the root causes of the 
Kashmir problem are to be found in events leading to the partition of British 
India and the opposing ideological perspectives of the All-India Muslim 
League (AIML) and the Indian National Congress (INC)” (1992, p11). The 
political background that determined the demand for the creation of Pakistan, 
particularly in the terms articulated by Jinnah and the AIML after 23rd March 
1940 (Lahore Declaration), compounded with each newly independent state 
and their perceptions of Kashmir, brewed into an intractable conflict, with 
still no solution in sight. 
 
                                               
81 One lac is equivalent to 100,000. 
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The provisions of the India Independence Act 1947, regarding the case of 
princely states, indicate the right to remain independent or alternatively to opt 
for one of the new states. Kashmir, a princely state that was ruled by a Hindu, 
whilst having a Muslim majority population, if one follows the logic agreed 
by the three parties involved in the partition of India, would become part of 
Pakistan, or become independent, pending the ruler’s decision. However, the 
ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, did not decide until 26th October 1947. Ever 
since, Kashmir has technically acceded to India. However, turmoil and revolt 
were already taking place in parts of the territory. A revolt in the Poonch 
region, together with the infiltration of “tribesmen” inbound from the NWFP 
region of Pakistan, allegedly triggered the Maharaja’s decision to accede to 
India without consulting the population82. The circumstances in the princely 
state of Jammu and Kashmir remained volatile. As mentioned, “tribesmen” 
from NWFP entered the state. A number of scholars acknowledge that ethnic 
Pashtuns have entered Kashmir from Pakistani territory (Korbel, 1954; 
Gupta, 1964; Lamb, 1994; Malik, 2002; Schofield, 2003; Behera, 2006; 
Snedden, 2013; Zakaria, 2018; Fair, 2018), causing panic and a trail of 
destruction. Yet, there are two main sets of scholarly work trying to ascertain 
whether or not the Pakistani government directed and supported the invasion. 
For instance, Sisir Gupta (1964), Prem Jha (1996), and Fair (2018) suggest 
that the Government of Pakistan supported the invaders. Similarly, Alistair 
Lamb notes that: “as 1947 drew to a close, it was already possible to detect a 
pattern in the Kashmir conflict. The combination of Azad Kashmiris and the 
                                               
82 The historiography about how and why Hari Singh opted out for India is itself a matter of 
dispute. The controversy between Prem Shankar Jha (1996) who authored Kashmir, 1947: 
Rival Versions of History and Alistair Lamb’s (1994) Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947 
signals well that there is no definitive version of what took place. 
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Gilgit Scouts, with varying degrees of assistance both moral and material 
from Pakistan, had produced the beginnings of a stalemate” (1994, p124). 
Joseph Korbel (1954) states in his book Danger in Kashmir that the invasion 
by ‘tribesmen’ was a response to the genocidal campaign carried by the 
Maharaja Dogra troops against Muslims in Poonch and Jammu. Korbel, 
however, notes that “no one, especially the Hindus and Sikhs, was safe before 
their barbarous fury” (1954, p76). For Snedden, 
 
the evidence shows that the people of Jammu and Kashmir themselves began the 
Kashmir dispute. Pukhtoon raiders or outsiders did not start it, as India has 
repeatedly stated since 1947. India used this argument to strengthen its position in 
the Kashmir dispute, but Pakistan’s acquiescence in it is surprising. (2013, p229)  
 
More recently, Anam Zakaria (2018), following recent field research in PCK, 
highlights how the movement of ‘tribesmen’ is still lamented by local 
Kashmiris. In my view, after reading several accounts, it is not possible to 
reach a full authoritative conclusion as to what happened in Kashmir during 
September and October 1947. 
 
As India’s Governor General after independence, Lord Mountbatten became 
fully involved in the accession process83. His oft-cited letter to Hari Singh 
dated 27th October accepting the accession clearly states that while the 
                                               
83 Alex von Tunzelmann (2007) argues that the existing relationship between Mountbatten, 
Nehru, and their mutual dislike of Jinnah helped to forge the idea that the latter personally 
organised the tribesmen to invade Kashmir. She explains that “according to British officials 
on the scene, Jinnah was innocent – though they conceded that the Pakistani government had 
passively supported the invasion by keeping local supply routes open” (von Tunzelmann, 
2007, p192). 
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Government of India accepts the accession, since there is a matter of dispute, 
“the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes 
of the people of the State  [… and] as soon as law and order have been restored 
in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s 
accession should be settled by a reference to the people” (Lord Mountbatten, 
cited in Ijaz Hussain, 1998, p10). The same promise to “settle by a reference 
to the people”, which has since been interpreted as a promise to hold a 
plebiscite, was also uttered by Nehru to Liaqat Ali Khan84 in a telegram dated 
30th October 1947: “Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from 
Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision about 
the future of the State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your 
Government, but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world” (Nehru, 
cited in Ijaz Hussain, 1998, p11). Seven decades later, Kashmiris have not 
been heard and have not been given the chance to decide. 
 
The arrival of Indian troops in Kashmir did not bring an end to the looting, 
rape and violence at the hands of the “tribesmen”, nor did it avoid the Jammu 
massacre of 5th and 6th November in the Jammu region, which would 
exacerbate the difficulties in coming to a settlement. Alex von Tunzelmann 
(2007) is one of the few historians who refers to it85, based on the account 
provided by Richard Symonds (2001) in his book In the Margins of 
Independence. The Jammu massacre, together with the overall spiral of 
                                               
84 Nehru consistently mentioned in different telegrams to the Pakistan premier, and in 
different addresses to the Indian people, that a plebiscite would be held. See Arundhati Roy 
(2011), esp. chapter on “Seditious Nehru”. 
85 See also Rifat Fareed’s (2017) report for Aljazeera. It may be found here: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/6/the-forgotten-massacre-that-ignited-the-
kashmir-dispute.  
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violence that took place during 1947 and 1948 in Kashmir, would then be 
legitimised as a war between India and Pakistan. Sumantra Bose describes it 
as 
 
an orgy of mass killing and expulsion in the Jammu region between October and 
December. … The entire Hindu and Sikh populations of Muslim-majority districts 
in western Jammu like Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Rawalakot (western Poonch), Kotli, 
Mirpur, and Bhimbar were killed or expelled. Mass murder and expulsion of 
Muslims occurred in Hindu-dominant eastern Jammu districts – Udhampur, Kathua, 
and Jammu city and its environs. (2003, pp40-41) 
 
What Bose describes mirrors the massacres that took place earlier on the 
plains of the Punjab where Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus killed each other 
almost indiscriminately86. The Jammu massacre may represent the extreme 
violence of the partition, but that time around in disputed Kashmir, where the 
first war between Pakistan and India took place. 
 
By the end of 1947, Pakistan and India considered appealing to the UN for 
mediation. According to Alistair Lamb, Pakistan would be the first to 
informally approach the UN, in order to obtain advice on “how the United 
Nations could take part in a Kashmir plebiscite, and in what way and to whom 
in the United Nations Pakistan could appeal” (1994, p155). This appears to 
have worked as a call for India, as until that point she had she had shown no 
interest in engagement. For a brief period of time, as Lamb explains, in 
                                               
86 An excellent account of the killings in Punjab can be found in Ishtiaq Ahmed’s book The 
Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret 
British Reports and First-person Accounts (Ahmed 2012). 
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November 1947, a conciliatory document was produced, which included 
troops’ withdrawal and a joint request to the UN to “send a commission to 
the Subcontinent to seek recommendations from not only the two Dominions 
but also the Government of Jammu and Kashmir (which was here evidently 
considered as an entity in its own right, presumably with Sheikh Abdullah as 
its political head) as to how best to set about organising a free and unfettered 
plebiscite” (ibid, p156).  
 
However, internal politics, the horrific humanitarian crisis in Kashmir, and 
continuous mistrust and misperception from both sides derailed a plan that 
could have avoided an all-out war between Pakistan and India. India’s 
insistence on Pakistan being labelled an aggressor (see Snedden, 2013, 
pp231-232) certainly complicated the road to negotiating a settlement, even 
though Pakistan showed some restraint and considered accepting and 
submitting that it would be “if not the guilty party, at least the party which 
would not at the outset protest its innocence too loudly” (ibid, p158). No great 
progress was made, and this marked the beginning of a history of missed 
opportunities. 
 
At the end of winter 1948, the Indian Army started a new military offensive. 
It resulted in further gains towards Pakistan-sponsored controlled areas. The 
Pakistan Government followed the British87 General’s advice: regular troops 
were sent under what appears to have been a pre-emptive decision, in defiance 
of strict interpretations of international law. Pakistan feared a full-scale 
                                               
87 General Gracey was the British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army. 
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invasion from India. After all, Pakistan’s creation and independence were 
perceived as being not fully accepted by India. Pakistan’s sense of insecurity 
was also a product of the developments on the ground in Kashmir during 1947 
and 1948. A truce was reached in January 1949, as the belligerent sides were 
exhausted and judged that no further territorial gains could be obtained (Bose, 
2003, p41). 
 
UN negotiations that took place in subsequent years proved fruitless. With 
India focused on declaring Pakistan as an aggressor, and the latter 
rejoindering based on the alleged flawed and dubious accession process, an 
impasse was reached. The promised plebiscite did not materialise, despite 
several resolutions passed by the UN Security Council prior to 1957. The 
necessary withdrawal of troops did not take place. Kashmir remains one of 
the most highly militarised zones in the world. 
 
War and violence have marked Pakistan’s relations with India. The former, 
however, has used conflict and war to express its non-acceptance of 
Kashmir’s accession to India. The Line of Control (or LOC) that divides the 
territory is controlled by both countries. Ceasefire violations happen 
practically on a daily basis, serving as a reminder that neither Pakistan nor 
India have upheld the demands for demilitarisation, nor have they allowed 
Kashmiris to decide on their own future. Thus, for the states of Pakistan and 
India, the LOC stands as the only possible trophy for a territory that they do 
not own. 
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Pakistan does not accept Kashmir’s accession to India. However, the status 
quo that India and Pakistan produce and reproduce benefits the latter in a 
variety of ways. It keeps alive the “two-nation theory” that is constitutive of 
the imagined state’s national identity. It also justifies the need to retain hostile 
relations with India. Consequently, the militarisation of Pakistan’s foreign 
policy entered into a process of enhancement and continuity that persists to 
this day. 
 
Yet, Pakistan did not accept the achieved status quo, and attempted to take on 
Kashmir by resorting to guerrilla warfare. In 1965, the Pakistani leadership’s 
morale in terms of the possibility of winning a confrontation with India 
increased, due to the latter’s defeat in the 1962 Border War with China. 
Pakistan’s military success in the disputed Rann of Kutch (see Abdul Sattar, 
2016) is also believed to have contributed towards the perception that 
Pakistan could take Kashmir. In addition, Pakistan’s link to the Western 
military alliances, which helped the Army to become the most powerful state 
institution, enhanced her revisionist politics towards India. Hence, an 
overconfident Pakistan, which saw to profit from unrest that prevailed in ICK, 
undertook “Operation Gibraltar”, to be followed, if successful, by “Operation 
Grand Slam”. Basically, Pakistan’s military government, albeit heavily 
influenced by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed, 
opted for an “infiltration of trained guerrillas under Pakistan Army officers 
into Indian-held Kashmir to help foment local dissent and uprising” (Nawaz, 
2008, p206). However, the uprising in ICK did not materialise. Both countries 
engaged in a full-scale war, with India crossing the international border near 
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Lahore. Despite heavy losses and huge costs, both sides claimed victory. 
According to Shuja Nawaz, “both had failed in their military objectives and 
the immediate effort was to put the best face on a difficult situation” (ibid, 
p236). 
 
The lengthy impasse in respect of the Kashmir issue continued without any 
substantial resolution until 1972. On the aftermath of the 1971 War, 
Pakistan’s and India’s leaders met at Simla, India, in June/July 1972 in order 
to resolve the pending issues of the Bangladesh Liberation War. Z.A. Bhutto 
went to Simla in a precarious position. India was holding nearly 93,000 POW. 
To be sure, both sides had specific interests: Pakistan sought the release of 
prisoners, who otherwise would be tried for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity; India was more interested in a definitive settlement on Kashmir. 
Somehow, Bhutto convinced Indira Gandhi that if Pakistani military officers 
would be put on trial, a conducive ground to negotiate Kashmir could not be 
met. Thus, the Simla Agreement contemplated Bhutto’s demands, together 
with key commitments signed by India and Pakistan.  
 
Whilst the commitments appeared to signal a way forward for Pakistan’s 
relations with India, they arguably came too late, as three wars had already 
happened. Both nations committed to the bilateral and peaceful resolution of 
all issues, to focus on people-to-people contact, and to uphold the inviolability 
of the LOC88 in Jammu and Kashmir, considered then key to agreeing an 
                                               
88 Zafar Khan draws attention to the fact that “Many Kashmiris do not recognize the Shimla 
Accord as they consider it inimical to their national interests. It is for this reason that 
Kashmiris often refuse to use the term ‘Line of Control’ to describe the de facto border since 
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enduring peace. Political scientist Ishtiaq Ahmed (2013) raises two important 
points: why did Indira Gandhi agree on the POW repatriation? This question 
remains unanswered. The other point relates to each party’s respective 
interpretation of the agreement. To India, Kashmir would no longer be an 
international issue and the LOC would remain an international border, 
whereas to Pakistan the agreement meant that a solution to the Kashmir 
problem was yet to come (Ahmed, 2013, p211). To date, Pakistan continues 
to envisage Kashmir as an international dispute, in violation of the Simla 
Agreement. 
 
4.2.2  Pakistan’s ceaseless fight for Kashmir and its impact on state 
identity 
 
Post-1972 Pakistan’s relations with India remained centred on Kashmir. The 
growing unrest in ICK, particularly after 1989, remains important in 
explaining how Pakistan’s relations with India became even more bitter. 
Pakistan continued to view the Kashmir issue through the lens of militaristic 
solutions. Pakistani military and intelligence services, namely the ISI, 
“started to use experience and resources from the Afghan jihad to begin 
helping the Kashmiri uprising against Indian control in Kashmir” (Nawaz, 
2008, p431). Whilst the Kashmiri uprising was indigenous, Pakistan quickly 
transformed it into a foreign policy practice, with two key objectives, as 
Stephen Tankel explains: “to make Indian-administrated Kashmir such a 
                                               
doing so would imply accepting it as a formal division – the decision over which they had no 
say and the consequences of which have devastated the state” (2021, p574). 
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burden that India would abandon it; and to bleed India at little cost to 
Pakistan” (2011, p51). According to Shuja Nawaz, the civilian government 
lead by Benazir Bhutto was unaware of ISI’s initial plans, whilst she was 
advised that the army did not favour a military solution to Kashmir (2008, 
p432). However, the support for the Kashmiri jihad expanded to politicians. 
The fact that the military and the ISI, as key Pakistani foreign policy actors, 
have been supporting armed groups in Kashmir since the late 1980s and early 
1990s is well documented by scholars like Fair (2014), Tankel (2011), or 
Greig (2016), as well as by international institutions. For instance, the latest 
UN report on the human rights situation in Kashmir adds significant 
institutional weight to the claims:  
 
Since the late 1980s, a variety of armed groups has been actively operating in the 
Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, and there has been documented evidence of 
these groups committing a wide range of human rights abuses … In the 1990s, 
around a dozen significant armed groups were operating in the region; currently, 
less than half that number remain active … The main groups today include Lashkar-
e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen and Harakat Ul-Mujahidin; 
they are believed to be based in Pakistan Administered Kashmir. … Hizbul 
Mujahideen is also part of the United Jihad Council, which began as a coalition of 
14 armed groups in 1994, claiming to be fighting Indian rule in Kashmir, that was 
allegedly formed by Pakistan’s defence establishment. Despite the Government of 
Pakistan’s assertions of denial of any support to these groups, experts believe that 
Pakistan’s military continues to support their operations across the Line of Control 
in Indian-Administered Kashmir. (United Nations, 2018, p39) 
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The supporting of militants and armed groups in Kashmir suggests how the 
state of Pakistan privileges the use of violence. Moreover, Pakistan’s foreign 
policy actors also made use of religious ideology to continue a relentless 
effort towards making territorial gains in Kashmir. A clear example relates to 
ISI’s trajectory on supporting the JKLF89. However, as soon as the former 
perceived that the latter, which operated on both sides of the LoC and was 
leading the rebellion (Tankel, 2011), was seeking full independence and not 
accession to Pakistan, the ISI put an end to its support. To be sure, full 
independence from Pakistan would signify a loss of territory, which in turn 
carries significance in strategic/defensive terms. Tankel adds that “according 
to Amanullah Khan, one of the founders of the JKLF, the ISI requested the 
group stop calling for sovereignty and instead focus on self-determination” 
(2011, p51). As the JKLF identified as a secular-nationalist movement 
(Haqqani, 2005), this could not fit within the Islamic conception of Pakistan’s 
national identity. A fully independent Kashmir would be a deviation from the 
hitherto conceived identity, with Kashmir perceived as a missing part. 
 
With support removed from the JKLF90, the ISI created and supported 
religiously inspired groups, linked with the Jammat-e-Islami in ICK (Tankel, 
2011). The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen also turned into an ISI proxy to conquer 
Kashmir. Relatedly, Tankel explains that 
 
HM’s agenda met with resistance from the Kashmiri population for several reasons. 
First HM’s goal was accession to Pakistan and not independence. Second, the group 
                                               
89 For an insider’s account of the movement, see Zafar Khan (2021). 
90 See also Anam Zakaria (2018). 
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was part of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir [JIJK] and was 
committed to establishing an Islamic state, which most Kashmiri Muslims had no 
interest in. (2011, p52).  
 
Furthermore, according to the author, HM also sought to annihilate JKLF. In 
my view, this contributed to Pakistan being one of the main factors in 
perpetuating the lack of unity between different Kashmiri political and social 
forces (see for instance Snedden, 2013). The involvement of Pakistan’s 
military and intelligence services in the Kashmir insurgency during the 1990s 
constitutes a clear example of how militarised foreign policy actors were able 
to further destabilise a population that has continuously lived in a zone of war 
and conflict.  
 
Another clear example of how the military/intelligence agencies control 
foreign policy towards India, and in particular those aspects relating to 
Kashmir, can be found in the events that took place in February 1999 in 
Lahore, during the symbolic visit of India’s PM, the late Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee. Pakistan was experiencing a period of civil government, which 
lasted until October of same year. Vajpayee’s entourage travelled by bus from 
Amritsar to Lahore. The Indian delegation was warmly received by its 
counterpart. In Lahore, both signed a declaration, and the event was described 
as “bus diplomacy”. According to Pakistan’s former FM Khurshid Kasuri 
(2015), the visit could have been decisive in resolving the Kashmir problem. 
However, Islamist parties, chiefly the JI, organised strong protests in Lahore 
and other cities (BBC, 1999). Hussain Haqqani (2005) discusses the 
significance of the protests, which indeed appear to corroborate the chosen 
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title of his book91. Nasim Zehra suggests that “given the army’s strong 
reservations about Pakistan’s official India policy, it is not improbable that 
these scripted protests had input from the intelligence agencies. On India, 




Pakistan’s clear non-conformity with the status quo agreed at Simla in 1972 
appears to support the argument that militarism and religious ideology (in this 
case, Islam) can be mutually connected, and thus shape how identity and 
security are interlinked. Pakistan, by supporting the enhancement of religious 
extremism in Kashmir, solely for the purpose of continuing its territorial and 
irredentist desires on Kashmir, has tried to erode Kashmiri identity, in the 
pursuit of attaining a full realisation of an imagined Pakistani identity.  
 
However, Pakistan’s state leadership appears to have little understanding of 
Kashmiriness, or Kashmiriyat92. This is the ethos of the inhabitants of 
Kashmir, particularly those from the Kashmir Valley, who, despite their 
religious backgrounds (Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus), exhibit a great deal of 
tolerance and have little or no antagonisms towards one another (Snedden, 
2013). Snedden also highlights that “compared with Hindus and Muslims in 
Jammu or northern India, Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits) 
                                               
91 Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military is the title of Hussain Haqqani’s (2005) book, 
which appears to aptly capture many of Pakistan’s social and political situations. 
92 Nitasha Kaul defines the concept as follows: “the centuries-old tradition of Kashmiriyat 
bears testimony to the identity of Kashmiris as a people who did not let their religious 
affiliations overwhelm their ethnic and regional commonality” (2010, p43). 
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had relatively few social divisions or antagonisms. While they nevertheless 
had disputes and rivalries, the two groups generally were more liberal and 
more tolerant and, in many cases, had amicable, even close relations” (2013, 
p71). Snedden provides another important observation, linked to the post-
1947 developments in Kashmir politics and the concept of Kashmiriness: 
 
Kashmiris may have been naturally attracted to secular thinking. This was partly 
because they were apparently not afflicted by “the majority-minority complex” that 
was evident among Muslims in other parts of the subcontinent, and partly because 
they were “a deeply religious people who abhor[red] political exploitation of their 
faith”. Hence, the pro-Pakistan stance of the major pro-Pakistan party in J&K, the 
Muslim Conference, and its Pakistan ally the Muslim League was not automatically 
popular with Kashmiri Muslims. To join Pakistan simply because it would be a 
Muslim homeland was an insufficient reason. (ibid, pp73,74). 
 
This Kashmiri stance continued for decades. Only in the 1990s was 
Kashmiriness targeted more significantly, due to Pakistan sponsoring 
religious extremism with the sole intention of consolidating her perceived 
territorial rights over Kashmir. The Pakistani leadership’s willingness to 
continue a patriarchal relationship of control and submission over Kashmir is 
evident, for instance, in how language is used. The following tweets from ex-
ISPR Director, Major General Asif Ghafoor during 2019 typify how the 
military perceives its relation with Kashmiris – namely as one of ownership 
and domination:  
 
Alhamdulillah. All His blessings. Credit if any goes to the leadership, brave soldiers 
and my predecessors. Kashmir runs in blood of every Pakistani. IA legitimate 
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struggle of our Kashmiris shall succeed to defeat Indian Occupation Forces. Time 
for India & world to realise. (Asif Ghafoor, 29th March 2019)  
 
It’s not over. It won’t be until just struggle of our Kashmiris succeeds. It will IA 
succeed. We will go to any extent to let them have their right to self determination. 
An illegal paper annexation won’t deter anyone of us. Revoking in essence gives 
occupied status 1947-48. (Asif Ghafoor, 6th August 2019) 
 
By saying “Our Kashmiris”, or “to let them have their right”, the military is 
but putting in place a domination relationship, whilst at the same time, 
paradoxically, it erases Kashmiri subjectivity93. Hence, Pakistan’s unfaltering 
territorial desires over Kashmir are represented in how the militaristic values 
of dominance and control continue to be a part of how the Pakistani leadership 
narrates Kashmir. To be sure, and as is confirmed by the kind of relationship 
the Pakistani state developed with the JKLF, a separate Kashmiri national 
identity based on territorial sovereignty is undesirable to Pakistan (and to 
India for different reasons). Yet, the Pakistani state uses Kashmiris to enhance 
a specific kind of nationalism, which is identified by Nosheen Ali as “savior 
nationalism – a nationalism that is geared towards saving a community, place 
or people, which is not yet wholly part of the nation” (2016, emphasis in the 
original). Ali, however, suggests that this saviour disposition “could be seen 
                                               
93 In November 2020, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir announced 
on Twitter the “formation of an Advisory Board for #KashmirCommittee comprising of top 
professionals from cinematic & sports spheres. This board will advise on measures to 
preserve & nurture heritage, culture & sports of #Jammu&Kashmir and its amalgamation 
with Pakistan” (Shehryar Afridi, 4th November 2020). This statement is significant in two 
main ways. First, said advisory board is not composed of Kashmiris, but mainstream 
Pakistani personalities, which raises questions about how Kashmir culture is intended to be 
represented. However, second, it is the idea of the amalgamation of Kashmiri heritage and 
culture with Pakistan that adds further plausibility to Pakistan’s desire to further occupy and 
control Kashmir, and her identity. 
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cynically, because it ultimately seeks to win over a territory and people into 
the boundary of the nation” (ibid). Pakistan thus imagines herself as the 
Kashmiris’ saviour, while remaining a force in occupation.  
 
However, Pakistan’s leadership has chosen to be represented as the actor 
holding a position of higher moral authority. It is an established fact that since 
the 1990s, India has intensified the level of oppression and violence in 
Kashmir (see Nitasha Kaul, 2018), to tackle Kashmiri opposition and dissent. 
This has resulted in the further dehumanisation of Kashmiris, a process that 
has been widely documented.94 And yet, Pakistan too has an appalling record 
on how it controls “Azad Kashmir” and Gilgit-Baltistan,95 which leads one to 
question what kind of “freedom” the country envisages for Kashmir, or if it 
indeed understands Kashmir as a place of co-habitation of different religions, 
as inscribed on Kashmiryat. For instance, Nitasha Kaul notes that, “in 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the Interim Constitution stipulates that the 
elected politicians have to serve the cause of accession of the entire disputed 
territory to Pakistan and that the office holders be Muslim. Given that 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir claims to be liberated, the message it sends 
out is that religious minorities will have to accept the dominance of Muslims” 
(2017). Indeed, this is despite Pakistan’s concerted efforts via foreign policy 
to internationalise the Kashmir issue, by calling attention to India’s rights 
                                               
94 The UN report may be found here:  
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IN/DevelopmentsInKashmirJune2016ToApril
2018.pdf  
95 See the previous chapter on Pakistan’s relations with China and its implications for Gilgit 
Baltistan. 
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violations.96 Yet, it continues to ignore the fact that the Kashmir question is 
not just of relevance to Kashmiri Muslims. Whilst the latter indeed bear the 
brunt of India’s policy options in Kashmir, Pakistan’s foreign policy strategy 
erases other Kashmiri identities. This reiterates Pakistan’s intention to 
convert Kashmir’s unique identity and societal relations into the former’s, 
dominated by a Muslim Punjabi ethos, as is currently the case in PCK.  
 
To be sure, as Nitasha Kaul notes, “the nations who claim Kashmir do not 
care for the Kashmiri people who inhabit the land of Kashmir. If they did, 
they would be able to see Kashmir as a ‘peopled’ place” (2010, p44). In the 
case of Pakistan, this is certainly true, as the state prefers to represent 
Kashmiris as Muslim victims of a Hindu India, in order to continue to validate 
the two-nation theory. For Pakistan, representing Kashmiris as victims 
signifies that it can act as a liberating power, thus continuing the narrative 
that justifies her existence – Muslim liberation from Hindu rule. Pakistan’s 
involvement with Kashmir has resulted in attempts to construct a Kashmiri 
identity that could justify a territorial integration. This construction matters 
greatly in terms of consolidating domestic support for the “Kashmir cause”. 
The Pakistani leadership is indeed increasingly determined to represent the 
Kashmir conflict as a Hindu-Muslim one, aided by the rise of extreme-right 
Hindu politics in India. Whilst the growth of Hindu-ultranationalism in India, 
known as Hindutva, is a worrisome reality, and whilst it has become 
increasingly clear that the Indian government does have a “Hindutva project” 
                                               
96 Since 2018, Pakistan’s Foreign Office has given more visibility to the Kashmir issue, and 
their website now includes a full dedicated section to it: http://mofa.gov.pk/jammu-kashmir-
dispute/ 
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for Kashmir (Kaul and Anand, 2020), it fits well into Pakistan’s territorial 
aspirations over Kashmir. 
 
To that end, the Pakistani civilian and military leadership have undertaken 
much effort to weave a narrative that aims to substantiate a representation of 
India as a fascist state, and therefore consolidate Pakistan’s role as the 
“Kashmir liberator”. For instance, Pakistan’s armed forces Hilal Magazine, 
for most of its monthly editions of 2020, included an article either exposing 
India’s human rights violations in relation to the rise of Hindutva, or exposing 
and explaining what this fascist ideology entails.97 
 
Becoming the “Kashmir liberator”, however, has implications for the 
enhancement of militarism and militarisation. In the next section, I will 
analyse how this “liberating” role has contributed towards militarism 
becoming central to Pakistan’s relations with India, and how this is 
interlinked with security and identity. 
 
4.3  Pakistan’s uses of militarisation in Kashmir: from war to 
discourse control 
 
In the previous section, I examined how the Pakistani leadership represents 
Kashmiris and how it has attempted to adapt Kashmiris’ specific identity to 
fit her territorial claims. I have also analysed how victimisation is used to 
enhance Pakistan’s moral high ground whilst attaining the role of “liberator 
                                               
97 The entire archive may be consulted here: https://www.hilal.gov.pk/archive-timeline  
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of Kashmir”. Indeed, Indian politics in Kashmir and the nefarious 
consequences must figure as a main concern in international politics, given 
extant documented evidence of the political violence that continues to occur. 
However, Pakistan’s use of such evidence as a foreign policy tool with 
specific aims towards territorial claims is no less relevant. Currently, 
Pakistan’s options beyond the articulation of the narratives that represent 
India’s Hindu-majoritarian and aggressive government as a real threat to 
Muslim Kashmiris (and other Muslims in India as well), with the narrative in 
which Pakistan is represented as a liberator, are indeed limited.  
 
That said, it is important to acknowledge the importance of Pakistan’s last 
significant military stunt in Kashmir in 1999. The Kargil War remains a clear 
example of how a military solution to the conflict is not an option. Yet, the 
Pakistani Army, or more concretely a clique of generals,98 including the 
COAS Pervez Musharraf, decided to launch an infiltration across the LOC, 
named Operation Koh Paima (Zehra, 2018; Nawaz, 2008). Whilst the 
strategic contours of the Kargil War are  not relevant to this discussion, there 
are several significant aspects about it, including a ravaging impact on 
domestic politics. Firstly, the chosen timing to pursue an infiltration at the 
LOC, when the prospects for peace talks led by the civilian government were 
a real possibility, although against the army’s will, is highly significant. As 
the military envisages itself as the only actor capable of engaging India, peace 
talks led by a civilian government were hard to accept. This signifies that the 
military, in constant need of following a permanent status of war-
                                               
98 “Clique of generals” is the term used by Nasim Zehra (2018). 
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preparedness, continued to prefer a militarised solution than one that involved 
non-military actors.  
 
Secondly, KP operation was allegedly also Pakistan’s response to a discovery 
in 1983 of Indian presence at the disputed Siachen Glacier, followed by 
India’s Operation Megdoot to occupy Siachen in 1984. Having lost that race 
and yet having engaged her troops at the world’s highest battlefield where 
soldiers are killed mostly by the harsh weather and not by the exchange of 
gunfire, this constitutes an example of how Pakistani leadership continued to 
prefer military solutions for contentious issues with India, in this case taken 
to an extreme level. 
 
And thirdly, the KP operation was so secretive that it was unknown to most 
army commanders; the latter were informed of Pakistan’s intentions only 
when early reports on Indian media started to reveal the possible presence of 
Pakistani elements across the LOC. Arguably, given the implications to 
Pakistan-India relations, not having the whole of the army aware of such an 
operation increases the likelihood of a munity. In a nuclear-armed country, 
with critical social and ethnic fractures, such a scenario could have had dire 
consequences, except for the clique of adventurous generals. Similarly, 
civilian government was not informed until 17th May 1999, as more reports 
from Indian media outlets surfaced, claiming that Pakistan’s soldiers were 
providing cover for Mujahideen infiltration, with soldiers occupying strategic 
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positions, and that Pakistan’s artillery could target a key supply route99 in 
ICK – the Srinagar – Leh Highway (Zehra, 2018). 
 
Hence, it is clear that the KP operation was clandestinely pursued by a clique 
of generals without prior knowledge from main state actors. When the plan 
was announced, the generals were not seeking permission. As Zehra suggests, 
“the prime minister was presented with a fait accompli” (2018, p161). PM 
Nawaz Sharif, despite having a divided cabinet on this issue, and 
notwithstanding serious concerns revealed by FO officials on how the 
international community would likely react negatively to Pakistan’s choices, 
he supported the army (ibid, p165). The Kargil War is certainly a clear 
example of how leadership personality matters. Sharif, of Kashmiri descent, 
it turns out, was easily lured. 
 
Moreover, if indeed the political aim of the operation was to seek a permanent 
solution for Kashmir in accordance with Kashmiris’ will, as per the account 
of brigadier Shaukat Qadir, and yet, the military’s aim, according to the same 
brigadier, “was to create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of 
leading to a military solution so as to force India to the negotiation table from 
a position of weakness” (cited in Haqqani, 2005, p251), the Kargil War shows 
how unacceptable it is to the army for a civilian government to lead any 
negotiation process with India. 
 
                                               
99 In fact, this was one of the key strategic goals of operation KP. 
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Kargil had far-reaching implications for Pakistan’s relations with the 
international community, with India, and of course with Kashmiris. In a rare 
reference to it in Pakistan’s foreign policy related literature, Abdul Sattar 
writes that “misconceived policies and actions not only isolated Pakistan 
internationally, they also gravely damaged the heroic freedom struggle of the 
Kashmiri people” (2016, p257). Pakistan did not receive any diplomatic 
support, including from Beijing. According to Zehra, Pakistan’s most reliable 
friend said that Kargil had to be vacated (2018, p210). In India, the Pakistani 
FM did not find any open door for dialogue, unless a withdrawal of troops 
were to happen. To be sure, India felt betrayed after the earlier process 
initiated in Lahore.  
 
Secretive decisions taken by top generals gave rise to a generalised insecurity 
situation across South Asia, as both states had by then reached the highest 
level of militarisation – nuclear weapons. As a nuclear power, Pakistan’s 
decisions conferred upon it the status of an irresponsible member of the 
international community. Pakistan had just joined the “nuclear club”. 
Relatedly, when the Kargil War began, there was no formally approved 
nuclear use doctrine, due to a series of bureaucratic events, including a change 
in the army command (Naeem Salik, 2018, p52). This fact may indeed render 
a threatening remark by Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad100 either totally 
irrelevant or a signal that rationality did not always prevail among Pakistan’s 
foreign policy decision-makers. 
                                               
100 The Foreign Secretary stated that “We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal 
to defend our territorial integrity” (cited in Zehra, 2018, p254). 
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Pakistan’s Kargil War resulted in several parameters that would mediate 
relations with India from that point forward. One of the most lauded outcomes 
from this war, particularly by nuclear weapons apologists, is that deterrence 
prevented an escalation, and henceforth, war between both countries was not 
an option. Yet, Pakistan continues to represent India as her greatest security 
threat despite Pakistan’s clear violation of the LOC. Shahid Amin, however, 
is rather dismissive, arguing that “India’s overreaction, war fever, and open 
threats to wage larger war with Pakistan … might have done more harm to 
India in the long run for not being a ‘responsible’ nuclear power” (2000, 
p266). This statement indicates how Pakistani foreign policy thinking in 
general operates: India always represents the greatest threat even when 
Pakistan mounts a clandestine operation across a de facto border, while 
deliberately being oblivious to what it means to be a nuclear-armed country. 
 
Domestically, the war had important repercussions, affecting the further 
inculcation of militaristic values in domestic and foreign policies. Nawaz 
Sharif, who had supported the army’s adventure, rushed to Washington to 
meet President Clinton. The objective was to seek American mediation and 
intervention. Sharif returned to Islamabad after having agreed to retreat and 
to prosecute the main actors and war architects (Haqqani, 2005, p253). Once 
again, the military and Islamists agreed to cooperate. The latter’s protests 
against the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif (BBC, 1999) would then be 
materialised in a military coup in October 1999. Pakistan entered into one of 
the most disruptive and violent decades of her short history. 
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Post-Kargil, a series of events have further strained relations with India. The 
attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, and the Mumbai attacks 
in 2008 are the most significant. In July 2001, both countries wasted yet 
another opportunity to find a way towards peace. At Agra, Musharraf (then 
Pakistan’s president) and Indian PM Vajpayee nearly signed a declaration. 
However, eleventh-hour disagreements from the Indian side have prevented 
it from happening, at least per Pakistan’s version of events. L.K. Advani and 
Sushma Swaraj were at the root of some of the rumours as to why the talks 
collapsed, given their insistence that Kashmir is not an international dispute 
– a point that Pakistan still insists on, in defiance of the Simla Agreement, 
and upon which has been built her strategy to gain a moral upper hand on the 
Kashmir issue. 
 
Pakistan’s foreign policy continues to mirror the Agra summit events. During 
my interviews with relevant Pakistani individuals, I found a diverse picture 
concerning whether space for diplomacy still exists. AC6, for instance, stated 
that “since India has constitutionally added J&K as part of India, I don’t see 
that they will ever be willing to discuss Kashmir and its plebiscite with 
Pakistan”. GO1 added that “India needs to have a larger heart; India is the 
key as they are most in occupation”. GO2 uttered a simple “No”. AC5, who 
has been actively involved in creating a solution for Kashmir, claimed that 
there is still space for diplomacy, and that Kashmir can still be resolved in 
keeping with Kashmiris’ aspirations. “Democracy never took place”, he 
added.  
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The variety of positions concerning the importance of having working 
diplomatic relations with India, however, seems to ignore altogether 
Pakistan’s support for armed and militant groups. The interviewees never 
mentioned the need for Pakistan to speak with India on what the latter 
designates as terrorism. AC5 mentioned that, as did TT1 too, that the current 
movement in Kashmir is “indigenous”, and that as such it is not perceived as 
terrorism by Pakistan’s statist elite. This idea prevails among foreign policy 
pundits in Pakistan.  
 
The representation of Kashmiri resistance as “indigenous” once again has 
implications for how Pakistan relates to the whole question. “Indigenous” 
thus serves to dissipate Pakistan’s support for radical militants in ICK, what 
Christine Fair (2018) designates as “proxy warfare”. To be sure, the 
considerable support that the ISI has extended to encourage a rebel war in 
ICK, usually known as Jihad, stands in contrast with Pakistan’s narratives 
that seek to present it as having taken the “higher moral ground” whilst 
wanting to be perceived as the “benevolent liberator”. Hence, when the 
Pakistani leadership assembles a narrative representing the state as the 
“saviour of Kashmir”, it also generates a narrative related to the politics of 
amnesia. Furthermore, the notion of an “indigenous Kashmiri movement” is 
also being used to represent how Kashmiris continue to need protection and 
liberation, which is something only the Pakistani leadership can deliver. Thus, 
a critical feminist approach is useful to understand how the latter currently 
controls the discourse on Kashmir. It is important to understand how this 
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narrative of being Kashmir’s saviour and the bearer of a higher morality is 
connected to militarism, and in turn how the latter mediates the interlinking 
of security and identity. As discussed in previous chapters, the Pakistani 
military controls and reproduces the construction of the national narrative that 
characterises the Pakistani self. What is more, as Enloe (2000) has noted, 
military institutions are embodiments of male ideological and physical 
domination. In turn, the Pakistani military, in partnership with the civil 
bureaucracy, is constituted by an assemblage of majoritarian identities: male, 
Muslim, Sunni, and Punjabi. These assemblages then constitute a dominant 
identity which is hegemonically masculine, and which characterises how 
ideological militarism works. The impact of this identity in terms of how main 
foreign policy actors represent Kashmir is therefore significant. The 
articulation of the “saviour/liberator” and “indigenous” via the narrative that 
describes India’s oppression in ICK is crucial in understanding how 
Pakistan’s relations with India are likely to continue to be shaped, given that 
war is no longer an option. 
 
In the same way, Nitasha Kaul (2018) highlights how the Indian state 
resources to similar representations of Kashmir and Kashmiris, which are 
deliberately gendered. Those representations aim to generate a “feminised 
understanding of Kashmir” that “posits the Indian state in conventionally 
masculine and patriarchal terms” (Kaul, p131), and, therefore, sustains the 
narrative of the role of the state to act as the ‘protector’ and the ‘saviour’. 
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Hence, a change in the articulations on the Kashmir narrative aims to 
transform the representation of her resistance to India’s occupation. The 
resistance that was once sponsored by the Pakistani state, and which brought 
the latter into close associations with terrorism – either by supporting 
Kashmiri militant groups, most notably Hizbul Mujahideen, or outright 
terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) or Jaish-e-Mohammed (JM) – 
now needs to be represented as docile and disassociated from state-sponsored 
violence. Therefore, the army, as a heavily masculinised institution, is 
therefore in a favourable position to articulate domination and control over 
the representations of Kashmir. Consequently, the more Indian oppression 
and occupation in Kashmir will be cited and repeated, the more Pakistan’s 
leadership reiterates its position as the bearer of hope for liberation, as well 
as that of the only international actor who displays “genuine” consternation 
over what happens in ICK.  
 
Examples of how the Pakistani leadership articulates this narrative may be 
found in official speeches and militarised spaces. For instance, the President 
of Pakistan, upon addressing a Navy Course Commission parade in December 
2019, “called out the world’s collective conscience to stand with the people 
of Kashmir in their just and rightful struggle against fascist regime of India” 
(ISPR, 2019). And in the Pakistan Army Green Book 2020, Senator Mushaid 
Hussain writes that “Pakistan, as the principal defender of the Kashmiri 
people and leading exponent of the Kashmir cause, must maintain the resolve 
and stamina to sustain a long term strategy of supporting the Kashmiri people 
and resisting Indian hegemony” (2020, p48). The language used in these two 
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examples is significant. Senator Hussain, writing in the relevant Pakistani 
Army Green Book, restates Pakistan as the “defender” of Kashmiris, and in 
order to continue to do so, it will need “resolve and stamina”. These terms are 
gendered, and represent the masculinised orientation enmeshed in the 
Pakistani leadership. Hence, it is possible to establish that Pakistan’s 
representation of Kashmir and Kashmiris utilises a discourse of a dominant 
masculinity that has been institutionalised through an ideological militarism 
that has been persistently inculcated in Pakistani society. Thus, the Pakistani 
military has started to consistently use the language of militarism, which is 
inherently masculinist. Furthermore, this language also establishes and 
produces gendered hierarchies. It must not be forgotten that Pakistan too is 
an occupier state in Kashmir, and, as discussed earlier, Pakistan’s 
predominant interest in Kashmir is territorial and geopolitical. The role of 
liberator and defender also confers on Pakistan a superior position that 
guarantees it a role of domination over the Kashmiris’ willingness to attain 
self-determination. So long as Pakistan will produce and reproduce this 
narrative, it will maintain a position of power that allows it to uphold its 
territorial aspirations over Kashmir, particularly the Valley, while also 
keeping alive the two-nation theory, as a orientating principle of Pakistan’s 
existence. 
 
4.4  Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I discussed Pakistan’s relations with India, by predominately 
focusing on the Kashmir issue. I provided an overview of the main elements 
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that characterise this relationship, as well as a historical contextualisation of 
the Kashmir issue. I then focused on analysing how the Pakistani leadership 
that controls foreign policy represents Kashmir, and how this is reflected in 
the country’s interlinking of security and identity. To be sure, war and war-
preparedness continue to mediate this relationship. Pakistan continues to need 
to represent its relations with India through the lenses of conflict, war, and 
the existence of a perpetual danger, of which Kashmir is the epicentre. It is 
no coincidence that in the Pakistan Army Green Book 2020, Pakistan COAS 
refers to Kashmir as a “nuclear flash point”, soon after summarising the 
unfortunate events of 2019 involving Kashmir. Nor it is a coincidence that 
the Pakistani PM uses the same terms101 to characterise the same events 
concerning Kashmir, Pakistan, and India.  
 
However, as I analysed above, a critical feminist approach can help us to 
understand how the Kashmir conflict is represented and filtered through the 
masculinised language of militarism, and how this helps Pakistan to articulate 
a narrative about Kashmir that represents a foreign policy position in which 
she aims to be perceived as a “defender” and “liberator” of Kashmiris. This 
position, however, contrasts with Pakistan’s own status in Kashmir. Hence, 
whilst the Pakistani leadership appears to have adopted a strategy of 
continuing to represent its own role in the Kashmir issue as a defender and 
liberator, in opposition to an occupying and oppressing India, this does not 
come without serious questions to Pakistan’s goals. Of course, one cannot 
dismiss India’s appalling political decisions in Kashmir, including its 
                                               
101 See, for instance: https://www.dawn.com/news/1505188.  
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occupation and extensive human rights violations. Yet, Pakistan’s use of 
masculinised and militarised narratives to represent Kashmir are also 
indicative of how her leadership anticipates the continuation of a politics of 
control and domination over the people of Kashmir. Indeed, Pakistan’s choice 
may preserve her relevance to the overall Kashmir question, and may help it 
to continue to exercise a position of control and domination over the 
aspirations of the Kashmiri people. However, it will not eliminate her status 




CHAPTER V  




5.1  Introduction 
 
Relations with the US represent one of the most critical foreign policy 
undertakings by the government of Pakistan since 1947. Since then, the US 
has acquired the status of Pakistan’s main international partner. This 
relationship was particularly important during the Cold War. Pakistan found 
herself amidst international power struggles as a result of her allied status 
with the US. This relationship, which was developed under the status of an 
alliance, remains key to Pakistan’s foreign policy. 
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The scholarship related to Pakistan-US relations is vast and has had different 
points of origin. Pakistan’s indigenous foreign policy literature follows the 
typical chronological organisation, using the country’s foreign policy phases 
to situate Pakistan’s relations with the US relations (Burke, 1973; Amin, 
2000; Sattar, 2013, 2017). Research on Pakistan’s history and politics (both 
regional and domestic) is also rich in accounts of the state’s involvement with 
the US, spanning from 1947, specifically focusing on the Cold 
War/Afghanistan War, and post-9/11 (Choudhury, 1975 ; Jalal, 1991; Ali, 
2008; Nawaz, 2008; Malik, 2008; Samad, 2011; Ahmed, 2013; Khan, 2011; 
Hathaway, 2008; Fair, 2012; Markey, 2013). US and Western-based scholars 
and diplomats have also contributed prolifically to the literature on Pakistan 
and the US, including accounts on post-9/11 US foreign policy, and its 
positions towards Afghanistan and Pakistan (Abbas, 2015; Kux, 2001; 
Woodward, 2010; Schaffer and Schaffer, 2011; Fair, 2014; Markey, 2013; 
Schaffer, 2017, Harrison, 2009; Rashid, 2012; Haqqani, 2013; Nawaz, 2019).  
 
The relationship between Pakistan and the US, recently described as a “bitter 
friendship” (Nawaz, 2019), has played a crucial role in shaping international 
political events, practically since the 1950s. Of particular relevance is 
Pakistan’s facilitating role in the process of establishing diplomatic relations 
between the US and China. Pakistan’s close relations with the latter became 
vital for Nixon’s administration. As the White House wished to open up a 
secret diplomatic channel to China in 1971, Pakistan’s services were sought. 
This would turn into an opportunity for Pakistan to take up an important and 
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recognisable role within the US’s strategy for a new global balance of power 
(Kux, 2001, p182). Thus, by virtue of Pakistan’s role as facilitator, US and 
Chinese foreign policies were significantly transformed during the Cold War. 
 
However, Pakistan’s diplomatic capabilities would be overshadowed by the 
Bangladesh Liberation War. In 1971, Pakistan was fighting a civil war in East 
Bengal/East Pakistan, whilst conducting a genocidal policy, carried by the 
Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. The US administration chose to pay no heed 
(see, for instance, Bass, 2013). Thus, whilst 1971 turned out to be an 
important year for Pakistan-US diplomacy, it is also marked by the gruesome 
realities created by the exigencies of realpolitik, at the expense of human 
lives.  
 
The Pakistani Army depended heavily on US supplies, a result of a 
concession on the part of Nixon during the early days of his Presidency. 
Regardless of the civil war in East Pakistan, the US and Pakistan upheld their 
individual interests, while Pakistan’s military massacred numerous lives in 
the East. Dennis Kux (2001) provides a rich account of this period, in 
particular what he describes as Nixon’s “tilt” towards Pakistan. More 
recently, Gary Bass’s (2013) The Blood Telegram: India’s Secret War in East 
Pakistan provides a compelling account of how the US dealt with the ensuing 
tragedy in East Pakistan. The cables sent by the US Consul General in Dacca, 
Archer Blood, bore witness to the atrocities committed by the Pakistan Army 
whilst using American weapons. Yet, as soon as Kissinger’s visit to China 
was discovered, the strategy that comes across as duplicitous between 
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Pakistan and the US became fully exposed. This was one the most horrific 
moments in the history of Pakistan and US foreign policy. 
 
The 1971 events pertaining to Pakistan’s relations with the US are helpful in 
understanding how Pakistan has foregrounded a relationship of dependency. 
The centrality of security to Pakistan’s foreign policy, chiefly oriented by the 
perceived threats posed by India, has contributed to shaping the country’s 
relations of dependency with the US, particularly when it comes to military 
assistance. This has generated a number of different views. For instance, 
Pakistan-US relations102 have been labelled as transactional, and based on 
clientelism (Jaffrelot, 2016), depending on how the client state is defined.103 
Jaffrelot argues that there is a “bargaining dimension but does not reflect the 
intention of the American patron, clearly interested in getting something done 
by its ‘client’ (and which literally pays for the service)” (2016, Kindle 
Locations 3738-3739).  
 
C.C. Fair and S. Ganguly (2015), however, offer a more charitable reading of 
the situation. They highlight the fact that Pakistan always claims the position 
of victim in the relationship, particularly because the Pakistani leadership has 
always felt abandoned by the US during critical moments of conflict and war. 
The authors debunk some of the myths in the relationship, especially in terms 
                                               
102 Pakistan-US relations have also been described persuasively as: a “roller-coaster” 
(Schaffer and Shaffer, 2011); “disenchanted allies” (Kux, 2001); and even as characterised 
by “lies and deceit”, according to President Trump’s January 2018 tweet.  
103 Christophe Jaffrelot cites a possible definition of clientelism given by a French political 
scientist: “a relationship of dependence … based on a reciprocal exchange of favours between 
two people, the patron and the client, whose control of resources are unequal” (Médard, cited 
in Jaffrelot, 2016, Kindle Locations 3738-3739). 
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of the military aid claimed by Pakistan, and the latter’s regional policies that 
are detrimental to US, for instance those in support of non-state actors. 
 
In my view, Pakistan-US relations can be better described as combination of 
the two: a transactional clientelism. Despite the inconsistent behaviour on the 
part of both countries with regard to their status as allies, they have mutually 
benefited from the agreements carved out over the decades. However, in the 
case of Pakistan, the consequences of this transactional clientelism have had 
a direct impact on society, including expansive militarisation and the 
inculcation of ideological militarism, as I will examine later in the chapter. 
However, the transactional clientelist relations have had a lesser impact on 
American society. 
 
In this foreign relation, it is particularly important to acknowledge how each 
partner represents the other. For instance, Hassan Rizvi (1993) suggests that 
in Pakistan foreign policy makers tend to overemphasise the country’s 
importance to US interests in Asia and the Middle East. However, US foreign 
policy towards Pakistan is shaped “primarily by considerations around 
Pakistan rather than within it” (Rizvi, 1993, p86). Hence, Pakistan is 
primarily perceived as an important geo-strategic partner for the US. Yet, as 
Daniel Markey (2013) notes, the shared history of these allied states is marked 
by conflicting versions of who made use of the other on different occasions. 
Yet, Markey acknowledges that for the US, “when Pakistan was helpful, it 
enjoyed generous American assistance and attention. When Pakistan was 
unhelpful, the spigot was turned off” (2013, p3).  
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The history of a “helpful Pakistan” in US foreign policy has been mostly 
associated with the political events in Pakistan’s neighbouring Afghanistan. 
In chapters 2 and 3, I have analysed aspects of Pakistan’s foreign policy 
related to religious ideology and militarism. These are closely linked to 
relations with the US and to the war in Afghanistan. The historical events 
linked to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and subsequently the 
post-9/11 moment, the so-called “Global War on Terror” (GWOT), however, 
are vitally important to understand how Pakistan’s relations with the US have 
generated representations of Afghanistan by the Pakistani leadership that 
have an impact on foreign policy and the interlinking of identity and security. 
Hence, in this chapter I will examine Pakistan-US relations by focusing on 
the events that have taken place in Afghanistan since 1979, including issues 
related to security and identity that can be said to have their origins in such 
events.  
 
Despite close cultural and religious links, Pakistan and Afghanistan have 
constructed an unstable and mistrustful relationship. That said, it is important 
to understand the importance of Afghanistan for the Pakistani state. In 1947, 
Afghanistan – a Muslim-majority country – did not recognise the newly 
formed state of Pakistan, indeed, even voting against its existence at the UN. 
Hence, an unstable neighbouring situation in the West, compounded by the 
nefarious events of the partition in the East, made Pakistan’s recognition as 
an independent state a tumultuous affair. The Afghan government was not 
ready to accept the controversial Durand line, which, as Nivi Manchanda 
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notes, was perceived by Afghanistan as “a manifestation of two distinct types 
of imperial control” (2020, p82). Whilst British India was no longer a reality, 
Afghanistan, despite having escaped occupation, was also the product of a 
colonial order (ibid, p82). Thus, adopting again a colonial border that 
symbolised imperialism, and one that had already caused great resentment in 
the Pashtun regions, was looked upon negatively. To be sure, given the 
precarious status of Pakistani nationalism at the time of partition, fears that 
the Pashtunistan nationalist movement could undo Pakistan in its 
westernmost regions and undermine her existence also influenced Pakistan’s 
perception of Afghanistan as a threat. 
 
Another key aspect to note is Afghanistan’s historical, political, and cultural 
links with India. Practically since 1947, Pakistan has perceived this 
relationship as a state security challenge. Undoubtedly, both countries do 
share a mutual animosity towards Pakistan, which would be reinforced by the 
1950 signing of a friendship treaty. Afghanistan and India have attempted to 
support ethno-nationalist causes in Pakistan, notably those of Pashtuns and 
Balochis, a situation the latter interprets as a concerted attempt to undermine 
Pakistan’s unity. Furthermore, India perceives Pakistan’s existence as 
obstacle to greater logistical connectivity, as for centuries trade and people’s 
movements between the two regions was carried out without disruption. With 
the exception of the Taliban government, India has maintained a close 
relationship with all other governments in Afghanistan. 
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Thus, Afghanistan stands in Pakistan’s foreign relations as the Indian “threat 
enhancer”, particularly in terms of what concerns her imagined fears of India 
undoing the partition. The Pakistani leadership has sought to eliminate this 
perceived threat by trying to influence and control successive political forces 
in Afghanistan, in what may be envisaged as a typical colonial attitude. As I 
will examine further in the chapter, Islamabad’s determination to control 
Afghanistan via Kabul was one of the primary motivations behind its support 
of the anti-Soviet jihad from 1979, and, after the Soviets’ withdrawal, to 
support hard-line Islamist groups, including the Taliban in later years. 
 
The present chapter is divided into three sections. This introduction has 
provided an overview of key aspects of Pakistan’s foreign relations with the 
US. The following section focuses on the post-1979 moment and how 
Pakistan and the US engaged in Afghanistan. The last section examines how 
Pakistan and the US have related post-9/11, especially since the latter invaded 
Afghanistan in October 2001, in an attempt to eradicate the terrorist group 
Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban, who controlled the Afghan state. The latter were 
believed to be acting as hosts for the Al-Qaeda leadership. In this chapter, I 
use a critical feminist approach to analyse how Pakistan-US engagement in 
Afghanistan has contributed to further increasing the footprint of militarism 
in Pakistan. 
 
5.2  Pakistan and the US War in Afghanistan 
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From the mid-1970s until the end of the next decade, Pakistan’s relations with 
the US were full of upheavals, and yet both countries created spaces for 
cooperation. Pakistani internal politics from 1974 to 1977 had a significant 
detrimental effect on her foreign policy towards the US. The army perceived 
Z.A. Bhutto’s disputes with the opposition as a potential threat to the internal 
stability of the country. Consequently, on 5th July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq 
imposed martial law, which led the country to remain under military rule for 
more than a decade.  
 
Shuja Nawaz explains how Bhutto built his role as an “independent 
nationalist who was the target of an international conspiracy” (2008, p350). 
This conspiracy, as imagined by Bhutto, was related to Pakistan’s recent 
intentions to acquire and develop nuclear technology, and how that could lead 
to a nuclear weapons programme. To be sure, the US opposed Pakistan’s 
nuclear ambitions, and as Nawaz also notes, with the ignominious end of the 
Nixon administration, Pakistan’s influence in Washington diminished, 
although a few friendly figures remained104. 
 
The imposition of military rule in Pakistan under the leadership of Zia-ul-Haq 
shaped Pakistan’s domestic and international dynamics. The dismissal of 
Z.A. Bhutto at the hands of his chosen COAS, Zia-ul-Haq, has been widely 
debated, and is well documented within the literature on Pakistan’s political 
                                               
104 Shuja Nawaz (2008) provides the excerpt of an interview he conducted with General 
Scowcroft. The US General admits that US policy towards Pakistan was also responsible for 
throwing Pakistan into a nuclear weapons solution for her security predicaments. The 
General offered some interesting comments: “Our policy, however well intentioned, was 
wrong. Our policy to stop Pakistan enhanced their insecurity and acted as a perverse driver 
towards nuclear weapons” (General Scowcroft, cited in Nawaz, 2008, p351). 
 238  
history (Nawaz, 2008; Talbot, 2012; Ahmed, 2013; Jalal, 2008, 2014; 
Jaffrelot, 2015). Shuja Nawaz suggests that “Zia’s regime was a watershed 
for Pakistani politics” (2008, p361). Zia’s military dictatorship was caught in 
the middle of important transformations during the Cold War, which would 
be reflected in how Pakistan and the US conducted their relations for nearly 
a decade. During Carter’s administration, Pakistan-US relations remained 
strained. Pakistan’s non-democratic status, and Zia’s full embrace of the 
nuclear programme, limited the bilateral relation. Hence, Pakistan’s relations 
with the US occurred under several themes: the continuous demand for 
weapons associated with perceived India-centric threats; Pakistan’s nuclear 
defiance; and the centring of religion as a driver for foreign policy. The latter 
was enhanced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For instance, as 
Lawrence Ziring highlights,  
 
the presence of the Red Army in immediate proximity to Pakistan’s frontier led 
Zia, like others at home and abroad, to conclude Moscow’s great target was not 
Kabul but Islamabad … [C]oncerned that the Soviets and Indians were 
determined to exploit Pakistan’s domestic problems, especially its ethnic 
conflicts, Zia had good reason to conclude that Pakistan faced mortal danger. 
(2003, p176) 
 
Under the conditions of a military dictatorship, values associated with 
militarism become more widespread. For instance, the use of force, the belief 
that having enemies is natural in human affairs (Enloe, 2016), and the belief 
that only military-oriented solutions are the most efficient in dealing with 
conflict are given preference. Hence, it is unsurprising that Zia’s regime could 
 239  
conceive that the USSR’s ultimate target would be Pakistan, and that in turn 
would make of Islam a “religion in danger”. General Zia held a very strict 
interpretation of Islam. The Islamisation programme that Pakistan underwent 
during his eleven-year rule is usually attributed to his personal influence aided 
by the country’s religious parties, particularly the Jamaat’ Islami. As far as 
foreign policy is concerned, Zia’s dictatorship did not depart from the 
ideological turf laid by Bhutto. However, Zia would be confronted with 
external pressures that exacerbated the presence and strength of ideology in 
foreign policy. Hence, as Shuja Nawaz (2008) notes, India’s fast-growing 
military and nuclear capacity, the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, 
and the Iranian Revolution all impacted on Pakistan’s foreign policy and 
consequently its relations with the US. 
 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has revealed how ideology became 
further entrenched in the foreign policy of Pakistan. Whilst Pakistan’s 
rapprochement with the US influenced and drove foreign policy, for instance, 
Shuja Nawaz calls attention to the fact that the Americans were not the first 
to initiate an opposition campaign against the Soviets: “immediately after the 
Soviets rumbled into Kabul, Prince Turki recounts how the Saudi king 
received a call from Zia, who wished to send General Rahman to the kingdom 
to brief its leadership” (2008, p372). Certainly, the US was instrumental 
during the ten-year-long war in Afghanistan, by funding the ultra-ideological 
training of rebels on Pakistani soil (Haqqani, 2013). However, the Saudi link 
proved to be of great significance, not only during the Afghan War, but also 
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in the continuation of its ideologically driven support for the Taliban during 
the 1990s.  
 
Hence, the Pakistan-US rapprochement is also a consequence of heightened 
militarism. The rationale behind Zia’s regime becoming involved in the 
Afghanistan War can therefore be explained as a consequence of ideological 
militarism. The military dictator was indeed fully set on maximising military 
assistance from the US, focusing on the imagined dangers represented by 
Soviet proximity, as well as trying to amplify the question of international 
security that the US had extended to other states. For instance, in an interview 
with ABC News, General Zia said that “If any country like Soviet Union 
attacks Pakistan it will be war with the free world or with the United States 
and the United Kingdom” (cited in Haqqani, 2013, p603). Zia argued that “if 
the United States could give security guarantees to South Korea, Israel, 
Taiwan, and Egypt, why could it not provide one for Pakistan?” (Zia-ul-Haq, 
cited in Haqqani, 2013, p603).  
 
Indeed, these countries had (and continue to have) significant military 
assistance from the US, and have experienced the militarisation of their 
political and social realms. By seeking to become a state that could use a US-
controlled international security apparatus,105 the Pakistani leadership was 
also endeavouring to be integrated and recognised as part of an international 
hegemonic framework of masculinity that relies upon and benefits from 
                                               
105 Whilst Pakistan received military assistance from the US during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
process was not straightforward. The Carter administration denied the sale of 110 A-7 attack 
aircrafts (see Akthar, 2018). 
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substantial militarisation. In turn, the Pakistani leadership imagined that the 
country would be represented as rational, strong, and prepared to deal with 
any conflict. Being perceived in this way, Pakistan would gain greater 
legitimacy, which was vital given that it was being governed by a dictator. 
 
Due to the war in Afghanistan, however, Pakistan came to be designated as a 
“frontline state”. Being a frontline state and allied with the US had two key 
implications for how Pakistan wished to be represented. On the one hand, 
because of the logistical and intelligence support it provided to her partner, 
Pakistan regained its importance in US geopolitical calculations, thus 
conferring the former with some form of leadership and control over events 
in Afghanistan. In other words, being a frontline state enhanced Pakistan’s 
masculinised state identity. On the other hand, it also served well the purpose 
of being represented as “strong” and “indestructible”, as part of a hyper-
masculinised state identity. As I have shown, this state identity can be seen 
as a product of foreign policy decisions, closely linked to the country’s 
persistent efforts to achieve security against perceived external threats, 
principally in the guise of India. 
 
Hence, Pakistan’s collaboration with the US was transformed into an act of 
performative war. The actors involved – particularly the ISI and the CIA – 
have simultaneously cited and repeated the same discourses of danger that 
justified their collaboration. Pakistan gained a new identity as a “frontline 
state” against a common enemy, the USSR (Shuja, 2008; Ahmed, 2013). 
Pakistan’s ISI and the army were then responsible for the production and 
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reproduction of discourses that have reinforced the nation’s need to be seen 
as constantly under threat. In turn, their role as “protectors and defenders” of 
the homeland and Islam were reinvigorated as the result of a foreign policy 
choice and practice that ultimately influenced the co-construction of the 
national identity-foreign policy nexus. 
 
In The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (1992), Brigadier Mohammad 
Yousaf, who was in charge of the ISI Afghan bureau during the Afghan War, 
explains how both intelligence agencies cooperated during the conflict. The 
book is filled with interesting details about how this relationship progressed. 
Yousaf reveals the means by which Pakistan armed the mujahedeen,106 and 
also uncovers the level of distrust between the CIA and the ISI.107 The book 
describes the extent of US involvement in Afghanistan. The former delegated 
most of its operations to the CIA, which acted as weapons seller and courier. 
The extended duration of the Afghan War demonstrates the US’s 
unwillingness to put an end to the conflict. During this decade, Afghani and 
Pakistani societies suffered an unnecessarily protracted period of war and 
dehumanisation, fuelled by the weapons trade, the rise of drug trafficking, 
                                               
106 Mohammad Yousaf mentions that the great bulk of weapons came to Pakistan from China, 
Egypt, and Israel. On the latter, he writes: “I had no idea that Israel was a source until quite 
recently, as, had it been known, there would have been considerable trouble with the Arab 
nations. It would not have been acceptable to wage a Jehad with weapons bought from Israel” 
(1992, p58).  
107 However, In The Pakistan-US Conundrum, Yunas Samad (2011) refers to the important 
Saudi influence in the Afghan Jihad, in a process that tried to bypass the ISI and the CIA, 
under the guise of humanitarian intervention, based on Pakistan soil, particularly in 
Peshawar. Certainly, the Saudis and the ISI worked together; however, the level of 
interference of the former is often relegated to a second plan. Samad, for instance, mentions 
that the “Saudi General Intelligence Agency had close relations with the ISI, which allowed 
it to bypass the political leadership, which it did after the death of Zia. It paid cash bonuses 
to designated senior ISI officers, and financial aid and discounted oil sales buoyed up the 
army’s and ISIS’s treasury” (2011, p101).  
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and the growth of religious radicalism that became entrenched in both 
societies, aided by the politics of guerrilla warfare that favoured the 
prolonging of combat. 
 
Despite issues of mistrust between both countries’ secret intelligence 
agencies, Pakistan and the US collaborated to extend the guerrilla war against 
the Soviets. It is a well-established fact that Pakistan provided more than just 
weapons distribution. Pakistan’s military dictatorship helped a US 
propaganda strategy that sought to indoctrinate Afghan children, which very 
much fitted in with its own interests too. For instance, Nivi Manchanda notes 
how during the 1980s, the US funded the “printing of millions of textbooks 
in Peshawar that were distributed to schoolchildren across Afghanistan” 
(2020, p2). These books108 included images of Kalashnikovs, bullets, and 
guns to help learn the alphabet and to learn how to count, and more advanced 
mathematical questions were based on warfare and firearms (ibid, p3).  
 
Hence, the Afghan War was not only directed at removing the Soviets from 
Afghan soil; it was also an ideological project based on supporting covert and 
proxy wars across the world (for instance, in Angola and Nicaragua) aimed 
at ending socialist-inspired politics, so that American imperialism could 
continue to grow. Yet, whilst the Pakistani leadership supported the 
weaponisation of the Afghan people, thus actively promoting violence, it 
                                               
108 The long-lasting effect of US intervention in Afghanistan is indeed harrowing. Manchanda 
notes that “The Taliban, in another grisly turn, continued using these American-produced 
textbooks, but, in keeping with their fabricated scripture that denounced all pictorial 
representation of human images, removed the heads of people depicted in the books. What 
remained were images of decapitated people” (2020, p3). 
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continued its plan to pursue a nuclear weapons programme, despite 
opposition from the US. 
 
Throughout the duration of the Afghan War, Pakistan adopted a double-
dealing strategy to continue its nuclear programme,109 whilst actively 
contributing towards the horrific war in Afghanistan, where her interests were 
closely associated with the kind of state her leadership was aiming to become. 
Possessing nuclear weapons and controlling Afghanistan became central 
national priorities. Both are relevant to understand how identity and security 
became even further interlinked, corroborating the fact that Pakistan is a 
militarised and hyper-masculine state. Despite US sanctions, Pakistan came 
to be seen as a state linked to power relations, war, conflict, and military 
might. The post-war moment in Afghanistan turned out to be important in the 
continuation of Pakistan’s militarised foreign policy and militarised state 
identity. In the next subsection, I analyse the importance of Pakistan’s 
involvement in Afghanistan after the Soviets’ withdrawal, and how this paved 
the way for her new engagement with the US after 2001. 
 
5.2.1  Assessing the cost of Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan 
 
When Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, there was no sustainable 
peace. Soviet influence on Afghan politics and society continued, and a pro-
Soviet regime remained in power in the capital Kabul, headed by Najibullah. 
                                               
109 See chapter 2 for a discussion of the importance of Pakistan’s nuclear programme as a 
representation of a masculine and militarised state identity. 
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The Pakistani leadership remained unsatisfied with this solution. Ultimately, 
this could have meant a more significant Indian presence and influence in 
closer proximity to Pakistan, namely in Afghanistan, thus reinforcing the 
centrality of the “India threat” to state security. Once again, Pakistan’s threat 
perception involving India appeared to lead her foreign policy options. 
 
After nearly a decade of supporting ideological guerrilla warfare, which 
entailed distributing the majority of CIA resources to Islamist groups 
(Haqqani, 2013), the Pakistan government was unwilling to relinquish its 
control over the Islamist groups it had nurtured during the war. Pakistan’s 
preferences orchestrated by the ISI and General Zia were directed towards a 
Pashtun-dominated government of Islamist orientation. The ISI pressure on 
the Tanzeemat (an organisation that represented the Islamist mujahedeen) to 
be part of an Afghan Interim Government (Khan, 2011) made clear the 
intentions of Pakistan’s leadership to retain political control over 
Afghanistan. Pakistan continued to interfere in Afghan politics, and instead 
of contributing to a stable solution for the devastated country, it kept acting 
in its own national interests, forging alliances of convenience with different 
factions of mujahedeen. This situation persisted after Zia’s death, with 
civilian governments in Pakistan (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) unable 
to negotiate a viable and stable solution to Afghanistan. 
 
Afghanistan fell into the hands of warlords, who controlled different regions 
of the country. The different mujahedeen groups began major infighting, thus 
bringing the country to the brink of civil war. In the South, Kandahar and 
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Helmand provinces were reportedly the most unstable, as no clear warlord 
power was being imposed, leaving the population at the mercy of rival 
commanders (Khan, 2011, p57). The dire situation into which Afghanistan 
fell prompted the rise of the Taliban, the “theology students” raised in the 
madrassas of Pakistan. These madrassas experienced a major influx not only 
of Afghan students during and after the war, but also of cash from the Gulf 
monarchies, who saw a window of opportunity to propagate a most rigid and 
orthodox interpretation of Sunni Islam. There, during the war, Afghan 
students were groomed for armed jihad. Groups of these students, now based 
in Kandahar, are believed to have started actions against the “corrupt and 
rapacious commanders and bring peace to the city. The local population 
supported the Taliban action and welcomed the new rulers, who appeared to 
bring safety and order to the city” (ibid, p58). The rise of the Taliban110 would 
be a fast process, given the disorder and chaos sown by the warlords and 
commanders, and the promise of safety that was offered by the Taliban.  
 
Pakistan’s initial position in relation to the Taliban is reported by Riaz 
Mohammad Khan as one of: 
 
considerable suspicion, especially among the religious-political elements who sided 
with Gulbadin Hekmatyar or other Mujahedin parties. Outlandish speculation 
included the conjecture by the Jamat e Islami-backed Weekly Takbeer that the 
British and the CIA conjured111 up the Taliban after their failure to prop up pro-
King Zahir Shah elements in Qandahar. (ibid, p59)  
                                               
110 For a comprehensive account of the rise of the Taliban, see Rashid (2010). 
111 This still holds much currency across Pakistan, a conspiracy theory that has been very 
useful in discarding Pakistan’s own interference in the whole process that precipitated the 
forming of the Taliban. On the other hand, renowned historian Ayesha Jalal writes in 
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However, Pakistan’s support for the new players in Afghanistan gradually 
increased and continued after Kabul fell into Taliban112 hands. The Taliban 
regime was backed by Pakistan113 and Saudi Arabia, albeit for different 
reasons. The former’s main concern was to keep Pashtuns in power so that 
Islamabad could put a term to the idea of an independent Pakhtoonistan, 
particularly on Pakistan territory (Cohen, 2005), whereas the latter was 
persuaded by the Taliban’s extreme orthodoxy, closer to Wahhabi 
interpretations of Islam, thus a form of extending its influence to South Asia, 
and curbing the rise of Shia politics and Iran’s influence in Afghanistan. 
 
Concerning the ISI’s direct influence on the creation of the Taliban, though it 
is a widely believed view, there is no consensus.114 Carey Schofield, in her 
conversation with an ISI general (DG), reports what she was told: “Pakistan 
retained its presence in Afghanistan but did not influence the course of events 
                                               
Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia, that “future members of Al Qaeda [the Taliban] were 
trained by American and British intelligence with the enthusiastic help of Pakistan’s own 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)” (2008, p275). 
112 Ahmed Rashid aptly notes that the “The Taliban’s emergence thus coincided with a 
fortunate historical juxtaposition, where the disintegration of the communist power structure 
was complete, the Mujaheddin leaders were discredited and the traditional tribal leadership 
had been eliminated. It was relatively easy for the Taliban to sweep away what little of the 
old Pashtun leadership was left. Thereafter, from within the Pashtuns, the Taliban faced no 
possible political challenges to their rule” (2010, p333). 
113 It is important to note the support for the Taliban during the time of Benazir Bhutto’s 
government. Although the reasons for why support was extended to the extremists are 
debatable, and linked by some to a forthcoming pipeline project with origins in 
Turkmenistan, thus crossing Afghan territory (see Jaffrelot, 2015, p504), the paradoxical 
nature of Bhutto’s policies is striking given the supposedly secular inclinations of the 
Pakistan’s People Party. However, the pervasive influence of the military during Bhutto’s 
government is also widely known.   
114 The ISI may not have directly created the Taliban, but it certainly brought about the 
conditions for the group’s rise. As Jaffrelot points out: “Beyond the Afghan mujahideen, the 
Pakistanis equipped Islamists who came from all over the world … The ISI relied on the JI, 
which had gained a share of power under Zia, to carry out its strategy” (2015, p502). Yunas 
Samad (2011) also mentions that the Taliban were not an ISI creation. Yet, as he notes, they 
“saw their progress as an opportunity to fill the power vacuum and extended support to them” 
(2011, p155). 
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as the country collapsed into brutal civil war … The ISI did not create the 
Taliban or plan its takeover of Afghanistan. But we certainly interacted with 
it, once it emerged” (2011, p107). Sean Gregory explains the aspects of that 
overarching interaction, concluding that “it is widely commented that the 
Taliban were empowered by the ISI but not created by them. In fact the ISI 
were very much the fathers and supportive parents of the Taliban, if not 
perhaps the mothers and midwives” (2007, p1019). Nevertheless, Pakistan’s 
ISI operations and interactions with the Taliban turned into a political practice 
with international consequences. The ISI was seen as the key institution 
capable of dealing with the ruthless regime in Kabul. As Schofield further 
adds: 
 
whenever anyone had to deal with the Taliban, even on fundamental foreign policy 
issues, the ISI was consulted and so its ownership of the relationship was 
strengthened … [T]he Afghan issues as a whole came to be seen as an ISI 
responsibility. Nothing could happen without ISI clearance, and this habit became 
so ingrained that even the ISI itself came to believe it. (2011, p108).  
 
The implications of having direct and privileged contact with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, a situation which was normalised into a foreign policy practice, 
are substantial. As the Taliban gained more power and control over Afghan 
territory, and the group’s following expanded, mostly in the form of Afghan 
Pashtuns who kept arriving from madrassas controlled by the Pakistani party 
JUI (Ahmed Rashid, 2010), Pakistan could no deny their role in abetting the 
Taliban. As soon as they could, the Taliban 
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immediately implemented the strictest interpretation of Sharia law ever seen in the 
Muslim world. They closed down girls’ schools and banned women from working 
outside the home, smashed TV sets, forbade a whole array of sports and recreational 
activities and ordered all males to grow long beards. … Taliban were to take control 
of 12 of Afghanistan’s 31 provinces, opening the roads to traffic and disarming the 
population. As the Taliban marched north to Kabul, local warlords either fled or, 
waving white flags, surrendered to them. (ibid, p123) 
 
It was to these governing practices that Pakistan became one of only three 
states who officially recognised the Taliban as an official government (the 
other two being KSA and the UAE). This turned out to be highly problematic 
for Pakistan’s representation in the international community. Yet, the 
Pakistani leadership continued to prefer to keep its influence and control in 
Afghanistan, to the detriment of adopting a more critical stance, particularly 
in view of the numerous human rights violations that continued to occur.  
 
Certainly, having a degree of control over Afghanistan was a core foreign 
policy objective almost since Pakistan’s creation. With the Taliban in power, 
the Pakistani leadership hoped for limited or no Indian presence in 
Afghanistan. With the Taliban controlling Kabul, India closed her embassy 
in 1996. Access to Central Asia and to Iran for trade purposes came to a halt. 
Hence, during the time when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, the 
Pakistani leadership benefited from a less assertive Indian presence on 
Afghan soil, which encouraged them to continue to support the ruthless 
Taliban regime. 
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Two decades later, it is possible to examine how Pakistan’s collaboration with 
the Taliban extremist regime has contributed towards the enhancement of 
political violence and religious extremism in South Asia. The Taliban’s 
takeover further aggravated the Afghan people’s torment with war and 
violence. Pakistan’s support only exacerbated this predicament. 
Reconciliation and development in post-war Afghanistan were not Pakistani 
goals. Pakistan’s leadership thus actively contributed to Afghanistan being 
one of the world’s least developed countries, a situation that continues after 
more than two decades since the Taliban gained power.115 
 
Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban fitted well into the country’s pan-
Islamist agenda (Gregory, 2007), which embroiled the country in a complex 
network of Islamic fundamentalist groups operating in South Asia, thus 
extending Pakistan’s sphere of influence. Whilst the Taliban’s radical and 
extremist ideas about Islam and its role in society contrast with most of the 
Muslim world, they found an affinity among important sectors of Pakistani 
society. Ijaz Khan speaks of this situation, noting that “support to the Taliban 
from non-religious circles was wide, especially in Punjab and Karachi, and 
has been extensively published” (2007, p155). He mentions that the Taliban 
received support from members of major political parties, and of course from 
religious parties like JI or JUI. In the same article, he further observes that 
whilst the FO “had expressed reservations about continued support to the 
Taliban” (ibid, p155), the ISI deflected the civilian institution, and support to 
                                               
115 Currently, Afghanistan ranks 170 on the UN Human Development Index, 2019. Available 
from: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG. 
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the terrorist continued until the events of 9/11. This stands as a clear example 
of how militarism operates, and in particular how it affects relations with 
civilian institutions. 
 
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in the context of her relations with the US 
is important to analyse because it stands as a direct consequence of the foreign 
policy engagements these two allies developed. As the US disengaged from 
Afghanistan soon after the Soviets’ withdrawal, Pakistan could continue her 
practices of control and domination by supporting those groups which 
represented a continuation of the Islamic-military ethos.  
 
The Afghan War and its aftermath, which was instigated by the Pakistan-US 
partnership to become a religious-oriented conflict, served well to express 
how the Pakistani leadership enmeshed the ideals of heterosexual masculinity 
and militarism, with the imagined concepts of religion and nation. The allied 
status bestowed by the US drove the Pakistani leadership to reinforce and 
perform the desired state identity that could represent the country as 
invincible and impenetrable, such that it could control its western neighbour 
whilst keeping India’s influence at bay. The Taliban’s aggression – a typical 
masculine trait, associated with religious piety – has also attracted support 
from hyper-masculine, religious-political circles in Pakistan. This fits well 
into Pakistan’s permanent need to reiterate the basis for her primordial 
nationalism – Muslim nationalism, as well as the need to restate her alterity 
in relation to India. Hence, the association with the Taliban constituted yet 
another opportunity to reaffirm a state identity associated with aggressive, 
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impenetrable masculinity, thus marking Pakistan’s distinction from a Hindu 
India, which was represented as less virile, non-combative, emasculated, and 
now absent from a territory that Pakistan had longed to have influence over. 
 
Furthermore, the interlinking of Taliban identity as being predominantly 
Pashtun (Manchanda, 2020) and belonging to the Sunni sect of Islam is also 
significant, in view of Pakistan’s ambition to establish control in Afghanistan, 
including access to her neighbouring Central Asia, and Iran. As Amin Saikal 
observes “the ISI raised the Taliban as a radical Sunni Pashtun force intended, 
at the very least, to link the Afghan territory organically from the Pakistan 
border to the Hindu Kush, into Pakistan for wider national and regional 
purposes, including securing unfettered access to Central Asia and 
strengthening its position vis-à-vis India” (2010, p9). Adeel Khan also notes 
that, 
 
the Pakistani establishment’s support for the Taliban was not for the ethnic Pukhtuns 
of Afghanistan116, but for the Sunni Muslims of that country, which the Pukhtuns 
happen to be. The reason was that Pakistan did not want to see the Shia-dominated 
government in Kabul, … more friendly towards the Shia Iranian government. (2005, 
p104). 
 
He further notes that the US favoured installing the Taliban in power, given 
the mujahedeen’s proximity to Iran. Thus, it is possible to conclude that 
Pakistan’s foreign policy options in Afghanistan in the pre- and post-Soviet 
                                               
116 To be sure, it should not be dismissed that whilst supporting and encouraging the Islamist 
brand of the Taliban, the Pakistani leadership also sought to curtail the expansion of Pashtun 
ethno-nationalism, as the latter continued to be perceived as a threat to Pakistan’s integrity 
(see Haqqani, 2013). 
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moments are closely associated with how the leadership envisaged the 
continuation of state identity, i.e. represented by a masculine, militarised 
association between Islam and nationalism, which is also reflected in her 
alterity in relation to India. This otherness relation implies placing what is 
perceived as security as a decisive factor in foreign policy. Afghanistan has 
thus provided the Pakistani leadership a space for controlling insecurity 
sources, whilst enabling the construction of a state identity, at the expense of 
the Afghan people’s rights. 
 
From 1979 to 2001, Pakistan’s relations with the US enabled the former to 
continue to consolidate this hyper-masculine and militarised state identity. 
Whilst the relationship was not one of forthright trust, and was overshadowed 
by US non-proliferation laws and Pakistan’s defiance in building a nuclear 
weapons arsenal, the militarisation of Pakistan was bolstered. The terrorist 
attack of 11th September 2001 in the US, carried out by Al-Qaeda, with full 
support of the Afghan Taliban,117 would then provoke a significant change in 
Pakistan’s foreign relations with Afghanistan, and in turn with the US.  
 
The US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 brought an end to the 
Taliban government in Kabul. Pakistan’s role during that period reflects the 
patterns of past decades of dealing with the US. Yet another military 
dictatorship governing Pakistan during a US intervention in Afghanistan, this 
                                               
117 Ahmed Rashid notes that “The brutal deterioration of the social and economic conditions 
in Afghanistan under the sway of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the 18 months before 11 
September should have signalled to the world that enormous dangers were lurking there as 
Afghanistan became a terrorist sanctuary for Osama Bin Laden and some 2,500 of his 
fighters” (2010, p701). 
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time headed by General Pervaiz Musharraf, extended full support to the 
US,118 which resulted in an end to the international isolation it was facing due 
to its support for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Once again, Pakistan played a 
dual role with the US. According to Ahmed Rashid (2010), the ISI did not 
cease its support for the Taliban, despite facilitating the US’s hunt for Al-
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. As the US intervention continued, the Pakistani 
leadership started to fear that the US could repeat the disengagement strategy. 
As a result, Musharraf opted “to hold the Taliban in reserve as a proxy force 
for Pakistan” (Rashid, 2010, p723). 
 
Despite these developments, Pakistan-US relations would once again be 
reformulated along the lines of a “marriage of convenience” (ibid, p165). In 
order to benefit from Pakistan’s geography, the US pushed sanctions related 
to nuclearisation and the Kashmiri insurgency to the bottom of the agenda. 
However, the US revival in Pakistan was not welcomed by the ulema whose 
support for the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda remained unchanged. Abdul 
Sattar suggests that the ulema defended the position that the “right was on the 
side of the Taliban and religious duty therefore required Pakistan to support 
them, regardless of cost and consequences” (2017, p271). The costs and 
consequences would be felt by Pakistanis of all backgrounds. Religious 
parties helped to fuel a mix of religious extremism, sectarianism, and anti-
                                               
118 As Ahmed Rashid writes: “Pakistan had granted the U.S.-led Coalition forces enormous 
facilities. Unknown to Pakistanis at the time, 1,100 U.S. forces were based in Pakistan for 
the duration of the war, including Combat Search and Rescue Units, U.S. Special Ops and 
CIA paramilitary teams, Red Horse squadrons (engineering teams that repaired airfields in 
the midst of war), and aircraft from the 101st Airborne Division. Pakistan agreed to a list of 
seventy-four basing and staging activities, such as overflight facilities, medical evacuation, 
refueling, and the setting up of communication relay sites for U.S. forces inside Afghanistan” 
(2008, p303). 
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American rhetoric, as well as anti-Musharraf/anti-Pakistan rhetoric that 
became hard to control. Once again, a result of Pakistan-US relations was 
more suffering on the part of the common citizen, who became powerless. 
Post-9/11 Pakistan-US relations, by virtue of the GWOT, were again 
converted into alliance-style terms. Pakistan regained the status of a military 
client. The numbers can be checked at K. Alan Kronstadt’s 2007 CRS Report 
for Congress. Since 2001, the US has provided 
 
nearly $1.5 billion in direct U.S. security-related assistance (Foreign military 
Financing totalling $970 million plus about $516 million for other programs). 
Congress also appropriated billions of dollars to reimburse Pakistan for its support 
of the U.S.-led counterterrorism operations … The Bush Administration requested 
another $1 billion in emergency supplemental coalition support funds for FY2007 
… The Administration also has requested another $1.7 billion in coalition support 
for FY2008. In justifying these requests, the Administration claims that coalition 
support payments to Pakistan have led to “a more stable [Pakistan-Afghanistan] 
border area”. (2007, p4) 
 
These numbers represent a considerable investment in Pakistan’s military 
capability, which had experienced a significant reduction in foreign military 
financing in previous years.119 This sudden increase in US aid to Pakistan, 
however, has been widely criticised. There have been accusations of a lack of 
transparency and accountability on the part of the donor, as well as in relation 
to how Pakistan has used the received funds. Furthermore, there is an 
                                               
119 For a comprehensive analysis of US Aid to Pakistan, see Azeem Ibrahim’s discussion 
paper for the  
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs:  
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.
pdf. 
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increasing concern that US taxpayers’ money is funding the Pakistani state, 
particularly the latter’s military. As Ibrahim argues,  
 
Pakistan’s military and security services have for many years been a black hole for 
U.S. funds. They have enriched individuals at the expense of the proper functioning 
of Pakistani institutions and the country’s ability to fight its extremist enemies and 
provided already kleptocratic institutions with further incentives for corruption. 
Many of the incentives for Pakistani army corruption are longstanding, institutional, 
and remain in place today. (2009, p6) 
 
US transfers of money and military aid during the George W. Bush/Pervez 
Musharraf years again bring to the fore past discourses that look upon 
Pakistan-US relations through the lenses of “transactional clientelism”. 
However, with the end of Bush’s administration, the US perceived that the 
objectives of the Afghan War had not been achieved, and that Pakistan, 
despite the aid it had received, was not fully cooperating with the war on 
terror in Afghanistan. The Obama administration therefore devised a different 
strategy in order to solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan – the so-
called AfPak. The next section examines the main features of AfPak and how 
it affected the role of militarism in Pakistan. 
 
5.3  The AfPak strategy and its impact on militarism 
 
In this section I analyse the impact of what became the US policy towards 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, during the Obama administration. The AfPak 
policy was formulated after George W. Bush’s Afghanistan policy had been 
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assessed as a failure,120 if not an example of outright negligence (Aslam, 
2012), as it was either unwilling or unable to end the insurgency in 
Afghanistan, including the presence of al-Qaeda. The scholarship related to 
this policy is primarily concerned with counter-terrorism, military strategy, 
and the successes and failures of Obama’s policy (Ahmad, 2010; Markey, 
2009; Shaikh, 2010; Aslam, 2012). 
 
AfPak was in essence formulated as a merging strategy destined to end 
insurgency and militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively, treating 
both states as “one geopolitical unit, thus expanding the theatre of war” 
(Ayesha Khan, 2010, p3). This strategy also generated some concerns and 
critiques. The same author suggests that AfPak “oversimplifies the nature of 
insurgency on both sides of the Durand Line, and fails to appreciate the 
differences in security trajectories and capabilities of the two states” (ibid, 
p3). Ishtiaq Ahmad, however, notes that this strategy “has greater scope for 
adapting to new political and security realities of the two countries, besides 
reinforcing and reshaping their respective counterinsurgency campaigns 
through a variety of cooperative mechanisms” (2010, pp193-194). He also 
tries to provide a rationale for bracketing Pakistan with Afghanistan, based 
on US perceptions of terrorism and counter-terrorism being unidimensional 
challenges based at the borderlands of both countries. However, Ayesha Khan 
(2010) emphasises the more complex aspects of the policy, related to the use 
of US drones to target militants in the FATA region of Pakistan, and to the 
                                               
120 There is evidence that Obama started working on what would become AfPak during the 
transition period, and not just after being inaugurated as President. See Woodward (2010); 
see also Khurram Hussain (2015): 
https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=24_10_2015_001_004. 
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strength of Pakistan’s military operations in the region, fuelled by US 
pressure to end terrorism. These operations had a devastating impact on local 
populations, including the creation of one of the “largest internally displaced 




5.3.1  Drone warfare in Pakistan-US relations 
 
One of the most controversial issues associated with AfPak, which has a 
direct impact on how Pakistan and US have built their relations, was the 
continuation of drone warfare on the borderlands of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. This was indeed responsible for non-militant and civilian 
casualties (Bastos, 2014; Harris, 2012), and has created a vociferous debate 
on the use of drones.121 For instance, C.C. Fair (2010; 2015) supports drone 
warfare based on its efficacy in eliminating terrorists, which is translated into 
a reduction in terrorist attacks and their lethality. Micah Zenko provides a 
number of policy recommendations in order to increase transparency and to 
“bring drone strike practices in line with stated policies” (2013, p26). The 
pro-drone arguments thus follow a state-centric approach to politics, and do 
not encompass issues related with gender and militarism. The latter are 
therefore absent from mainstream narratives on Pakistan-US relations. In the 
                                               
121 Critics of drone warfare stress that it “vests extraordinary power in the executive office, 
overrides the judicial process, demobilizes the U.S. public, and militarizes the CIA, while 
placing terrorist suspects, including U.S. citizens, on a kill list. As suspects are killed rather 
than captured for trial, the executive branch, in effect, adopts a ‘take no prisoners alive’ 
approach” (de Volo, 2016, p53). 
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previous section, I demonstrated how this relationship is represented through 
hegemonic masculinity associated with war, potency, control, and 
combativity, which is defined against the feminine. Relations with the US 
thus have enhanced these characteristics of Pakistan’s foreign policy, 
particularly in terms of foreign relations with her main neighbours India and 
Afghanistan.  
 
However, drone warfare, which itself is considered deeply gendered (de Volo, 
2016; Clark, 2018), also challenges “the war-masculinity nexus”, as it is “less 
effective in conferring venerated forms of masculinity at the individual and 
state levels” (de Volo, 2016, p57). Thus, what was conceived as a counter-
terrorism policy in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan during 
George W. Bush’s administration, and subsequently enhanced by the AfPak 
strategy, can also be seen as a disruption to the masculine, heteronormalised 
relations between Pakistan and the US. Here I am using an intersectional 
perspective linked to critical feminist approaches in order to explain how 
drone warfare is also a sexualised and gendered venture, and to explain how 
it became important to understand the relationship between security and 
identity in the context of Pakistan’s relations with the US. 
 
For instance, Cara Daggett suggests that hunter-killer drones render ideas of 
hegemonic masculinity – which are associated with the heterosexual, straight 
warrior, and which “provide moral and practical bearing for killing in war” 
– as “strange” (2015, p362). Daggett then argues that “drones are genderqueer 
bodies … human-machine assemblages that do not track onto male-female, 
 260  
human-machine binaries” (ibid, p362), thus bringing to the fore the 
queerness122 of drone warfare. Daggett thus makes the case for framing drone 
warfare as appearing “both hypermasculine in its technological achievements 
and emasculating in its removal of the US soldier’s body from mortal danger; 
it is both penetrating in its flaunting of sovereign state borders and at the same 
time evidence of the impotence of the United States in ultimately securing 
itself against terrorism” (ibid, p347). 
 
By focusing on this particular gendered aspect of drone warfare, it is possible 
to represent the US as being technologically advanced, a characteristic 
associated with masculinity. On the one hand, this penetrative technology, 
which, in the case of its relations with Pakistan, represents US supremacy and 
hypermasculinity against a perceived weaker Pakistan that is friend and/or 
enemy. On the other hand, it removes from the US attributes of the patriotic 
body of the soldier, which is associated with combative masculinity and 
mostly heterosexual. Hence US drone warfare in the context of Pakistan 
relations constitutes something of a challenge to hypermasculine ideas of 
combat and masculinity, whilst revealing how these can simultaneously be 
disrupted, so long as the drone performativity continues. 
 
                                               
122 I understand the term queer/queerness along the lines proposed by Cynthia Weber (2014; 
2016). Weber explains that their notion of “queer logic of and/or comes from Roland Barthes’ 
description of the and/or as an ‘and’ that is also at the very same time an ‘or.’ In terms of 
gender, for example, this means one can be a boy or a girl while at the same time being a boy 
and a girl. According to Barthes, the and/or is ‘that which confuses meaning, the norm, 
normativity’ (Barthes 1976:109). To my mind, this is what makes it queer (Weber 1999), for 
it describes that which, in Sedgwick’s terms, cannot or will not signify monolithically” (2014, 
p598). 
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Whilst Pakistan’s territory becomes penetrated by a highly technological 
killing machine, which, arguably, would result in a reduction in the threat of 
terrorism within her sovereign territory. Thus, territorial sovereignty would 
be challenged and transgressed, and yet at the same time the territory would 
be liberated from militant terrorists.123 US drone attacks therefore pose a 
challenge to the Pakistani state’s heterosexual, masculine identity as a hard, 
impenetrable country, whilst the killing act of the drone could contain the 
potential to bring an end to the terrorist threat. In this way, it is a queer logic 
of and/or that mediates this relationship, particularly during the GWOT and 
the Obama administration’s time in office. Hence, this phase of the history of 
Pakistan-US relations, involving drone warfare, may be framed as one that 
disrupts hegemonic forms of masculinity associated with their own 
constructions of the interlinking between identity and security.  
 
A decade after the controversial US killing drone campaign, which generated 
a wave of protests and a revival of anti-Americanism,124 the Pakistani military 
has indigenously developed a laser-guided UAV/drone (The Express 
Tribune, 2015). The drone, a genderqueer body, following Daggett (2015), 
ironically, has been named “Burraq”, the magical horse that in Islamic 
tradition is believed to have transported Prophet Muhammad on a voyage 
from Mecca to Jerusalem, and then onwards to the “seventh heaven”. It is 
                                               
123 I take this as a possible representation. I personally consider the use of drone warfare to 
be ethically and morally challenging. 
124 See for instance the New York Times report of 2013 by Salman Masood Ihsanullah Tipu 
Mehsud, on Peshawar protests organised by PTI, the party of the current Prime Minister of 
Pakistan, Imran Khan, who is supported by the military establishment. Available here: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/in-pakistan-rally-protests-drone-
strikes.html. The same party also protested in 2012 against the use of drones. 
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significant that an ultra-conservative state (and society) that criminalises 
homosexuality and discriminates against LGBTQ+ people125 adopts a 
weapon that has the potential to queer the relationship between security and 
identity. Thus, whilst Pakistani state identity remains heavily masculinised 
along heteronormative lines, it is also possible to envisage it as one that is and 
may be queered.  
 
 
5.3.2  AfPak and the enhancement of militarism 
 
The drone warfare carried out by the US in the borderlands of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan remains a controversial issue within the AfPak strategy. 
However, this would not be the sole controversy in Pakistan’s relations with 
the US during this time. To be sure, the Pakistani state leadership was 
unhappy being yoked to Afghanistan. For instance, Christophe Jaffrelot 
(2016) highlights one of the guiding principles of the AfPak policy, which 
was “not only to use Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan but to highlight the fact 
that the Islamist problem lay in Pakistan – something the Bush administration 
had not been unaware of but did not pay much attention to either” (2016, 
Kindle Locations 4005-4009). The “Islamist problem” – which Barack 
Obama compared to a cancer (ibid) that he wanted to contain126 to prevent its 
                                               
125 For an up-to-date and comprehensive report on the state of LGBTQ+ in Pakistan, with 
reference to Sexual Orientation and gender identity or expression, see the 2019 UK 
Government report, available from: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/814050/Pakistan-SOGIE-CPIN-v3.0_July_2019_.pdf. 
126 Writing for the Washington Post, Bob Woodrow quotes the US President: “Safe havens 
would no longer be tolerated, Obama had decided. ‘We need to make clear to people that the 
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spreading to Afghanistan – was certainly an issue with which Pakistan society 
was grappling. Yet, the Pakistani leadership disliked how this issue had been 
framed by the US President. Not least, the idea that the “cancer” was not in 
Afghanistan but in Pakistan is, arguably, a gross overlooking of the whole 
issue, and merely represents Pakistan in a pathological way. To be sure, 
Pakistan’s extremism problem, fuelled by a violent brand of Islamism, was, 
and indeed continues to be, an issue that furnishes the ideological material 
used to convert people to terrorism. However, portraying Pakistan in such a 
demeaning way demonstrates how successive US administrations have 
tended to adopt an attitude of selective amnesia. Of particular concern is the 
US’s support for ideological radicalisation, including the printing of 
schoolbooks. Furthermore, the idea that “the cancer won’t spread there” is 
rather problematic even for the US’s own credibility. Since 1989, the US has 
been unwilling and unable to engage in an adequate solution for Afghanistan. 
The 2001 invasion is, at the time of writing, yet to be met with a stabilisation 
plan. Pakistan, however, is slowly and with some notable successes trying to 
eradicate extremism and terrorism. 
 
The design of the AfPak policy impacted Pakistan’s internal politics. For 
instance, the policy had recommendations including: “Increasing and 
broadening assistance in Pakistan”127 and “Strengthening Pakistani 
                                               
cancer is in Pakistan,’ he declared during an Oval Office meeting on Nov. 25, 2009, near the 
end of the strategy review. The reason to create a secure, self-governing Afghanistan, he said, 
was ‘so the cancer doesn’t spread there’” (Washington Post, 29th September 2010). 
127 The white paper defines it as: “to include direct budget support, development assistance, 
infrastructure investment, and technical advice on making sound economic policy 
adjustments – and strengthening trade relations will maximize support for our policy aims; it 
should also help to provide longer-term economic stability. Our assistance should focus on 
long-term capacity building, on agricultural sector job creation, education and training, and 
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government capacity”128, which were then integrated into the “Kerry-Lugar” 
Bill.129 The bill, despite being a bipartisan piece of legislation, generated 
controversy in both the US and Pakistan. In the former, detractors were 
mostly concerned with Pakistan’s generalised corruption, and the lack of 
accountability for the billions of dollars sent without visible results, whereas 
in the latter, it was the army who expressed the strongest opposition to the 
bill. The army’s opposition to this piece of US legislation aimed at targeting 
Pakistan’s development was formulated on the basis that it did not include 
direct military aid, thus contrasting with previous dispensations of direct aid 
to Pakistan. As the bill sought to strengthen civilian governance in Pakistan, 
the military reaction appears coherent with their dominance of internal 
politics in Pakistan. However, by 2009, the army already understood that the 
future of Pakistan rested on the construction of democracy. As per the ISPR 
press release of 9th October 2009, reporting on the Corps Commanders 
meeting:  
 
Kerry Lugar bill also came under discussion during the conference. The forum 
expressed serious concern regarding clauses impacting on National Security. A 
                                               
on infrastructure requirements. Assistance should also support Pakistani efforts to ‘hold and 
build’ in western Pakistan as a part of its counterinsurgency efforts”. 
128 Defined in the white paper as: “Strengthening the civilian, democratic government must 
be a centerpiece of our overall effort. Key efforts should include fostering the reform of 
provincial and local governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the 
NorthWest Frontier Province. We need to help Islamabad enhance the services and support 
in areas cleared of insurgents so that they have a real chance in preventing insurgents from 
returning to those areas. With international partners, we should also promote the development 
of regional organizations that focus on economic and security cooperation, as well as 
fostering productive political dialogue”. 
129 See, for instance, the analysis of Pakistan’s Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 
provided by Najam Rafique, entitled “Analysing the Kerry-Lugar Bill” for an overview of 
the bill and its implications. Rafique suggests that: “Micro-management of programs, 
projects and assistance to Pakistan seems to be the aim of this bill and would be particularly 
focused on benchmarks relating to democracy, non-proliferation, civilian supremacy, 
Pakistan’s role in the war on terror, and, relations with India and Afghanistan” (2009, p264). 
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formal input is being provided to the Government. However, in the considered 
views of the forum, it is the Parliament, that represents the will of the people of 
Pakistan, which would deliberate on the issue, enabling the Government to develop 
a National response. (ISPR, PR396/2009) 
 
The military opposition130 to the bill was made through its decades-old 
civilian ally: the Jamaat-i-Islami. The JI organised a referendum and printed 
45 million ballot papers in order to show how the Pakistani people were 
against the bill. According to the newspaper Dawn, the ballot papers 
contained the following information: 
 
“It [the Kerry-Lugar Bill] is a charge-sheet against country’s sensitive agencies”; 
“It is an American attempt to capture Pakistan’s nuclear assets”; [and] “Is aimed at 
spreading terror through American security agency Blackwater to continue the 
massacre of innocent people by American drone attacks and the extension of the 
American embassy (converting it) into a cantonment.” “Voters” were asked to put 
a tick-mark on “I reject Kerry-Lugar bill” or “I don’t reject Kerry-Lugar bill”. 
(Dawn, 29th October 2009)  
 
Between the myths and facts about the Kerry-Lugar Bill,131 the reality is that 
once again a US policy towards Pakistan exposed how the military relies on 
religious ideology, resulting in an interlinking of identity and security that is 
simultaneously militarised and oriented towards religion. The reason behind 
the inclusion of nuclear weapons within this narrative is related to JI’s attempt 
                                               
130 David Ignatius (2009), from the Washington Post, clearly states that. He further points out 
the causes of Anti-Americanism which have been generated, and allegedly not accounted for 
by the Obama administration. See: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/10/09/AR2009100902851.html. 
131 US Senator John Kerry’s explanation given to Pakistan’s Dawn: 
https://www.dawn.com/news/916031. 
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to associate the close US-India relations as representing an imminent danger 
to Pakistan, which also forms part of Pakistan’s othering process. Yet, the 
Kerry-Lugar Bill does not make any reference to nuclear weapons. 
 
The Kerry-Lugar Bill also reveals how the military enjoys hegemonic control 
over the state and civil society. For instance, back in 2009, Ambassador 
Maleeha Lodhi said to the New York Times that “[t]he offending part of the 
legislation sets up the country as hired help and puts the military in the dock, 
presumed guilty on many counts and having to prove its innocence to 
Washington” (interview with Jane Perlez, New York Times, October 2009). 
Whilst Lodhi’s statement reiterates her close association with the military 
establishment, it also reveals how unacceptable it is for the military forces to 
be criticised132 or made accountable. To have “the military in the dock” is an 
almost unthinkable event.133 As such, it is hardly surprising that the Kerry-
Lugar Bill came to be so controversial in Pakistan. The bill was deemed 
offensive, particularly to the military.  
 
It is also important to note that the US’s AfPak strategy and the Kerry-Lugar 
Bill were introduced at a critical moment when Pakistan was experiencing an 
official transition from a military dictatorship to civilian government. This 
transition took place within a highly volatile political environment, amidst 
constant episodes of violent extremism and terrorism taking place almost on 
                                               
132 More recently, Pakistan’s ruling party, PTI, has introduced legislation seeking to jail 
anyone who “ridicules or brings into disrepute or defames” the military (Reuters, 2020). 
133 I have personally experienced this during conversations with ex-military personnel in 
Pakistan. For instance, a retired General-ranking person told me that while he disliked 
General Musharraf, he would not like to see the latter face trial or be arrested. 
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a daily basis. The military was becoming increasingly engaged in counter-
terrorism operations against terrorist outfits, which would continue for nearly 
a decade, whilst the US continued to pressurise Pakistan to “do more”. The 
military was thus represented as being fully involved in the recondite double 
game of terror and counter-terrorism operations, explained in part as a 
response to perceived American hubris towards Pakistan, and in part by the 
latter’s ever-present insecurity towards India.  
 
Yet, despite criticisms of playing a double role on fighting terrorism, the 
military has achieved an important degree of success in eliminating terrorism 
in Pakistan. During my fieldwork in Pakistan, I experienced how the GWOT 
has impacted common people’s daily lives and how they perceive themselves 
in relation to the world. Pakistanis see themselves as the greatest victims of 
the war on terror, which indeed has claimed thousands of lives in Pakistan 
alone; yet, they have been confronted with the fact that Osama bin Laden was 
captured in Pakistan territory. The military has been able to rekindle the 
narrative of its war against terrorism as a great episode of national bravery 
and pride, in what was necessary to have a peaceful, stable, and normalised 
Pakistan. The relatively new Army Museum in Lahore already displays a 
separate section highlighting not only the main military operations against 
terrorists, but also how the latter’s actions have had a major effect on 
Pakistani society. Whilst the elimination of the terrorist outfits that were 
operating on Pakistani soil was indeed necessary, and whilst the military has 
played a key role in this regard, the institution has also gained yet another 
opportunity to further extend militarism. War-preparedness became further 
 268  
enmeshed in national security practices, and the assumption that the 
institution is the country’s sole source of authority became reinvigorated. 
 
Hence, given that Pakistan’s war on terror was inseparable from the US-led 
GWOT, their relationship once more paved the way for the consolidation and 
enhancement of the military institution. The combination of the AfPak 
strategy with the Kerry-Lugar Bill, however, did not diminish militarisation, 
nor did it slow down the entrenchment of militaristic values in Pakistani 
society. Whilst US payments in military aid have waned in recent years (Alex 
Ward, 2018), this has neither prevented the Pakistani armed forces from 
increasing their military power, thanks to her close relations with China, nor 
has it decreased the circulation of militarised ideas and values. Media and 
technology have been particularly relevant in the latter’s enhancement. 
 
5.4  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I examined Pakistan’s relations with the US by focusing on 
Afghanistan as one of the main themes within this relationship. The invasion 
of Afghanistan by the USSR in December 1979 marked another 
rapprochement between the two, and Pakistan’s status as “allied” and a 
“frontline state” became representative of how her security and identity were 
constructed in the context of her relations with US. Militarism, and to a 
certain extent religious ideology (based on Pakistan’s role in supporting 
madrassas, and later the Taliban) also returned as salient features mediating 
this foreign relation. This chapter also explored the aftermath of the Soviets’ 
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withdrawal and its impact on the construction of Pakistan’s interlinking of 
security and identity, in light of how the ISI continued to consolidate its role 
as a foreign policy actor. That role was extended beyond the events of 9/11, 
and the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. With it, Pakistan’s 
previous militarised representations were reinstated, and so did her role 
within the GWOT, being simultaneously a fighter and/or a victim. The fact 
that the US devised a specific strategy to deal with Pakistan and Afghanistan 
during the GWOT, despite having antagonised the military, however, did not 
serve to decelerate or derail the processes of militarisation in Pakistan. That 
said, the role of the US in the expansion and inculcation of militarism and 
militarisation in the country may be ebbing, in light of the US’s internal 
politics and also in the reduction in direct military assistance the US gives to 























6.1  Introduction  
 
In the three previous chapters, I have engaged with Pakistan’s main three 
foreign relations. I have examined aspects of those relations which are 
conventionally absent from Pakistan’s foreign policy narratives. These 
aspects include critical, rather than realist and conventional approaches to 
issues raised by the ongoing implementation of CPEC, representations of the 
Kashmir question by the country’s main foreign policy actor, the army, and 
how the influence of the US on Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan went 
beyond parochial strategic concerns. Through these discussions I have sought 
to build a critical approach to Pakistan’s foreign policy which is less state-
centred and more inclusive of intersubjective issues. 
 
This critical approach to the foreign policy of Pakistan includes concepts 
borrowed from feminist and postcolonial IR theories. A feminist approach is 
particularly important to identify how militarism is enhanced by gendered 
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power relations of control and domination. Yet, the narration of seven 
decades of Pakistan’s foreign policy, which follows a conventional approach 
to international relations, has often underplayed to this fact. Moreover, the 
study of foreign policy in general, and of Pakistan’s in particular, fails to 
account for how the power relations that shape foreign relations are also 
mediated by race, class, and gender. Nor is sufficient attention paid to the 
relationships between the former empires and the effects of (neo-) 
imperialism. Yet, as Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair note, it is crucial to 
acknowledge that imperialism works as a “critical historical juncture in which 
postcolonial identities are constructed in opposition to European ones, and 
come to be understood as Europe’s ‘others’” (2004, 2). This is of major 
importance in trying to understand how in postcolonial states, which 
originated from colonial political practices, the production and representation 
of identities happen. 
 
In the introductory chapter of this study, I discussed the importance of 
including post-colonial and feminist approaches to the study of IR and foreign 
policy. In this chapter, I will take a more in-depth examination of these 
approaches and apply them to the context of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Thus, 
I aim to build the case for a critique of the foreign policy of Pakistan that is 
situated at the intersection of post-colonial and feminist approaches to 
International Relations. In this process, I will examine how feminist 
approaches to security and foreign policy allow one to identify how 
militarism and its representations serve to shape Pakistan’s state identity. 
Already in the thesis, I have interrogated how security and identity influence 
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foreign policy, and how militarism as an ideology has become associated with 
security, identity, and masculinity. Here I will use the three previously 
discussed case studies of Pakistan’s foreign relations (namely with China, 
India, and the US) in order to build this critical and interpretative approach to 
assessing Pakistan’s foreign policy. 
 
The consolidation of a postcolonial feminist critique emerges from the fact 
that both post-colonial and feminist scholars have acknowledged that their 
respective research areas have been too slow to engage with one another. In 
addition, the hegemony and Eurocentrism of white/Western feminism has 
also contributed towards existing disjunctions. The former did not appreciate 
how women’s struggles were differently impacted by religion, nationality, 
class, race, and sexual orientation. This oversight prompted other feminists to 
build a powerful critique (Mohanti, 1988; McEwan, 2001; Phipps, 2020). 
Moreover, white/Western feminism has been inclined to reproduce the same 
colonial practices linked to gender and race enacted by white women in the 
colonies (Phipps, 2016; Hamad, 2019). Yet, despite these disjunctions 
between different kinds of feminist positions, feminist scholars have been 
able to create new spaces for analysis. One such space has been opened by 
legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1991) concept of intersectionality. This 
inclusive concept posits that social categories like gender, sexuality, race, 
ethnicity, and class should not be analysed in isolation from each other. The 
concept also posits that one category cannot be privileged over another. Thus, 
intersectionality is central to a postcolonial and feminist analytical approach 
to world politics, including foreign policy (see Achilleos-Sarll, 2018). 
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Postcolonial feminist analysis therefore stands at the intersection of several 
features that profoundly shape politics. Anna Agathangelou and Heather 
Turcotte offer a compelling outline of what post-colonial feminist is about:  
 
A feminist grounding of postcolonial theory reads through the fingerprints of 
colonial history and subverts its boundaries by attending to the multiple and 
intersecting axis of power. Postcolonial feminisms work to expose narratives of 
“civilization”, “domestication” and “growth” as forms of oppression; they reveal 
how colonial frameworks seek to exterminate and assimilate anybody who does not 
fit into the dominant discourse of the interstate system. (2016, p41). 
 
One of the key features of a postcolonial feminist approach is the importance 
given to amnesia, particularly to the “colonial practice of amnesia that 
obscures IR’s role in reproducing colonial genealogies” (ibid, p42). As I 
argue in this chapter, this has been a permanent feature of Pakistan’s narration 
and practices of foreign policy. Yet, it is important to contextualise the 
genesis of the postcolonial state of Pakistan, as a new member of the interstate 
system, in order to depart from conventional analysis of her foreign policy. 
Thus, in the introductory section, I provide the necessary contextual 
background before going on, in the remaining sections of the chapter, to 
examine Pakistan’s relations with China, India, and the US from a post-
colonial feminist approach. 
 
Situating colonial practices in postcolonial Pakistan 
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The construction of Pakistan as a postcolonial nation-state stands at the 
intersection of a range of crises that have taken place in South Asia since her 
independence in 1947. Despite other crises and conflicts that occurred in 
other South Asian states, such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, or the Maldives, those 
involving India and Pakistan have gained more prominence in the scholarship 
on South Asia and international studies. The partition of India, the 1971 
Bangladesh Liberation War, and the nuclearisation of the region are widely 
considered to be the main crises in South Asia, as they involve India as the 
main hegemonic power in the region. However, one of the critical issues faced 
by South Asian nation-states relates to identity and territory. Sankaran 
Krishna observes that South Asian nation-states and various ethno-nationalist 
movements in the region maintain that “territory and identity must somehow 
be made to coincide” (1999, p221). Post-colonial South Asian states, which 
have continued to undergo the experience of nation-building since 
independence, adopted the same model followed by former colonisers, 
namely that of aligning territory with identity, despite the violence it has 
caused elsewhere (ibid, p223).  
 
The case of Pakistan is particularly interesting in this respect. At the time of 
its creation, neither territory nor identity coincided with the imagined nation-
state, vaguely defined as a “homeland for the Muslims of India”. Despite 
following the blueprint provided by the former colonial power, neither in her 
Western wing nor in the geographically anomalous Eastern wing did identity 
and territory coincide. In fact, the attempt to combine identity with territory 
resulted in a rather unstable polity. As such, past colonial political practices 
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of administration continued to be utilised as a form of governance, and to 
forcefully make an imagined identity and territory coincide. Thus, identity 
markers such as ethnicity, class, gender, and sexuality were brought under the 
control of the state.  
 
Pakistan’s early leadership, including the country’s founder Mohammed Ali 
Jinnah, thought that by following a European representation of state symbols, 
including one language, one flag, a national anthem and one constitution that 
could provide the legitimacy of the military and of other governmental 
bodies, this would be sufficient to implement a nationhood in the newly 
imagined nation-state. The historical evidence, however, tells a different 
story. The lack of identification with the reasoning for Pakistan’s existence 
was a reality in the NWFP and Balochistan, pre- and post-partition (Jaffrelot, 
2002; Khan, 2005; Pattanaik, 1998; Sheikh, 2018). And the 1971 
disintegration of the Pakistani state further supports the view that neither the 
two-nation theory nor the enforced alignment of identity and territory could 
work as natural glue. 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, the political projects of aligning identity and 
territory are often met with resistance. Pakistan, as one such project of nation-
state building, has since its inception continuously been challenged by its 
status as a multi-national country. To obtain an imagined homogenisation of 
identity, which would be solely oriented by religion, state elites have 
attempted to erase ethnicity as an identity marker. Ethno-nationalisms in 
Pakistan, which are mostly comprised of Baloch, Pashtun, and Sindhi groups, 
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have been represented by the state as one of the most serious threats to the 
state, often involving claims of being supported from overseas, as Iftikhar H. 
Malik (1997) has observed.  
 
Yet, the dominance of the state apparatuses by two other dominant ethnic 
groups in Pakistan, practically since independence, is relevant here, 
particularly given its consequences in elevating ethno-nationalisms to the 
status of a “security threat”. Post-1947 it was Punjabis and Muhajirs who held 
the most important decision-making positions, both domestically and 
internationally. A significant explanation for this may be found in how, 
historically, these two groups established relations with the British colonisers. 
As Adeel Khan notes,  
 
the two dominant groups, Muhajirs and Punjabis, had been the most favourably 
placed communities under the colonial rule. The reason for that was the colonial 
administration’s dependence on the loyalty of the big landlords for the maintenance 
of its control system. The United Provinces (UP) of India, from where these Urdu-
speaking Muhajirs had migrated, was the traditional power base of the Muslim 
landed gentry and they continued with their privileges even after the colonial 
takeover. (2009, p171). 
 
The importance of integrating a postcolonial feminist approach thus starts to 
emerge. To this day, these are the ethnic groups that have taken control of the 
military-bureaucratic axis. These two groups, however, do not occupy a 
distinct role in their domination and control of the state by virtue of 
demographic factors alone. Their dominant position was made possible by 
the combination of ethnic belonging, with historical links to power, and class. 
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Thus, the history of how colonial rule happened in the Punjab and Northern 
parts of India is relevant here. It is important to observe how colonial 
structures of power continued to be exercised in the post-colonial state.  
 
During the British Raj, military power originated primarily from the Punjab 
(see, for instance, Talbot, 1991; Yong, 2005; Rashid, 2020). The existing 
scholarship on imperial/colonial relations of the British in the Punjab has 
clearly demonstrated how the administrative and military practices aimed to 
transform that region, which was represented with significant strategic weight 
towards the defence of the Raj. Ian Talbot (1991) notes the importance of 
Punjab loyalty to the British during the 1857 revolt, and how that was 
represented as “loyalism”. The Punjab was thus turned into a linchpin of 
colonial policy, where agrarian development, particularly the establishment 
of irrigation canals and respective colonies, and the source of military power 
combined to reinforce British colonial rule. 
 
One such part of the history of British colonial rule that is specifically relevant 
to this study relates to the constitution of the British Indian Army. The latter 
followed a racist recruitment policy of attracting so-called “martial races”, by 
which Punjabis134 (Muslims and Sikhs) were singled out for their masculinity, 
combativeness, bravery, and loyalty. The British believed that only such 
“martial races” were capable of soldiering. This preference for the “martial 
races” was also extended to civilian roles. For instance, Mrinalini Sinha notes 
                                               
134 Whilst Punjabis, Muslims and Sikhs comprised an important number of the British Indian 
Army, the latter also drew from other identified “martial races” including, for instance, 
Pashtuns, certain Hindu castes, Dogras, and Gurkhas (see, for instance, Rashid, 2020; Streets, 
2004; Sinha, 1995). 
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that “the ‘manly’ native civilian from the Punjab or the North-West Provinces 
could serve safely anywhere in India, the effeminate Bengali civilian could 
serve only in such provinces as Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, but was totally 
useless for service in the Punjab and the North-West Provinces” (1995, p123).  
 
Thus, in these two examples of how the British colonisers dealt with race, 
ethnicity, and class in order to continue and implement imperial rule, one can 
establish a parallel with what happened during in the newly created state of 
Pakistan. The new state adopted and reproduced a colonial-style 
administration (civilian and military), resembling colonial Punjab which 
became known as the “sword arm of the Raj” (Yong, 2005). In addition, the 
colonial-style rule that West Pakistan established in East Bengal/Pakistan 
resonates with how the British represented Bengalis – namely as effeminate, 
weaker, and of a more “enervated character” (see Streets, 2004; Sinha, 1995).  
 
Hence, the construction of government structures in the postcolonial state of 
Pakistan led to a neo-colonial tendency of privileging and gendering certain 
parts of the population, to the detriment of those perceived as less fit for 
soldiering or administration.135 This may be interpreted as reproducing and 
representing how colonial practices were implemented to achieve the 
“civilisation” and “domestication” of indigenous populations. Thus, perhaps 
to no surprise, seven decades later, the only ethnic group to have not voiced 
any collective grievances against the state continues to be the Punjabis. Thus, 
                                               
135 A caveat needs to be introduced. During the 1950s, the PM office was held by three 
individuals originating from Bengal. However, all of them belonged to the Bengali privileged 
upper classes. Yet, civilian and military bureaucracy maintained marginalisation of Bengalis. 
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as Talbot observes, the phrase “Punjabization of Pakistan”136 is a valid 
representation of the country, given the predominance of demographics and 
the military, whose recruiting strength continues to be confined to three main 
districts of Punjab: Attock, Rawalpindi, and Jelhum (Talbot, 2002; Rashid, 
2020).  
 
Punjabi majoritarianism is also related to gendering practices, and closely 
linked to the enhancement of militarism. Looking back to British colonial 
rule, as Jaspreet Bal suggests, “the British used the existing patriarch of 
Punjab and further shaped it … That which was useful to the military and 
political effort was honed and glorified. Thus other, non-militarized 
masculinities were considered effeminate” (2020, p3). In addition, Prem 
Chowdhry (2013), writing on militarised masculinities in colonial Punjab, 
notes that masculinity surfaced as a colonial ideology. In a Punjabi-dominated 
Pakistan, the interlinking between masculinity and colonial-inspired civilian 
and military governmental practices continues to be reproduced. An example 
of such reproduction can be seen in foreign policy processes, and their 
othering capacity. Moreover, as I will discuss below, by conducting foreign 
policy that reinforces post-colonial practices, states (in this case, Pakistan) 
contribute towards the continuation of colonial practices. 
 
In the previous chapters, I have analysed how the interlinking of security and 
identity happens within the context of foreign policy. Thus, foreign policy, as 
both a political process and a political practice, is also a process of otherness. 
                                               
136 Talbot (2002) attributes this phrase to Pakistani-origin scholar Yunas Samad.  
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The influential work of David Campbell (1992) is useful in understanding 
how foreign policy is connected with issues of ethnicity, gender, sex, and 
class, which inform a feminist post-colonial approach. Campbell suggests that 
foreign policy consists of “boundary-producing practices central to the 
production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates” (1992, 
p75). He calls attention to the importance of context, and to the need of 
“specifying the exact nature of the relationship between state-based foreign 
policy and political identity” (ibid). He also makes two other important 
distinctions – namely between “foreign policy” and “Foreign Policy” (ibid, 
p76). Whilst the former is associated with the processes that constitute 
identity and takes into account elements such as “ethnicity, race, class, gender 
or geography … which have operated in terms of the paradigm of sovereignty 
and constituted identity through time and across space” (ibid), the latter is a 
“conventional understanding within the discipline – is thus not implicated in 
the constitution of identity” (ibid). Campbell further observes that, despite the 
distinction, both cannot be separated, for “Foreign Policy serves to reproduce 
the constitution of identity made possible by ‘foreign policy’ and to contain 
challenges to the identity which results” (ibid, italics in the original). 
 
I use Campbell’s definitions of foreign policy here as they appear to be 
sufficiently encompassing to establish a bridge between foreign policy 
understood as a political concept of practice, and the need to integrate it into 
a postcolonial feminist analysis. In addition, Columba Achilles-Sarll notes 
that although Campbell’s work does not directly engage with feminist theory, 
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he acknowledges the importance of “gender norms” and “codes of gender” in 
the processes of “Othering” that are inherent to foreign policy (2018, p40). 
 
Hence, having established the importance of a post-colonial feminist 
approach to analyse Pakistan’s foreign policy, and having contextualised it in 
relation to Pakistan’s post-colonial predicament, in the following sections I 
will outline what a post-colonial feminist approach can draw out of our 
analysis of Pakistan’s main foreign relations. I will follow the order in which 
the case studies were presented in previous chapters. 
 
6.2  A postcolonial feminist critique of Pakistan’s relations with 
China 
 
In the chapter dedicated to Pakistan’s relations with China, I discussed the 
importance of two key geographic places at the centre of CPEC: the seaport 
of Gwadar in Balochistan, and the Northern region of Gilgit-Baltistan, which 
is also part of Kashmir. These two places represent how Pakistan’s relations 
with China, specifically in the context of CPEC, are enhancing the inculcation 
of militaristic values in governance, with the consequent rooting of militarism 
as a state ideology. Thus, CPEC is both a gendered and gendering project. 
 
However, the extension of CPEC’s impact, as I argue in this section, can be 
situated beyond the conformist Pakistani-based discourse of it being an 
“economic game-changer”. These state-centred discourses largely ignore the 
impact of the corridor on local populations, specifically those who perceive 
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CPEC as a threat to their livelihoods, such as Gwadar’s fishermen who have 
felt threatened since the construction of the port was announced in 2002 
(Khan, 2009). Whilst the Pakistani government continues to portray CPEC as 
a stimulus to develop the country’s most deprived province, recent concerns 
over the pace of the project’s development (Shahid, 2020) raise the level of 
scepticism around the whole viability of the project. Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that foreign policy analyses related to CPEC remain silent about how 
the project is also a representation of oppression. 
 
State-centred discourses, however, call for a postcolonial feminist analysis to 
identify how Sino-Pakistan relations are in fact enhancing narratives linked 
to “growth”, “domestication”, and “civilisation”, which are part of (not so) 
old colonial strategies of governing with the objective of controlling and 
dominating entire populations. CPEC’s state discourses are heavily pinned to 
“growth”. In a recent interview with the Chinese media, CPEC’s chairman, 
the retired General Asim Saleem Bajwa, reiterated that: 
 
We will increase our exports, and it will be a big boost to our economy … CPEC is 
a project which will eventually benefit the people of Pakistan. … I can assure that 
the people of Pakistan and the government have a very clear vision, that there is 
nothing which can stop or disrupt the progress of CPEC. CPEC is for the future of 
this country. Our economic future is linked with our iron brother China. Therefore, 
it will progress … nothing will be able to disrupt or slow down the progress of 
CPEC. (Bajwa, cited on Xinhua.net, 2021) 
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Whilst Pakistan urgently needs to have a sustained and sustainable plan for 
the future of her economy, pinning the country’s hopes solely on its “iron 
brother” raises some key questions from a postcolonial feminist perspective. 
The relationship with China is represented by Pakistani officials as one that 
is patriarchal and masculinist. Moreover, it rests upon the notion of continued 
“growth”, which, as the cited General mentioned, will not be disrupted. This 
is also connected to how “domestication” is taking place in Balochistan. Even 
prior to the launching of CPEC, the federal government built new military 
cantonments closer to Balochistan’s natural resources hotspots of Sui and 
Kohlu, thus drawing together militarisation, domestication, and old colonial 
practices of territorial control for the sake of resource extraction (Akthar, 
2007). With CPEC, the federal government has continued its process of 
control and domestication, to “start” to develop Balochistan, by promising 
better infrastructure and essential facilities to its inhabitants. However, 
Balochistan’s politicians have repeatedly voiced concerns regarding either 
the progress or the very existence of the federal government’s intended 
programme (Adnan Aamir, 2017).  
 
Yet, Pakistani scholars continue to defend the importance of military control 
in the province as a guarantor of “economic prosperity”, thus leading to peace 
(Khetran and Saeed, 2017). That is accompanied by renewed appeals to 
operate Gwadar as a military base (Akthar, 2020), with the sole purpose of 
pursuing state-centric, militarised, and neo-colonial politics in Balochistan, 
in order to shield the Sino-Pakistani partnership from threats, both real and 
imagined. However, the extension of neo-colonial practices associated with 
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CPEC are often absent from the dominant geopolitical discourses around the 
project. One such discourse is associated with connectivity, particularly that 
between the Indian Ocean and the landlocked western regions of China, 
namely the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. This specific aspect of CPEC’s 
connectivity goals constitutes a complex issue of human rights violations 
associated with neo-colonial politics. 
 
6.2.1  CPEC and human rights violations in Xinjiang 
 
In this sub-section, I will explain how CPEC potentially contributes to human 
rights violations and violence carried out by China against the Uighur 
population in Xinjiang. Post-colonial feminism analytical approaches are also 
interested in how geopolitics shapes hegemonic power relations and global 
violence (Agathangelou and Turcotte, 2010, p44). Xinjiang is a vast land-
locked region controlled by China, bordering Central Asia and Pakistan. The 
majority of Xinjiang’s population are ethnic Uighurs, most of whom are 
Muslim. In recent decades, China’s control of Xinjiang has not resulted in 
any sense of autonomy, but rather in political alienation. This has been 
exacerbated by cultural, religious, and ethnic differences in relation to the 
Chinese dominant Han ethnic group (Haider, 2005). Uighurs have tried to 
resist Beijing’s rule. To counter such resistance, the Chinese government 
created its own version of Uighurs’ connections with the region. The 
government separated  
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Uyghurs’ origins from Xinjiang, and explained their migration and assimilation 
with the Iranian Saka tribes and Indo-Europeans only after their arrival from 
Mongolia. And territorially, the Chinese government claimed that since ancient 
times, Xinjiang “has been an inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese 
nation”. (Ang, 2016, p400)   
 
Whilst various narratives on Uighur ethnic and territorial affiliations co-exist, 
the one sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party137 seeks to ensure that 
no territorial claims over Xinjiang may be linked to the Uighurs. This, 
together with a steady “Sinicisation” of the region, disguised as government 
policies to modernise and develop Xinjiang, and which a post-colonial 
feminist critique would designate as “domestication and civilisation”, appears 
to have increased separatist sentiments. 
 
Pakistan and Xinjiang are connected by a route, the Karakoram Highway, 
which has served to strengthen relations between the distant regions, 
including closer contacts between Pakistanis and Uighurs during the 1980s 
(Haider, 2005). Symbolically, the Karakoram Highway represents the strong 
Sino-Pakistan bond. With the launch of CPEC, the importance of this 
connection has been renewed, thus reinforcing the centrality of connectivity 
implied by the corridor, despite geographical issues associated with the road 
(see Garlick, 2018). This route, on which construction began in the 1960s by 
the Chinese and Pakistani armies, also had a role in weapons trading during 
the Afghan Jihad. The Chinese government was uneasy about the Soviet 
                                               
137 See China’s White Paper on the history and development of Xinjiang (2003). Available 
from: 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/10/05/content_281474992384669.htm 
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invasion of Afghanistan. The alleged Chinese involvement in the Afghan 
jihad, either by trading weapons or by providing support to mujahedeen 
training in camps located in Pakistan and Xinjiang (Cooley, 2002), appears 
to have had an impact on Uighur separatist movements. According to Haider, 
“many Uighurs who fought alongside the mujahideen returned to Xinjiang 
along the Karakoram Highway. … Subsequently they joined the nationalist 
movement there, often violently agitating for independence” (2005, p530). 
As such, the Karakoram Highway shares a history linked to Chinese statist 
approaches to her perceived internal and external security threats. 
 
However, China has been responding to Uighur insurgency/radical Islamic 
militancy with heavy militarisation of the region and draconian security 
measures (Odgaard and Nielsen, 2014), which include the banning of travel 
and religious activities, in what appears to be the replication of similar 
policies used in Tibet by the same Communist Party Leader, Chen Quangou 
(Zenz and Leibold, 2017). It is clear that the success of CPEC and BRI is 
highly dependent on how Pakistan and China will manage their perceived 
national insecurities. For instance, China has weaved a discourse that equates 
Uighur nationalism with militant Islam, which includes more recently links 
to ISIL (Shaw, 2014). Furthermore, China has been pursuing a policy of 
keeping Islam under strict state control, which includes the appointment of 
state-approved imams, to the exclusion of what the Chinese government 
denotes as “wild imams”,138 the engineering of Uighur lives and minds 
                                               
138 See, for instance, Manaya Koetse explaining how Chinese government identifies “wild 
imams”: https://www.whatsonweibo.com/chinas-imams-online-preaching-on-weibo/ 
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(Byler, 2017), which, together with other forms of propaganda, including 
visual ones,139 represent clear attempts to enforce strict state control over 
religion. 
 
However, it is not only the Uighurs who China is determined to re-design. 
Pakistani Muslims also must be made to believe that their Muslim 
counterparts in Xinjiang are not deprived of their Islamic identity and way of 
life. In this task, the Pakistani leadership, through the CPI, is playing its role. 
The CPI website features a two-part documentary called “Rising China”,140 
which engages the Xinjiang Muslims, one of the ten Muslim minorities in 
China, according to the film. The documentary features an interview with the 
Vice-President of Xinjiang Islamic, who says that “non-Muslim friends often 
ask whether Muslims face any problems in life. They are very much 
concerned about the situation of the Muslim community here”. He then 
responds: “I believe that the CPC ethnic and religious policies are unique”. 
Having mentioned that he has visited some foreign countries, all Muslim, 
including KSA, thus making him familiar with the Muslim policies of those 
countries, he then states that “therefore, I’m in a position to say that the CPC 
relevant policies which endow people with the right for religious freedom are 
very wise and correct”. He concludes, in a happy and confident manner: “The 
CPC ethnic and religious policies can’t be found anywhere else in the world”.  
 
                                               
139 See, for instance, BBC’s ‘The colourful propaganda of Xinjiang’: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30722268; see also Darren Byler’s 
comprehensive article on the theme: https://livingotherwise.com/2017/04/26/imagining-re-
engineered-muslims-northwest-china/  
140 The documentary can be accessed here: http://www.pakistan-china.com/mn-
documentary-on-rising-china.php 
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In another interview for the same documentary, the VP of the China Islamic 
Association says that the “first priority of Chinese Muslims in their minds is 
to regard themselves as Chinese citizens and make joint efforts with people 
from all ethnic groups of China to work on China’s development undertaking. 
We are upholding the importance of the roles played by religious personages 
in the development of the socialist society. The Chinese Muslims also have 
such basic expectations”.  
 
These two interviews are part of Sino-Pakistani concerted efforts to cover up 
existing dissent in Xinjiang. The Pakistani response to this issue has been a 
mixture of counter-narratives. While some sectors of the media try to expose 
the CCP’s ways of dealing with Muslims in Xinjiang, for instance when The 
Express Tribune (2015) reported on how religious freedom is being 
suppressed, in a piece that corroborates the above-mentioned reports by the 
BBC and Darren Byler, there are also efforts to counter discourses that voice 
how the CCP coercively controls religious freedom in Xinjiang.141 More 
recently, Pakistan’s Prime Minister has confirmed that he has knowledge of 
the issue about the Uighur crackdown by China, including the existence of 
“detention facilities”, which are believed to be “re-education” facilities (see 
for instance BBC, 2020; Financial Times, 2019). 
 
                                               
141 Amid reports that fasting during the holy month of Ramadan was restricted by Chinese 
authorities in Xinjiang, in 2016 the Pakistani Ministry of Religious Affairs sent a delegation 
to Xinjiang to probe how fasting was being observed. This was reportedly after the Chinese 
government had requested Pakistan to do so, after international reports on restrictions. As 
such, Pakistan acts not only as a prober, but also the main target of its own probe. See Dawn: 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1268006  
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Hence, Pakistan’s strong bond with China is also represented as one that 
places the state’s interests over and above human lives. The coordinated 
efforts by both governments, which involve think thanks, the media, and a 
growing number of CPEC centres,142 are therefore part of an expansionist 
project, whose modus operandi resembles past colonial practices of dealing 
with dissent, of population control by settlement, sterilisations, and 
eventually of organised genocide (Smith Finley, 2020). Therefore, Pakistan’s 
most significant foreign policy event is one that shares with her partner a neo-
colonial project, marked by violence and dehumanisation. 
 
Yet, official discourses on Pakistan’s foreign policy towards China continue 
to be reluctant about including any analysis that goes beyond perceived 
national interests. One of the key concerns seems to be that of controlling 
discourses that are critical of CPEC outcomes, including economic and 
financial ones, whilst turning a blind eye to the Uighur question and human 
trafficking, including the trafficking of women to be married to Chinese men 
(see Gannon, 2019; Afzal, 2020). It is thus clear that analyses of Sino-
Pakistan relations that are solely centred on state-based interests remain blind 
to the intersection of factors like gender, ethnicity, class, race, and sexuality. 
Such analyses, which privilege strategic interests, here understood as a 
combination of economic and military ones, are therefore problematic and 
restricted. They limit the scope of foreign policy research, contribute towards 
                                               
142 In a tweet from the Director of a CPEC centre at a University in Lahore, the author shares 
pictures with the following caption: “Elders on the streets of #Kashigar #Xinjiang beards & 
covered heads expose fake propaganda of restriction of religion in China (the flag emoji is 
used)”. A retweet says that the author took the pictures himself while traveling by road. It 
can be found here: https://twitter.com/HaroonkRasheed/status/926863275014451202 
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the silencing of dissent and critique, and, ultimately, serve the construction of 
a neo-colonial form of international politics, which enhances oppression 
across the globe. The government of Pakistan is therefore an active actor in 
such construction, not only as a partner to China, but also in terms of her other 
foreign relations, with India and the US, as I will examine in the following 
sections. 
 
6.3  A postcolonial feminist critique of Pakistan’s relations with 
India 
 
In the chapter dedicated to Pakistan-India relations, I examined how the 
Kashmir issue, the main tension between the two countries, has contributed 
towards the militarisation of Pakistan, and how that has also shaped the 
interlinking of identity and security. In the same chapter, I also outlined how 
Pakistan enhances her role as the “saviour” of Kashmir and Kashmiris, 
particularly since India’s occupation has taken an even more ruthless turn. 
However, despite Pakistan’s tireless and self-serving efforts to 
internationalise the plight of Kashmir, which, as discussed, included the 
initiation of territorial invasions that led to war, India continues to govern and 
occupy Kashmir by using stringent colonial practices that, according to 
Nitasha Kaul, are comparable with “British colonial practices of centre-
periphery relations” (2018, p127). 
 
Recently, Pakistan-based scholars have been trying to highlight India’s 
human rights violations in Kashmir. These works make reference to ethnic 
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cleansing and changes in demography (Shamim, 2019; Amar, 2019; Malik, 
2019). Yet, whilst echoing Pakistan’s official discourse on Kashmir, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, such scholars do not establish that India’s colonial practices 
in Kashmir, which also include the possibility of introducing 
“deradicalisation camps”, share a common ground with those currently 
underway in Xinjiang (see Kaul, 2020). Thus, what the Pakistani discourse 
on India’s inhumane and undemocratic governmental practices in Kashmir 
fails to recognise is that both states, China and India, resort to colonial 
practices of control and domination. Hence, these two nations, which Dibyesh 
Anand (2012) formulates and designates as “postcolonial informal Empires”, 
have  
 
at the core of their polity, center-periphery relations of power that minoritize 
borderland ethno-nationalist communities within the large nationalist project, that 
reluctantly accept cultural difference and autonomy but reject any compromise on 
military and political control and deny political agency to the borderlands 
minorities. They see themselves as continuations of historical, great civilizational 
empires, which sets them apart from some Western hegemonic powers, such as the 
United States. … PIE as a concept is different from multiethnic state because the 
relationship between the center and the periphery in the PIE is asymmetrical, one 
that has strong imperial impulses. (2012, p73). 
 
Anand further explains how China and India operate under a politics of self-
denial, which includes being perceived as a victim of Western imperialism, 
whilst representing themselves as being the antithesis of the former. China, 
he explains, does not accept accusations of being a colonial actor in Tibet or 
Xinjiang (ibid, p74). Concerning India, Anand observes that despite having a 
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foreign policy that favours close engagement with the West, the country 
continues to invest in a discourse that portrays her policies as being rooted in 
a combination of “plurality, traditional civilization, and modern democracy 
… even [if] the Indian state brutalizes populations in its peripheries and 
subverts democracy by allowing the military and paramilitary a free hand, it 
peddles the myth of a postcolonial democratic nation” (ibid, pp74-75). 
 
However, Pakistan’s discourses that prioritise making visible the brutalities 
of the Indian state in Kashmir, fail to recognise that there is another PIE, 
namely China, which also rules by imperial designs at her periphery, in many 
ways akin to India’s repression of freedom and rights in Kashmir. Thus, 
Pakistani foreign policy-related discourses that are destined to highlight 
India’s atrocities, to a considerable extent, contribute to enhancing existing 
bouts of amnesia. The latter are not only rooted in colonial practices, but are 
also shared by her most important international partner, her declared enemy, 
and are prevalent in Balochistan, and to a certain extent in Pakistan-controlled 
Kashmir. Moreover, those discourses may be considered as somewhat half-
hearted, insofar as they selectively privilege certain dissent and struggles 
against state violence over others. India’s colonial designs in Kashmir, 
together with her ambitions to become a dominant global and regional power, 
as Nitasha Kaul (2020) explains, share commonalities with the Chinese 
Communist Party’s plans in Xinjiang. Kaul further notes that existing 
resonances are robust enough to overshadow issues related to border disputes 
and strategic rivalry. 
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Yet, when Pakistan’s government officials make appeals to the international 
community143 to take notice of India’s ruthless policies in Kashmir, or try to 
highlight how the Hindutva-influenced government of Narendra Modi uses 
violence against other minority communities in India, Pakistan creates a 
difficult position for herself. For instance, the Human Rights Watch 2019 
report on Pakistan identifies serious issues concerning the rights of minorities, 
including those of the persecuted Ahmadiyya community (see Human Rights 
Watch, 2019). In addition, structural violence continues to impact the lives of 
women and children. The report also highlights the existence of serious 
discrimination around issues related to gender and sexuality. 
 
Nevertheless, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir, 
Shehryar Khan Afridi, in August 2020 struck a defensive tone, stating that 
“the world needed to learn from the way Pakistan had set a model of equal 
treatment to its minorities, as non-Muslim communities here enjoyed all 
rights” (2020, cited in Dawn). Pakistan’s efforts to adjust a discourse that has 
foreign policy-related goals, therefore, may be interpreted as only a partial 
engagement with the discourse of human rights and its intersection with 
issues related to sex, gender, ethnicity, and class. In view of Pakistan’s 
dubious record on human rights, and her insistence on turning a blind eye to 
the Uighurs’ persecutions in Xinjiang, this attempt to engage human rights 
with a foreign policy discourse is unlikely to produce any fruitful outcomes, 
particularly in respect of ending the brutality of the Indian regime in Kashmir. 
                                               
143 An example of such initiatives took place at a seminar at the Pakistan Institute of 
Parliamentary Affairs in August 2020. See: https://www.dawn.com/news/1573984. 
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Whilst the government of Pakistan is making every effort to incorporate 
human rights discourses into her foreign policy, it is clear that one of the main 
targets is an attempt to construct a representation of Pakistan as a state that is 
concerned with human rights, in opposition to a human rights violator in the 
form of Hindu India. This constitutes an example of foreign policy as a 
boundary-making practice, following Campbell (1992). It is also exemplary 
of the fact that Pakistan’s foreign policy thinking lacks the capacity to 
integrate different approaches (feminist and postcolonial) into its core state-
centric, realist orientation. Therefore, any attempt to use human rights 
violations or examples of colonial practices (which, interestingly, Pakistan’s 
official discourses are unable to voice as such) will remain only half-baked, 
lacking self-reflexivity, and ultimately remaining oriented towards fulfilling 
a state-centric interest, namely gaining territorial control over the entire 
Kashmir region.  
 
Here, then, we can see the importance of including a post-colonial feminist 
critique of foreign policy, which is particularly concerned with creating a 
more inclusive world by not overlooking the ways in which different 
struggles can indeed intersect, “whilst looking backwards to acknowledge 
colonial legacies when foreign policy is produced” (Achilleos-Sarll, 2018, 
p46). Thus, it is advantageous to build a more inclusive and transformative 
foreign policy discourse. In the case of this study, it is also helpful to explain 
how Pakistan’s relations with China and India have relevance beyond strategy 
and regional rivalry. These foreign relations are also vital in understanding 
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how post-colonial states perpetuate colonial practices of government, in order 
to ensure majoritarian power, translated differently across the respective 
geographies of India, China, and Pakistan. Another important advantage of a 
post-colonial feminist critique is that it can bring to the fore the significance 
of political accountability (Agathangelou and Ling, 2004). The examples 
examined here, particularly Pakistan’s concerns with human rights in IOK, 
and her role as collaborator in Xinjiang, constitute relevant foreign policy 
events that call for detailed scrutiny that exceeds parochial state-centred 
analyses of power relations.  
 
 
6.4  A postcolonial feminist critique of Pakistan-US relations 
 
Pakistan’s foreign relations with the US are simultaneously central and 
perennial. The case of the Afghan War (1979 and post-9/11), the exponential 
militarisation of Pakistan, including the country’s nuclearisation, are key 
themes in the history of this foreign relation. In previous chapters, I discussed 
how this relationship has enhanced a masculinist and militarist ethos in 
Pakistan. In this section, I will examine how issues related to representation 
are key to understanding this relationship, and will apply a post-colonial 
feminist approach. 
 
To be sure, the history of Pakistan-US relations is conspicuous in a series of 
political and military engagements and subsequent fallouts, most of which 
coincide with the US’s imperial power politics. Pakistan’s neighbourhood 
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and geography are also key factors that influence US engagements, as noted 
in the literature (Sattar, 2017; Rizvi, 1993; Schaffer and Schaffer, 2011). For 
her part, Pakistan’s initial need to have a friend-like ally in the international 
community in order to be able to placate her insecurities, mainly in relation 
to Hindu India, as a newly formed state is also the most common explanation 
offered for the existence of this relationship (Nawaz, 2019). 
 
Seven decades of Pakistan-US relations are marked by foreign policy 
discourses related to military strategy and war. Yet, in the dedicated literature, 
there is a notable absence of analysis of the historical constructions of power 
and how the latter is constituted by gender, sex, class, and race, as well as 
how these are also constitutive of this foreign relationship. Moreover, there 
is also no reference to how representations are important in foreign policy 
discourses. When Pakistan became a member of the international community 
after 1947, the US had already established herself as the most powerful state 
in the world, after their key intervention that led to the Allied victory in the 
Second World War. Pakistan’s early leadership, which was significantly 
influenced by Western liberalism and less so by socialist ideas, had no 
difficulty in joining the US as a partner and an ally. Pakistan’s enthusiasm to 
be a closer friend144 to the US is expressed in the significance of her first 
Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, during his two-month long visit to the 
United States and Canada during May-June 1950. Liaquat targeted different 
audiences to explain what Pakistan was about, her culture, and future aims in 
                                               
144 This enthusiasm, however, did not resonate with the US leadership. Pakistan’s strategic 
location was indeed an attractive factor for the US, yet, as Rais Khan notes, “only a small 
group of professionals both in the State Department and the Pentagon were conscious of 
Pakistan’s strategic location” (1985, p85). 
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the international order. He tried to spread the idea that, like the US, Pakistan 
was committed to the “free world”, progress, and peace. The Pakistani leader 
tried to demonstrate that Pakistan, “poor though we may be, backward though 
we may be, young and inexperienced we may be”, was “neither poor nor 
backward nor immature in our love for democracy and for freedom” (Liaquat 
Ali Khan, 1950, 2011, p85).  
 
This part of Liaquat’s discourse is significant inasmuch it represents how the 
early Pakistani leadership imagined their newly established state to become – 
namely closer to what the US/West represented: civilisation and growth, the 
narratives with which post-colonial feminist approaches take issue. In the 
specific case of Pakistan, the desire to be associated with a US/West 
representation of civilisation became a problematic if not paradoxical one, 
given the Islamic ethos of her polity. However, it also represented a way to 
construct a different process of otherness, which would include a distinct 
“other” in the form of India. 
 
However, Pakistan’s relations with the US would become more a 
representation of militarism and war, and less one of “peace”, “democracy”, 
or “freedom”. In chapters I and V, I have analysed various moments in the 
history of this relationship that show how war and militarism have been 
central to the partnership, and how those evolved to create an interlinking 
between security and identity that is a heavily masculinised one. Indeed, the 
Pakistani leadership explicitly sought to engage with the full range of US 
foreign policy interests: imperial politics of control and domination, war, and 
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the creation of “discourses of danger”, which, according to Campbell, are 
“associated with the discursive economy of foreign policy/Foreign Policy” 
(1992, p196). Indeed, discourses of danger have been critical in linking the 
foreign policies of both countries. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which 
was largely perceived by both Pakistan and the US as a “dangerous” 
expansion of Communism, and the GWOT/terrorism post-9/11 are perhaps 
the most significant examples of such discourse of danger. Yet, one of the 
most critical outcomes of Pakistan-US foreign policy engagements is 
reflected in the exponential expansion of the Pakistan armed forces since the 
1950s. This, as explained in previous chapters, has led to militarism becoming 
a state ideology. 
 
The US’s status as an imperial military world power qualifies it, according to 
a feminist understanding of politics, as a patriarchal system that structurally 
and ideologically “privileges and perpetuates masculinity” (Enloe, 2004, p4). 
Pakistan, too, shares the same patriarchal ethos,145 rooted in how associated 
former colonial practices of government, representation of different 
ethnicities, and social control have been perpetuated since the country’s 
independence. The continuation of this relationship, despite its highs and 
lows, however, did not disrupt the enhancement of a militarised, masculinist, 
and patriarchal state in Pakistan. Indeed, as I mentioned in chapter I, the 
relationship with the US contributed towards colonial-rooted representations 
of the post-colonial state in Pakistan. The US leadership went even further 
                                               
145 Here I am not associating patriarchy with Islam, or Muslim identity. Indeed, this is part 
of an important sociological debate. Whilst Islam may be represented as more patriarchal 
than other religions, there is no evidence that other religions rank higher or lower in this 
regard. For a full discussion of this matter, see Alexander and Welzel (2011). 
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and enhanced Pakistan’s desired alterity framework that would grant the latter 
a clear distinction from Hindu India.  
 
Andrew Rotter (2000), whom I cited in chapter I, delves into how the main 
South Asian religions – Hinduism and Islam – resonated in US foreign policy 
thinking in the 1940s and 1950s, as a result of the conservative Christian 
upbringing of some of their main foreign policy makers, namely John Foster 
Dulles. Rotter establishes that the Americans followed British colonial 
categorisations of Hindus and Muslims, which were deeply enmeshed in 
gendered and cultural/religious categories. For instance, he notes that 
“Dulles’s version of the United States as a Christian republic had a qualified 
South Asian counterpart in Pakistan” (Rotter, 2000, p599). That was 
complemented with the idea that Muslims, unlike Indian Hindus,146 were 
more masculine (and therefore more susceptible to the Christian ethos) as 
they were more “upstanding, fearless, vigorous, energetic, [and] good 
fighters” (ibid, p604). These aspects, which are absent from parochial 
discourses on US-Pakistan relations, and therefore, arguably, render such 
analyses incomplete, are very significant for seeking to understand how 
Pakistan became a militarised state and a “frontline state” for the conflicts in 
which the US involved itself in the region. As Rotter observes,  
                                               
146 It is also important to mention that, as the US adopted the British colonial representations 
of Muslims, it also did the same to the overall colonial and no less Orientalist representation 
of India. As Rotter observes: “the Western representation of India as female conferred 
effeminacy on most Indian men. Caught in the enervating web of Hinduism, which 
Westerners regarded as less a religion than a pathology, the majority of Indian men had been 
deprived of their manliness and their virility. … [I]t is possible to discern three features that 
Westerners historically assigned to most Indian men. The first of these was passivity and its 
more exaggerated forms; the second was emotionalism; the third was a lack of heterosexual 
energy. All of these features were associated with femininity, which Westerners regarded as 
effeminacy if exhibited by a man, and all imposed on India the Western constructions of the 
feminine and the masculine” (1994, p523). 
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the Cold War crusade had influence on the development of U.S. policy toward South 
Asia following partition in 1947 … [and] Muslim men, now mostly in Pakistan, 
were forthright, vigorous, combative in a healthy sort of way, and monotheistic. In 
short, they were much like American men. Those who governed Pakistan were 
straight shooters and good sports. (ibid, p607) 
 
All of which helped to shape Pakistan-US relations beyond the circumstantial 
joining of military alliances, the supply of arms, or the joint efforts to fight 
communism. Thus, when parochial literature on Pakistan-US relations traces 
the origins of this relationship, it overlooks the gendered and gendering nature 
of the processes that led both countries to engage in alliance commitments. 
 
Hence, this gendered relationship is also intersected by class and cultural 
elements. The Americans, as Rotter (2000) further notes, were convinced of 
an existing, comparable, political affinity between both countries’ founders, 
consisting of being “schooled in the democratic philosophy and … willing to 
labor for their independence” (ibid, p608). A key aspect of this imagined 
Pakistani identity by the Americans continued to be how they contrasted it 
with India, which was perceived to be less democratic and leaning more 
towards communism. In addition, Americans equated the polytheist Hindu 
religion and its influence on Indian society as a source of whimsical foreign 
relations and diplomacy, and therefore ill-equipped to resist communism. 
 
To be sure, as the history of Pakistan-US relations shows, the first decade of 
close ties did not endure. Gradually, subsequent US administrations became 
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more trustworthy of India and less so of Pakistan due to her internal politics, 
an incessant paranoia about India’s intentions, and an excessive drive to 
become further militarised. This led the Americans to conclude that 
Pakistanis, despite their hypermasculinity being compatible with US imperial 
designs, could also be represented as fanatical and deceitful. Indeed, the 
history of the past thirty years of this relationship has been narrated in such a 
way that blurs the affinity that both states constructed during that first decade. 
The supposed effeminacy of India that was perceived during her first decades 
after independence has not prevented the US from becoming a key partner to 
enhance US foreign interests in Asia. Indeed, effeminacy appears to no longer 
be an issue in the US imaginary, whilst Pakistan’s representations of 
treachery and fanaticism continue to persist. 
 
One of the main issues that has led to such US interpretations of Pakistan are 
closely linked to terrorism and the political landscape in Afghanistan pre- and 
post-9/11. Such interpretations, arguably, result from two main sets of 
discourses, which, once examined in tandem, result in a representation of 
Pakistan as an unreliable US partner. One such discourse is related to US aid 
to Pakistan (both civilian and military). For instance, recent research by Shuja 
Nawaz (2019) – published as a book The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter 
Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood147 – provides significant 
information and discussion regarding US aid to Pakistan. Whilst I have 
partially discussed it in the chapter dedicated to Pakistan-US relations, with 
                                               
147 The book launch in Pakistan was postponed by the military leadership in 2020, as the 
author explains. See: https://www.dawn.com/news/1527704  
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reference to the Kerry-Lugar Bill, which was vehemently opposed by the 
Pakistani military, there are other relevant aspects of the comprehensive 
assistance to Pakistan that are relevant to understanding how Pakistan is 
represented. Nawaz’s exhaustive discussion of civilian and military monetary 
assistance, including the amounts disbursed from the Coalition Support Funds 
(CFS)148 and details about the negotiations involved around the Kerry-Lugar 
Bill and other USAID initiatives, is indicative that regardless of whether the 
strategy was adequate to reform US-Pakistan relations, to produce 
developmental change or to support democratic institutions, the US was 
indeed committed to helping Pakistan to emerge from the detrimental effects 
of terrorism upon the country’s stability. Furthermore, Nawaz cites an 
interview with  Jasmeet Ahuja, a South Asia expert working for Congressman 
Howard Berman (D), in which she states:  
 
So we believe in democracy … the whole freedom agenda of President Bush was to 
spread democracy, and so part of that is helping, for instance, civilian institutions 
get legs. Ensuring that the military isn’t involved in selecting government, and we 
hear, and have heard, and continue to hear voices in Pakistan who agree with us, 
and so we want to, as we say in US parlance, amplify those voices and give them a 
voice. That was the intent of the bill. Maybe it’s impossible … We want to get our 
hands dirty and help on women’s empowerment or women’s rights because we think 
there’s profound change that can happen from empowering a mother, a sister, a 
                                               
148 The numbers are indeed staggering. As Nawaz adds: “Since 2001 (US FY2002), Pakistan 
had received some $8 billion of direct and overt security-related assistance. These flows had 
hit a peak in FY2011 before declining steadily, with FY2018 producing a total of only some 
$134 million programmed. In addition, Pakistan received CSF of some $14.6 billion from 
FY2002 to FY2017, though the FY2017 amount remained subject to certification 
requirements. It was the largest recipient of CSF money from the US worldwide. CSF monies 
were supposed to be reimbursement for Pakistani expenditures related to support for the US 
war against terrorism in Afghanistan” (2019, p790). 
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daughter, but it’s not sexy [as a dam] and it’s really hard. (Ahuja, cited in Nawaz, 
2019, p763, my italics) 
 
Ahuja’s words are significant to a postcolonial feminist analysis of this 
relationship, particularly as it comes from the realm of foreign relations’ high 
politics. The US’s strategy of empowering the civilian realm in Pakistan and 
trying to control the political aspirations of the military, which, in my opinion, 
is largely responsible for emerging representations of Pakistan as a 
treacherous and fanatical state, all the while trying to become the “saviour” 
of Pakistani women, shares many similarities with past colonial policies. 
From a postcolonial feminist critical perspective, there are some key concepts 
that encompass the policy that Ahuja commented on, which is linked to the 
Kerry-Lugar Bill. First, Ahuja’s discourse is integrated into a policy 
framework that is dominated by white/Western hegemony, which informs 
Western/liberal/white feminism, representing a “systemic consequence of a 
global historical development over the past 500 years – the expansion of 
European capitalist modernity throughout the world, resulting in the 
subsumption of all ‘other’ peoples to its economic, political and ideological 
model of operation” (Ien Ang, 2003, p197). This informs and mirrors what 
the US’s interventionist policy is trying to achieve, particularly if this is 
understood within a post-colonial feminist framework, which is interested in 
the intersections of colonial and neo-colonial political practices, alongside the 
categories related to sex, gender, class, nation, and ethnicity. Ahuja’s 
statement also raises questions around how Western/liberal/white-based 
feminist thinking represents women who live and work in the Global South 
as “victims”, and in this case seeing “Muslim women” as victims in need of 
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being rescued and empowered. In this specific case, it is also relevant that 
“empowering women” is being used as a foreign policy tool to enhance 
democracy, and potentially to restrain the expansion of the military. A caveat 
needs to be inserted here. Whilst I think that the military in Pakistan must be 
prevented from interfering in political processes, the orchestration of 
“women’s empowerment” from a Western perspective is problematic. On the 
one hand, it carries the potential to not fulfil specific forms of empowerment 
which Pakistani women actually desire, and which are not necessarily akin to 
those considered important to Western-tailored concepts of women’s 
empowerment. On the other hand, it further reproduces and reinforces the 
patriarchal neo-imperial system, thus enhancing the representations of the 
interests of white, heterosexual men, and therefore it works as a continuation 
of colonial modes of control and domination. 
 
However, the aforementioned statement is also useful in highlighting the 
importance of constructing a critique of foreign policy based on post-colonial 
feminism. Hence, as Alison Phipps notes, following Lugones (2008), 
“[women] exist at the intersections of capitalism, white supremacy, and 
heteropatriarchy, with little control over the means of production but raced 
and classed domination that requires feminine submission” (2021, p6). This 
is precisely what Ahuja’s statement, understood as a foreign policy tool, 
ignores: the very origins as to why women need to be empowered are 
precisely the ones that should be disrupted and not reinforced by sentiments 
such as wanting to “get our hands dirty and help on women’s empowerment 
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or women’s rights”, which is but a representation of those mentioned 
intersections. 
 
The two examples I have discussed in this section involving Pakistan-US 
relations demonstrate that conventional foreign policy analyses of Pakistan’s 
foreign policy overlook issues of gender, sex, class, and gender, and fail to 
pay heed to the colonial origins of political practices and representations that 
have constituted foreign policy since the country’s inception in 1947. The 
case of Pakistan-US relations is particularly important because it remains 
closely associated with how militarism as a state ideology has expanded in 
Pakistan, as I have discussed in previous chapters. In addition, it is also 
significant to identify that the much discussed engagements and 
disengagements, as well as the receding moments of trust between the two 
states, are also processes that are gendered and gendering, whilst remaining 
linked to a neo-imperialist logic that is intimately bound up with white, 
heterosexual patriarchy. Hence the need to emphasise the explanatory 
potential of a post-colonial feminist analysis. 
 
6.5  Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have set out the case for the relevance of including a 
postcolonial feminist perspective to the analysis of Pakistan’s foreign policy. 
Such an approach can also be extended to other studies of foreign policy. I 
have analysed the three main foreign relations cases in Pakistan’s foreign 
policy, and in all three it is possible to uncover how the political processes 
 306  
involved are connected to colonial modes of government, and how those are 
also deeply associated with gender, sex, class, and ethnicity. The cases of 
Pakistan’s relations with China and India are significant in view of how 
existing struggles in both countries (Uighurs in Xinjiang, and Kashmiris in 
IOK) share some similarities concerning neo-colonial political practices, 
including territorial occupation and ethnic cleansing. Yet, these are 
differently narrated in Pakistan’s foreign policy discourses, and, in the case 
of China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang, they are dismissed by the 
Pakistani leadership. This particular situation raises questions about the 
ethical import of Pakistan’s foreign policy decisions about raising the 
Kashmir issue internationally. A feminist postcolonial critique therefore is 
helpful in foregrounding the vital ethical issues that surround foreign policy, 
albeit within a framework that takes into account the different intersections 
of gender, class, sexuality, and ethnicity, whilst not being oblivious to the 
























This study has investigated how the interlinking of security and identity 
shapes foreign policy in Pakistan. The study has also examined how 
militarism as an ideology that is closely linked with security and a masculinist 
identity, has been enhanced by the state leadership of Pakistan. In order to 
answer to these questions, I have used feminist and postcolonial approaches 
to analyse foreign policy events and their effects. Such approaches have been 
used as alternatives to prevalent approaches that privilege realist and 
neorealist approaches to foreign policy and international politics. 
 
I have found that the interlinking between security and identity has been in a 
constant state of construction and renovation since the country’s creation in 
1947. In the due process, politics linked to Islam and to militarism have 
simultaneously become the upshots and the catalysts of such process. Foreign 
policy, defined as being political and boundary-making practices (Campbell, 
1992,1998), therefore sets the background against which for this interlinking 
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takes place. Hence, in this study I have demonstrated that Pakistan’s main 
three bilateral relations – namely with China, India, and the US constitute key 
foreign policy milieux where the interlinking of security and identity is 
produced and reproduced. 
 
In this research I have established that each bilateral relation can be 
encapsulated by a specific foreign policy issue that predominantly contributes 
towards the enhancement of militarism. Hence, militarism, which may also 
be understood as a representational phenomenon (Frowd and Sandor, 2018) 
that is supported by evidence of extensive military influence, and being in a 
constant status of war-preparedness, thrives in, and is enhanced by Pakistan’s 
foreign relations with these three countries. In the case of Sino – Pakistan 
relations CPEC is currently associated with the growth of militarism; the 
consequences of the latter are particularly felt in regions that are deemed 
central to CPEC’s development, namely Balochistan and the Kashmir region 
of Gilgit-Baltistan. In addition, the geopolitical significance of those regions 
can be traced back to the British colonial rule in India; then, as of now, 
colonial political practices linked to a militaristic ethos are identifiable, as I 
have shown.  
 
Furthermore, as I bring to the fore in the respective chapter, the fact that China 
has been identified as Pakistan’s most important arms supplier over the course 
of seven decades, not least in throwing her weight behind Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons programme, make this bilateral relationship the most sustained 
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historical source of Pakistan’s militarism originating from the latter’s foreign 
policy decisions. 
 
Pakistan’s bilateral relation with India, due to its complexity that is rooted on 
a common postcolonial existence that has been persistently marked by war 
and conflict, continues to be the linchpin of the country’s foreign policy. Any 
other foreign policy engagement, particularly with China and with the US, 
outgrows from this contentious relationship. As I have examined in this study, 
the ‘Kashmir Question’ that has generated the irreconcilable Pakistan – India 
relations, and which remains at the core of Pakistan’s foreign policy has also 
contributed towards militarism to grow as a state ideology. Of particular 
relevance in this regard is the permanent state of war-preparedness, a key trait 
that defines militarism, and that the Pakistani leadership has chosen to 
embrace. This includes her status as a nuclear state, which, as AC7 put to me 
in an interview in September , is seen as “necessary to prevent any military 
coercion and blackmail.” (AC7, interview September 2017). 
 
Concerning Pakistan – US relations, this study has established that the 
collaboration that both countries established during the wars (post 1979 
Soviet invasion, and post 9/11) in Afghanistan have been key sources of 
militarism in Pakistan. The political influence of the military on both 
occasions, which coincided with two separate periods of military rule in the 
country, was also important in nestling militarism as part of the state’s already 
existing on constructing its identity. The military in association with the 
intelligence services, the ISI which simultaneously incorporated the roles of 
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main foreign policy actor and US collaborator in Afghanistan, has been 
crucial to perpetuate the militarisation of foreign policy. This research has 
also demonstrated that Pakistan – US relations are also constituted by, and 
represented through discourses originating from a colonial and gendered 
political ethos that the Americans learned from the former rulers of South 
Asia. 
 
The inclusion of feminist and postcolonial approaches to examine these 
relationships has been critical to this study. By analysing foreign policy 
related events through these critical lenses, I have been able to establish how 
the prevalence of militarism operating as a “set of complex ideas and values” 
(see Enloe, 20016) which are predominantly associated with masculinist 
representations of power has been continuously influencing Pakistan’s 
security and identity. Moreover, a feminist postcolonial critique was shown 
to be useful in including a genealogy of the masculinist ethos and its 
representations, which, in the case of Pakistan, can be traced to the British 
colonial domination of South Asia. Those representations, as the study has 
found, continue to be produced and reproduced within Pakistan’s foreign 
relations with China, India, and the US. 
 
One of the main contributions that this research seeks  to make is to fill the 
existing gap in the study of Pakistan’s foreign policy, particularly insofar as 
it is lacking a feminist and postcolonial approaches. As I argued in chapter 
VI, one of the key features of a feminist postcolonial critique is its 
engagement with intersectionality, and with making visible certain ethical 
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issues that may potentially be erased from foreign policy decision-making 
and practices. The erasure of ethical concerns from foreign policy, in the case 
of Pakistan, is currently processed in a selective manner, explained by the 
dominance of discourses that privilege the enhancement of state-centric 
perceived interests – which includes state security, backed by the protracted 
obsession with India.  
 
In contrast, discourses pertaining to issues  linked to political and human 
rights, in terms of  Pakistan governing practices in Balochistan, and in Gilgit-
Baltistan are silenced and supressed by the state, as I have found during my 
research. The prominent position accorded to CPEC overshadows the right to 
dissent in those regions, and indeed across Pakistan. However, current 
Pakistan leadership has adopted a foreign policy strategy of including human 
rights oriented discourses in order to expose India’s violent control in 
Kashmir. A postcolonial feminist critique therefore helps us question such 
“rights friendly” foreign policy when we note Pakistan’s official discourses 
on the crescent evidence of China’s oppressive practices in the Xinjiang 
region. 
 
As this research has shown, existing studies of Pakistan’s foreign policy 
through its seven decades of existence have paid little to no attention to non-
state-centric factors. Whilst the interlinking between security and identity has 
always existed, studies of foreign policy have tended to overlook its formative 
importance and influence on the permanent construction of state identity. 
Pakistan is currently a military state; studies have identified her political 
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regime as hybrid in form (Shah, 2019; Adeney, 2017), in view of the sizeable 
interference of the armed forces in different domains of democratic 
governance.  
 
This research  aims to constitute an additional contribution to the study of the 
postcolonial state of Pakistan, the study of her foreign policy, and the study 
of origins and development of militarism and its connection with a state 
identity that, is profoundly masculinist, gendering, and patriarchal. It is also 
hoped that this research will encourage others to take up a postcolonial 
feminist foreign policy toolkit, which may be applicable to foreign policy 
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